


Partition of India in Print Media and Cinema
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Lecture - 34
Home and Nostalgia – II

Good morning and welcome back to the lecture series on Partition of India in Print Media and Cinema. We are talking about Home and Nostalgia. When we talk about home and nostalgia, we need to understand the concept of borderline; how the borderlines defining the nation politic are fraught with a sense of localized struggle.


They have fluid meanings, overlapping meanings and we understand that borders are thereby inscribed through some violent acts, or borders are rather imposed on the common people.

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Partition as Fractured Identity

- The production of national identity is a contested process. Struggle is involved in producing citizens out of unmanageable accounts by common people, much of what passes for history in modern times.
- In India, the process has been accompanied by an enormous degree of violence, both physical and epistemic. Universality of cartographic metaphors, the production of the inside-outside rhetoric along the borders of the country, reveal the epistemic and physical violence that accompanies the enterprise of nation-building. Encounters between the state and the people along frontiers is suggestive of the disputed nature of sovereign identity.
- Cartographic anxiety as a facet of a larger postcolonial anxiety: a society suspended forever in the space between the "former colony" and "not-yet-nation." (Krishna, *Cartographic Anxiety: Mapping the Body Politic in India*, 508).

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So, the production of national identity is itself a process entailing a lot of struggle and contestations.

So, struggle is involved in producing the citizen subject out of an unmanageable account by common people, and these unmanageable accounts, we see how much of these accounts can be included as part of the modern history. How much of the accounts, you

know, coming from the common people can be included in history, in the modern times is something that needs to be... something that needs to be examined.

So, in the discourse that shapes that citizen, what is being represented, being visibilized and discussed, and what is being left out is also something that needs to be studied. So, in India this process of etching out borders, of leaving out some and including others that are, you know, legitimized or that are [associated with legitimate subjecthood].

This entire process is accompanied by an enormous degree of violence, a violence happening both at the physical and epistemic level. And this is not only in the case of India, this is the process of state formation; this is the process of building the nation.

So, universality of cartographic metaphors, the production of this inside-outside rhetoric or the insider-outsider rhetoric that enables the border, that justifies the functioning of the border of a given country reveals some sort of epistemic and physical violence which accompanies the enterprise called the nation building.

So, [through] the encounter...the nation actually churns out of this encounter happening between the state and its people, more so the people inhabiting the frontiers, and these encounters are suggestive of the disputed nature of a country's sovereign identity. So, cartographic anxiety as a facet of a larger postcolonial anxiety, [even] after the colonization is no more, after the British people quit what becomes the [postcolonial] nation.

How does it evolve, how does it mutate, how does it respond to the immediate crisis and the subsequent crisis. Critics call this situation as suspended between a space of or a state of being a former colony and trying to become the nation, but not yet a nation.

So, a kind of in-betweenness, a kind of liminal state which further aggravates, further escalates the tension and aggravates the confusion. So, we were already talking about how after partition, until a certain period the leaders themselves were not aware of what/how much of geopolitical land India encompassed and how much of land was encompassed by Pakistan.

So, there were a lot of overlapping areas where violence was consciously being enacted in order to dispel the minority population from that given land. (Refer Slide Time: 06:10)

- “As the physical map of India gains ubiquity as an iconic representation of the body politic, it becomes the terrain for competing efforts to define, and possess, the self” (Krishna 510).
- “The operation of the inside/outside antinomy serves not so much to prevent “foreign infiltration” as it does to discipline and produce the “domestic(ated) self” (513).
- People’s lives along the borders of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are abstracted by the discourses of citizenship, sovereignty, and terror. Fluid definitions of space and place prevail in the midst of efforts to hegemonize territory.
- Gyanendra Pandey – preoccupation with ‘statist’ history glosses over the experiences of ordinary people in the partition episode, condemning them to lifeless statistics.
- Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya - the topography of places transformed due to the partition. Localities and places become meaningful as “socially constructed entities invested with a range of meanings by the people who inhabited them” (2000, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia*, 16).

So, we see Krishna observing that as a physical map of India gains ubiquity or universality as an iconic representation of the body politic, it becomes the terrain for competing efforts to define and possess the self.

So, when the map [we were talking about the cartography], when the map defines or tends to define/ claims to define all people, the multifarious meanings have the compulsion to converge and contribute to and fatten a kind of metanarrative, a grand narrative about the self, the self which constitutes this nationhood and the process of nation building.

This actually happens, the process of defining happens at the cost of some people, some ethnicity, some languages being eclipsed. This is a forever phenomenon in all nations. When we talk of nation, we constantly we need to probe about the question of human rights, the question of a minority protection, question of women's protection, you know, question of protecting the women and the less able-bodied subjects.

The operation of this inside-outside antimony serves not so much to prevent foreign infiltration...when we try to define who is insider as opposed to the outsider, it is also a process of domesticating the self, the process of disciplining and producing the self vis-a-vis the other. The self is defined essentially in terms of not being the other, and that is the definition that sustains a nation more than anything else.

People's lives... when we look at these lives along the borders of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, these lives are abstracted by the discourses of citizenship, sovereignty and everyday life processes, which [are] deeply scarred and informed by terror.

So, fluid definitions of space and place prevail amid the nation trying to hegemonize its territory. Gyanendra Pandey observes that preoccupation with statist history is a process of overlooking the experiences of ordinary people in the partition and post-partition...


you know, in the partition episode and beyond the partition, and what we do in the process is something that we have already see in so many artworks on partition, commenting on partition. It is that the normal lives are reduced to lifeless numbers. How many people had died, how much worth property have you lost.

So, when we try to smoothen and flatten struggle and loss in terms of numbers, we are trying to manage the unmanageable, we are trying to work on the edges...the rough edges that are frightening to deal with basically. We do not deal with human pain, because history perhaps does not have the language or the objectivity of history cannot contain human pain; it can only contain lifeless statistics.

So, Tan and Kudaisya note that the topography of places transformed due to the partition. I mean it can be read such that the localities and places become meaningful as socially constructed entities that are invested with a range of meanings.

Local spaces or/ and places have different meanings. How they are centrally looked at and understood, and how the local people understand these places; how much (once again going back to my earlier question), how much can the map cover from its top view, from an all-encompassing and all-pervading, all-engulfing point of view, how much can be covered?

Do we cover the local narratives? Can we cover the mini stories? So, these stories actually emerge from the population that inhabit the lands. So many meanings actually cross path...so a land is actually at the crossroads of different meanings. (Refer Slide Time: 12:00)



- People's association with their places, which post-partition existed only in the realm of memory and came to be embedded in the consciousness, powerfully shaped their subsequent life.
- The cross migration of the communities – mainly Hindus and Muslims had far reaching repercussions and maladjustments in the social stratification, which impacted the industrial economy.
- Short distance between Lahore and Amritsar turned into an interminable journey as the uprooted population traversed an unknown path filled with apprehensions about leaving a chapter of their lives behind, towards an unseen future where they would be turned from prosperous gentlemen into struggling "refugees", a homeless humanity seeking rehabilitation (Maini, 'Partitioned Localities, Fractured Identities: A Historical Reconstruction,' *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 2002*, 796).

Now, people's association with their places, which post-partition existed only in the realm of memory powerfully shaped their conscious, their subsequent lives. How people

relate to their land, what memories they carry of their land tend to shape an individual's identity and self-perception even.

So, the cross migration of the communities, especially we are talking about Hindus and Muslims here, had far-reaching repercussions, and made adjustments which impacted the industrial economy. So, the partition and subsequent population exchange did have effects, its negative effects on the industrial economy.

The entire fabric of a given society changed, and I mean, people were not prepared for it. So, people also (when we talk about journeys), talking about home, nostalgia we talk about short journeys (that are geographically considered as short) became everlasting psychic journeys.

I mean Lahore and Amritsar geographically speaking are abutting, they are not very far away; yet they became interminable journeys, as people were traversing... the uprooted people were traversing an unknown path in terms of what they were undergoing inside of them. It was a path filled with apprehensions [regarding] where they would land up, it was the fear of the unknown, of the host society.

And so, they were actually making a move towards an unseen future where they would be, I mean where they would be turned from respected revered gentlemen to refugees; they would have to carry the stigma of being refugees and for the poorer sections, they would be actually reduced to paupers. So, a homeless humanity seeking rehabilitation from being elite people to becoming a nobody in a new nation.


This journey cannot be gauged only through its geographical distance from one point to the other. It is also a tireless and in fact, an incessant psychic journey that takes away everything from the uprooted. So, Amartya Sen notes that the varying interpretations of Indians, Indian identity share an inclusionary reading of Indian identity which tolerates, protects and indeed celebrates diversity within a pluralist India.

When people were trying to interpret what the free India is going to look like, or what it is going to be like, there were these interpretations shared -- a general refusal to privilege any kind of narrowly circumscribed perspective based on religious approach. So, the idea of the nation was challenged or undermined from the very inception as the cohesiveness of the nation would be jeopardized by the nationalist discourses that shaped it.

So, the official Indian historiography worked at erasing the violence of partition. And this is something we see Gyanendra Pandey repeating in so many of his works. This has been a basic premise of his arguments that history happens through smoothing the jagged edges. So, the event of partition had suddenly [changed connotation]; partition would be thought of as something anomalous.

The Indian people from various communities [are] not capable of doing [such heinous acts] although it was done and it was before people's eyes, the statistics were there...post-partition, India was in a state of amnesia, partial amnesia and in a state of denial -- not ready and not willing to confess and realize how much of atrocity had taken place.

So, when we talk of building the nation, it is also [about] showing the good sides of the nation, celebrating the good sides and not discussing/ sweeping under the carpet every uncomfortable topic that tends to take away the glory. (Refer Slide Time: 17:49)



- Statistics made in the mid-1930s reveal that 97% of the Congress members were Hindus, and during that time Gandhi himself invoked Hindu imagery in his public speeches to gather new followers (P. Anderson 2012, *The Indian Ideology*, 94).
- By using this religious iconography, the seemingly secular leaders were walking in the footsteps of the late nineteenth-century Bengali nationalists who had developed a political and cultural ethos based on Hindu myths and on Bankim Chatterjee's poem, "Vande Mataram," which inspired the anthem of the Congress Party (P. Anderson 99).
- Indian government tried to marginalize the tragedy of Partition by focusing on consolidating its secular ideal.

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So, statistics made in the mid-1930s reveal that 97 percent of the Congress members were Hindus and during that time, Gandhi himself was invoking Hindu imagery in his public speeches in order to gather new followers.

So, Congress also mutates -- there is a journey that Congress undergoes and through this journey, a lot of its members do not see themselves included; do not see their own reflection in the Congress ideologies as Congress matures and grows up, although it upholds its secular ideologies.

We see Gandhi's prayer song, for example; Gandhi often uses the famous song Raghupati Raghava Raja Ram. So, he is talking about Rama the king and the ideal polity, that is when the mistrust might start building within Congress and people do not see themselves enough represented within this discourse, within this language.

So, when religious iconography inspires the Congress ideals, the seemingly secular leaders were walking the same footsteps as the Bengali nationalists who developed their political and cultural ethos based on Bankim Chatterjee's poem Vande Mataram, which inspired the anthem of the Congress party too. So, Vande Mataram as we have discussed in one of our earliest lectures is celebrating the motherland, calling it/celebrating India as the motherland, envisioning India as the mother figure.

And in the end, there are incantations that invoke Goddess Durga, the Warrior Goddess, and that is the point where nationalism and religious fervor, Hindu religious fervor merge and it becomes a little exclusive, where people where a lot of members from other communities start falling out from such imagination because they do not see themselves included in this discourse.

So, that is how.. and that actually leads to the question of having another nation defined through another religion's signifiers. The question of having a land, a nation made by the Muslims and shaped through Islamic tenets, Islamic principles and the Islamic value system and juridical systems.

So, there was a kind of misunderstanding maybe for a while that the free India would become a land of Hindus, a land that primarily harbored the Hindus and saw the Hindus as the first citizens, more than others. So, the Indian government tried to marginalize this tragedy, this rift among people through focusing on the secular ideals and not so much

on what went amiss, where was the lapse and where secularism was falling short perhaps. (Refer Slide Time: 22:07)

- By denying this legacy of communitarian violence as a way of smoothening out cultural and religious differences, the government-fueled “collective amnesia” prevented the nation from confronting its collective trauma and working through it (Pandey, “In Defense of the Fragment 33).
- Biased and displaced forms of Partition violence permeated cultural productions and resurfaced on the socio-political stage.
- Time and again the distinction between 'secular nationalism' (advocated by Congress) and 'religious nationalism' (represented by the Muslim League) was blurred, especially in the late 1930s and 1940s when communal forces joined the ranks of 'secular' Congress at the provincial and local levels.

So, by denying this legacy of communitarian violence as a way of smoothing out cultural and religious differences and thereby showing that everything had always been right all the while, the government was fueling some kind of collective amnesia. It was encouraging amnesia and prevented the nation from confronting its collective trauma and thereby confronting -- not only confronting, but also confessing and working through the trauma actually.

This was never done in a bid to celebrate the glories. So, biased and displaced forms of partition violence permeated cultural productions. Whenever partition came back in the official discourse, it would often come back with a lopsided picture, where one community's imagination would privilege at the expense of silencing the other, and that is how partition resurfaced on the socio-political stage.

So, the distinction between secular nationalism and religious nationalism -- secular nationalism referring to the imagination or the ideals originally proposed by Congress, and religious nationalism as has always been represented by the Muslim League. We see that this distinction after a point gets blurred, especially in the late 1930s and 1940s when several communal forces join the ranks of secular Congress party at the provincial and local levels.

And so we see...just going back to Garhmukteshwar riot and how people were committing...Hindus were committing crimes against the Muslims and they were wearing the Gandhi cap and they said that this was not against the principles of the Gandhians. These acts are not against what Gandhi teaches.

So, they were also in a way vilifying Gandhi, although not only Gandhi, but the entire Congress (when) at its inception had a completely different vision. So, we see that a section of Muslims that have generationally been Congressmen fall out, they feel betrayed and that is when we see Muslim League and the concept of Muslim nation as a possibility comes to the horizon.

It becomes a reality from which there is no looking back, because those Muslims that were part of Congress also start supporting.. they become members of the Muslim League in order to find some sense of belonging...get hold of some sense of identity for themselves. (Refer Slide Time: 25:56)

- Ella Moore – “Personal relationships and kinship loyalties were not destroyed by partition but underwent forced readjustments as refugees adapted to the new parameters of their lives. Common linguistics and culture aided assimilation; however difficulties posed by the refugee crises led to a re-evaluation of identity classifications and created a struggle to survive, rather than to belong.”
- Ravinder Kaur – tensions between the ‘differing’ experiences did not create a unity in their misfortune. “Identical historical and macro-social processes, such as the Partition of India, can bring about different results locally.” Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff investigates extensively on how Bengali refugees and Muslim settlers in Jharkhand areas are not directly affected by Partition (Roy and Nandi Bhatia, *Partitioned Lives* 2008).
- Some elements of the society are more inclined to publicise their experiences, such as the affluent *bhadralok* class, of which many individual have penned memories on their experiences following independence.

Ella Moore notes that personal relationships and kinship loyalties were not destroyed by partition, but they underwent forced readjustments, as refugees had to adopt the new parameters of their lives. So, all the languages and cultures mostly would be similar if not the same when compared with the local population, the host society's populace.

However, the refugee crisis would live on and it would live on through the identity classifications and the reality of the refugees struggling on an everyday basis, struggling to survive rather than to belong. So, the question of belonging to the nation-state, of becoming full-fledged citizen subjects came/emerged much later. Initially, it was only the question of survival till a certain time.

Ravinder Kaur notes this tension between differing experiences, which did not create a unity in their misfortune. For example, I mean it is very difficult, like we have said, to understand a refugee crisis outside the specific cases, the localized realities. So, unless we look at the historical and the macro-social processes that a people, a given refugee population deal with/ interface with, we cannot understand what they have gone through.

So, Sinha Kerkhoff in this regard studies the situation of the Bengali refugees and Muslim settlers in Jharkhand areas, for example, who were not even directly affected by partitions. So, experiences are diverse and they are never uniform. And some experiences get precedence over the other owing to who is writing, who is the mouthpiece. In the case of Bengal, the affluent bhadralok refugees or it would be better to call them as immigrants...

the affluent bhadralok class immigrants have mostly penned the memories on their experiences following an independence. And that is the lens that has, until the very recent time, that has been the persistent lens that explained the crisis of the Bengali refugees. Although that has been problematized, questioned and challenged by now.


And so the canon of Bengal partition literature is being visited in order to advantage other kinds of viewpoints. (Refer Slide Time: 29:13)

- As high-class educated citizens the Hindu *bhadraloks* were able to record their own experiences, a privilege not afforded to the mass illiterate population of whom little paper records are held till a long time.
- The Central government restricted its responsibilities by limiting official definition of partition to 'occurrences' between June 1947 – 1948.
- Continuous migration, as Meghna Guha Thakurta (2002) states, has not only had a curious effect on the social make-up of the region, but the mixture of motives that compelled migrations in the east was conveniently used by the state to accord discriminatory treatment to displaced persons .

So, Hindu bhadraloks and the Hindu elites were able to record their own experiences, and this was not a privilege till some time for the the mass of illiterate population, for whom it was not possible to document what they witnessed/ what they underwent.

Their versions are coming after generations, which is why partition is still a burning issue, it is far from over, far from a closed chapter. A lot of people that have now become literate can start reminiscing and they are reminiscing, they are going back to their childhood experiences, they are many of them from Dalit sections and they are writing about their refugeness.

So, as Meghna Guha Thakurta notes, the continuous migration in the case of Bengal has not only had a very peculiar makeup, a very peculiar effect on the social makeup of the region, but the motifs of the compelled migrations in the east would conveniently be used by this state to discriminate and differentially treat the displaced persons. Not all displaced persons were given similar privileges. (Refer Slide Time: 30:52)



- Pia Oberoi argues that the vast numbers of people who were uprooted from their homes did not, as is expected of persons in refugee situations, lose their citizenship of a state . Rather, they expected that their co-religionists in India and Pakistan would grant them both a nationality and succour.
- Partition refugees were technically not outside the country of their nationality until the Radcliffe Award was announced, when they found themselves without a nationality and outside the country of their residence.
- The refugee also complicated the official notion of displacement, a trope that recurs throughout Partition literature and compels an inquiry into the meaning of place, home and belonging.

So, we see that partition refugees were technically not outside the country of their nationality, until the Radcliffe Award was announced; they were still Indians regardless of where they were because everything was India before the Radcliffe Lines or the Radcliffe Award. And suddenly, they found themselves without a nationality and outside the country of their residence, [as outsiders].

So, there were suddenly this crisis of a bifurcation between what they used to know as their homeland, their motherland, their home, and what was to become their nation. So,

the refugee also complicated this official notion of displacement, a trope that recurs throughout the partition literature and compels an inquiry into what and how we can define place, home and belonging. These are categories/let us say notions or these are the questions of space that are fraught with a lot of complexity and difficulty. (Refer Slide Time: 32:23)

- The alternative narrative of partition is difficult to analyse due to the vast scale of voiceless citizens caught up in India's partition. A significant majority of the population were illiterate and therefore unable to write any memoirs. Further, marginalised groups such as women had traditional roles which were dictated by a paternal authority within families, limiting their expressions of freedom.
- Bidyut Chakraborty : It is evident that the high politics of partition constituted the background of the majority of the stories and focussed on upper and middle classes. Within newer contexts family units were renegotiated and open to change, severed customs and traditions of residing together.
- *Reformulation of Loyalties through Partition*, Ella Moore (p 3) : Previously identities were always in flux and layered. Now, putting aside cultural, linguistic, geographical and economic only religious identity marker is privileged.

So, in Bengali for example, people used two separate words, a lot of refugees have the tendency -- even if they have their permanent house which they have bought and which is rightfully theirs in India, they tend to call it as their "basha". So, the "basha" or where they are living, it's almost... the word -"basha" reminds us of the bird's nest and there is something temporary about it, something fragile about it versus "bari".

When they talk about "bari", it is an invisible thing that would... it is something that they might have never seen, it was their grandfather's property or their father's property, but that is still referred to/ alluded as the permanent home, the home across the border.

So, that is the permanent home, where they would never live, which they can never occupy and claim versus the "basha" or the nest that they have. So, the alternate narrative of partition is difficult to analyze due to the vast scale of voiceless citizens and a significant majority of these were illiterate, they were unable to document their own memoirs. And so, marginalized groups such as women had traditional roles too.

So, although some of them had little education and could write, they were dictated by the patriarchal authority, by the male-centric rules of the society, where they had to serve or they had to fit into traditional roles.


And this limited their expressions of freedom; it would be unthinkable for many refugee women, many refugee women to just sit down and pen down their thoughts; write a book about their experience, write an autobiography which might be seen as neglecting one's domestic duties/ domestic chores.

Bidyut Chakraborty states that it is evident that the high politics of partition constituted the background of the majority of the stories that we have on partition. And the focus on the upper and the middle-classes within newer contexts, family units were renegotiated.

And so, the customs were also changing. This is also something we have discussed while reading Rachel Weber, who notes how the space [changes for the many of the erstwhile well-off refugees, who earlier lived in] sprawling mansions and are made to live in colony houses, where there are no separate rooms, there are no separate zones or domains for men and women, there is no kachari and there is no andarmahal.

So, that the general relations accordingly change, a lot of customs are severed and the traditions are re-molded accordingly. So, identities are constantly in flux and layered; apart from one's linguistic, geographical and economic background, the refugees now have to carry a new dimension of their identity, which is their identity marker as the uprooted.

And then beyond language, geographical and economic facets of one's being, [and] the religious identity marker has always been privileged by the partition discourse. (Refer Slide Time: 36:56)



- Everyday effects of partition cannot be achieved through official letters, statistics and documents – limitations of being subjective, emotional and prejudiced.
- Besides economy and politics, human dimension adds anthropological, sociological and psychological angles. Personal narratives imbued with gender and class connotations, social classifications dictate the level of exposure to the effects of partition.
- Moore – “Entitlement to government aid was ascertained by the first scientific survey in May 1948 which questioned refugee families on issues such as age, sex and marital conditions of family members, caste group and access to economical resources” (Moore 12).
- 15 October 1952 – Introduction of passports formalized citizenship entitlement and legally solidified refugee identities.
- The psychological state of refugees was significantly impacted by the deplorable living and healthcare provisions.
- Refugees were forced to regress into a “Hobbesian state of nature” wherein life became “nasty, brutish and short”(Moore 13).

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Everyday effects of partition cannot be achieved enough through official letters, statistics and documents; they are limited.

So, we see besides economy and politics, human dimension adds anthropological, sociological and psychological angles to the narrative. Personal narratives are imbued with gender and class connotations too, social classifications; this dictate the level of exposure to the effects of partitions.

So, we understand the partition is not only a story of two religions, there is more to it. And this is only possible when we hear voices from below and not only from above -- the psychological state of refugees was significantly impacted by the their deplorable living and health care provisions.

They were forced to regress into what Ella Moore calls as the "Hobbesian state of nature", wherein life became "nasty, brutish and short" for a long time. I mean for some it was a short period; for others it was longer. Refugees were living in sub-human existences. Mostly, the population that had moved from rural areas to the hub of the urban metropolis, many would confess later on that they would be allured by the glamour of city life.


They had not seen people wearing shoes, they had not seen a gramophone. So, Dalit refugees are often stereotyped as increasing the incidents of theft, robbery, crime in a city after they arrive. So, this is the kind of pejorative stereotype that the Dalit refugee especially has to constantly deal with, someone that is not able to rehabilitate himself successfully.

At the same time, what is very remarkable is that, within the same family from a similar background, some members go on to become very successful, others cannot achieve as much. And so we see these gaps emerging within the families too, where some family members that have not been able to make it big, not even been able to find suitable jobs in the city after immigration...

they are not mentioned in the family narrative, their names are kind of covered up because they become a source of shame and embarrassment for the family. So, the narrative of the refugee rebounding, the narrative of the refugee's resilience and getting

you know... refurbishing what has been taken away by partition can only be fed by a handful of successful family members.

So, within the family we see hierarchies, very interesting hierarchies emerging and the family narrative is very selective in its representation; who gets to permeate and become a protagonist, a character in that narrative is also something that needs to be studied further. (Refer Slide Time: 41:03)



- According to Udit Sen , there are three distinct phases of rehabilitation :
 - i) 1947-50 – government denied all responsibility for refugees
 - ii) 1950-52 – responsibility shifted from center to state
 - iii) 1952 – government began to shut down all refugee camps
- The formation of group consciousness among the refugees became politicised and soon came under the influence of left-wing groups who were to have a profound effect on government policies.

So, the formation of group consciousness among the refugees became politicized as soon as they came under the influence of Left wing groups, who were to have a profound effect on government policies. This is something we see in the case of Bengal partition, I mean how the Left wing at that time... they were opposition, they were an opposition party.

They had started influencing the refugees, especially as there was an increasing anti-Congress sentiment, a sense of betrayal by the Congress party. The Left wing groups started having profound effect, and they actually formed their government in West Bengal in 1977 through the support of the Bengali refugees.

Many of these refugees, like we can see, would hail not only from the upper- and middle-classes, but also from the Dalit sections. With this, I would like to come to stop today's lecture. With this, I would like to stop today's lecture and we will meet again for the next lecture.

Thank you.