Globalization: Theoretical Perspectives

Professor R Santosh

Department of Humanities and Social Sciences

Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

Lecture - 42

Anti-Globalization: The Empire Thesis Part – II

(Refer Slide Time: 00:14)

Anti-Globalization: The
Empire Thesis

So, welcome back to the next session. This is a continuation of the previous session in which we discuss this Empire thesis by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. So, in the last class, we were talking about how these two scholars, who provide a powerful political critique of globalization and also a roadmap for political action, how did they characterise globalization as the Empire and this empire, they understand it as a new form of sovereignty in which the political power and economic power permeates into the cultural and social life of an individual. So, we discussed those sections in the previous class and let us continue that discussion.

They argue that the present is constituted by the function of biopower.

The second component to their argument in effect corresponds to the mechanism by which Empire works. For this they draw on two of Foucault's concepts in relation to power: 'biopower' and the 'society of control'. In relation to the former, the concept refers to 'a form of power that regulates social life from its interior' (ibid.: 23) whereas the latter corresponds to the kind of society that 'is able to adopt the biopolitical context as its exclusive terrain of reference' (ibid.: 24). It is a society where power is expressed 'as a control that extends through the depths of the consciousness and bodies of the population' (ibid .

So, one of the critical arguments of Hardt and Negri is where they use, extensively Foucauldian argument of biopower, and they also invoke the Deleuze and Guattari. So, we are trying to understand what does it mean. They argue that the functional biopower constitutes the present and this biopower we will elaborate on this biopower now; let us see what their overall argument is. The second component of their opinion corresponds to the mechanism by which Empire works. They draw on two of Foucault's concepts about power.

One is biopower and the society of control; we will have to elaborate on these two topics, which may be in the following slide. About the former, the concept refers to a form of power that regulates social life from its interior. In contrast, the latter corresponds to the kind of society that can adopt the biopolitical context as its exclusive terrain of reference; it is a society where power is expressed as a control that extends through the depth of the consciousness and bodies of the population.

Biopower is literally having power over bodies; it is "an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations"

Foucault: "By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. This is what I have called biopower"

"Where discipline is the technology deployed to make individuals behave, to be efficient and productive workers, biopolitics is deployed to manage population; for example, to ensure a healthy workforce".

So, let us see what Foucault means by the term biopower and the Society of control? These two terms are essential in a contribution, especially biopower. He often says a very nuanced and, more remarkably, very fine argument about power operation. And we know that Foucault is a significant philosopher who radically changed the definition of power. As we have mentioned, I have said a couple of times; power was conventionally defined as the ability to influence somebody's actions or mind irrespective of their will; there is a very conventional definition provided mainly by Weber, Max Weber.

So, power was seen as something that has a source acting upon somebody. So, this relationship between the person who works with power and the person who receives it is seen as entirely different. On the other hand, Foucault conception of power is much more nuanced; of course, he identifies this much larger power over somebody. But Foucault has far more exciting theorisations about micropower, as the power everywhere is power in a more fluid nature.

For example, he brings in the fascinating connection between power and knowledge. So, how knowledge is connected with power and how knowledge many times is a product of power, but also how knowledge can be the site of the power. So, his Foucauldian understanding of power and especially, when you read it along with the Gramscian knowledge of power, offers a far more nuanced understanding of how power works.

So, here Foucault brings in how modernity brought in new forms and formats of power to control its subject population. And one of the very fundamental arguments of Foucault is that modernity has, they have succeeded in creating docile subjects, people who are controlled already, people whose bodies are held, people whose thinking are influenced, people's imaginations are handled through a series of mechanisms which he uses the term governmentality and number of other terms.

So, biopower has power over bodies. So, what do we mean by this term power over bodies? It is an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for subjugating bodies and population control. So, from looking at the population, the subject population as a mere accumulation of people, Foucault argues that modernity succeeded in developing a host of technologies, a host of disciplines and a host of institutions through which these populations have been controlled, they have been reared, they have been disciplined in a particular way.

And this includes your intervention in education, your intervention in health, intervention in, say, maybe vaccination, through medicine, through religion. Through several other institutions, you have succeeded in controlling the population.

So, a group of people, your population is not merely a set of people who act on their whims and fancies and ideas and another thing, you can able to generate, you can create a population who are well disciplined and who can be controlled, who are malleable, who are, very, docile in their character. So, Foucault own quotation, 'by this I mean several phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of human species become the objects of a political strategy or a gender strategy of power.'

So, what does he mean by these basic biological features? And this input may be the control in reproductive activity, so controlling in human reproduction, whether it is the kind of interventions in terms of controlling population growth or even in deciding at what should be the marriageable age, who can get married to what and the host of such kind of interventions, and about other types of interventions aimed at creating a healthier population, including vaccination, medicines, and then different types of interventions.

Though they all look like it is only aimed at creating more non-disabled, healthy people, Foucault argues that it comes from a much larger political project. It comes from a much more

significant concern of having complete control over the population. So, your biological features of the human species become the object of the political strategy of a general system of power, or in other words, how starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species, this is what I have called biopower.

So, this particular argument that power is not only political power or economic power, but power works through this kind of institutions; power works through this kind of scientific technologies, power works through this kind of policies, is one of Foucault's most critical arguments. You know that he argues, his studies on sexuality, his reflections on prison, his thoughts on madness; this are precisely his project.

Telling or elaborating or explaining how these modern institutions were ultimately institutions of control, institutions of controlling the population, institutions that brought in new discourses of our better kind of control over the people. So, another quote from Foucault, 'where disciplines are the technology developed to make individuals behave, to be efficient and productive workers, biopolitics is deployed to manage the population, for example, to ensure a healthy workforce.'

So, where discipline is a technology deployed to make individuals behave, to be efficient and productive workers, biopolitics is deployed to manage the population, for example, to ensure a healthy workforce. So, how do you confirm that you have a beneficial force, whose thinking has been moulded, whose physique has been moulded, and whose health parameters have been regulated?

So, such a workforce is something so crucial for any industrial society. So, it is something like you make to order, and Foucault uses this term, biopower, basically to talk about the mechanisms of power relations.

Foucault defined *disciplinary societies* as those which arose during the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe and reached their peak at the outset of the 20th. Such societies inaugurate and develop the organization of vast spaces of enclosure, in which the individual passes sequentially from one closed environment to another, each having its own laws. The first (narrative) environment is that of the family. From there, the individual passes on to the school and after that, if a man at that time, to the barracks. The passage continues to the factory and, on occasion, the hospital, and possibly the prison, this last place being preeminent instance of the enclosed (narrative) environment. For Foucault, the prison serves as the central analogical model.

And another essential term that Hardt and Negri uses is the term, is a disciplinary society or the Society of control. And Society of power is mostly or more developed by later scholars by Deleuze and others, Deleuze and Chantal Mouffe. But that is derived explicitly from the Foucauldian definition of a disciplinary society, which he argues emerges as part of this modern society. So, Foucault defined disciplinary societies as those which arose during the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe and reached their peak at the outset of the 20th.

Such societies inaugurate and develop the organisation of vast spaces of enclosures, in which the individual passes sequentially from one closed environment to another, each having its laws. The first narrative environment is that of the family. From there, the individual passes on to the school and, after that, if a man at that time, to the barracks. The passage continues to the factory, and on occasion, the hospital and possibly, the prison.

This last place being the notable instance of the enclosed narrative environment, for Foucault, the prison serves as a central analogical model. So, in a disciplinary society, Foucault argued that, unlike any other previous epochs in human history, modernity brought in its institutions preoccupied with the purpose or with the sole aim of disciplining the population.

So, he says that the life of people in modern European societies is a continuous movement from one correctional institution to that of the other, and these are the institutional spaces,

institutional, set up where you are constantly under watch and whether it is starting from family or to school or military barracks to hospitals.

And finally, even maybe to the prison, especially prison, he develops this argument about this panopticon where you are constantly under the watch, there is a central tower, and the people will be. The sentries posted there can look at the inmates housed in different barracks in that kind of a place. So, he developed this disciplinary society as societies preoccupied with surveilling, having surveillance over the inmates and then, in such an orientation.

(Refer Slide Time: 11:58)

The disciplinary societies, as defined by Foucault, are in the process of becoming societies of control, as defined by Deleuze, Chantal Mouffe (2012: 23) contends. This transition, which does not necessarily imply a complete replacement or displacement, is marked by the emergence of a new paradigm of power. In the disciplinary societies, command is exercised through the articulation of a network of apparatuses (dispositifs) that produce, and regulate customs, habits and practices of production, the major disciplinary institutions being the family, school, factories, asylums and hospitals. In societies of control, however, command is immanent to the social field, distributed to the minds and bodies of the citizens.

The means of social integration and exclusion are no longer realised primarily as enclosures (spatialised, territorialised, exteriorised) but through perception (interiorised, cognitive) that guides and is woven into embodied inter-action, as the environment is scoured for opportunities and affordances, for permissions and interdictions. This new paradigm of power is termed 'biopolitical'.

Deleuze (1992: 4) summarises the difference between enclosures and controls in the following terms: "Enclosures are *molds*, distinct castings, but controls are a *modulation*, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other …"

Now, Hardt and Negri use this argument and develop further into the kind of societies of control defined by Deleuze and Chantal Mouffe. As defined by Foucault, the disciplinary organisations are in the process of becoming societies of control. So, there is a Mouffe and Deleuze, and even Guattari argues that there is a transformation from institutions, from the disciplinary organisation into communities of control, contends.

This transition which does not necessarily imply a complete replacement or displacement, is marred by the emergence of new paradigms of power. In the disciplinary societies, the command is exercised by articulating a network of apparatus that produce and regulate customs habits and practices of production, the major penal institutions being family, school, factories, asylums and hospitals.

In societies of control, however, the command is imminent to the social field, distributed to the minds and the bodies of the citizen; it is a fundamental argument. So, Foucault envisaged a series of spaces and institutions in disciplinary societies through which this surveillance, this control, is enacted upon the population. So, you have a family; you have a school, a church, asylums, prisons, and military barracks.

So, these are the institutional mechanisms and institutional primary institutional techniques and apparatus through which you were disciplined. So, here the importance is given to the different institutional devices and devices, institutional spaces and apparatus and methods introduced very consciously to punish the people. In a society of control, Deleuze and others argue that you do not require these institutions spaces as extra spaces; instead, this mechanism of power is already ingrained in the society itself.

These, you do not require, or of course, it is not a complete displacement or replacement of these institutions. But more importantly, the societies themselves have learned to incorporate, or the mechanisms of control are being included in the social, cultural and biological life of the population itself. So, however, the command is imminent, to the social field, distributed to the minds and bodies of the citizen.

So, how is that, you can create a population whose psychological thinking as already, which already includes this kind of commands or how do you make population who, by default, will think in those lines or which will which cannot believe any other way or which is already disciplined? So, that is a very, very interesting argument that these scholars are making. The means of social integration and exclusion are no longer realised primarily as enclosures.

Specialized, territorialised, exteriorised but, so, these are not the means of social integration and exclusion, are not done through this kind of separate institutions, but through perceptions interiorised, cognitive, that guides and is woven into embodied interactions as the environment is scoured for opportunities and affordance for the permissions and interdictions. This new paradigm of power is termed biopolitical.

Deleuze summarises the difference between enclosures and the control in the following terms. Enclosures are moulded distinct castings, but controls are a modulation like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other. So, it is a more nuanced or more

complicated argument about how power works in the, maybe in the late modern society. So, if disciplinary societies talked about these institutions as moulds through which you pass through and mould in a particular way. These arguments discuss your existing condition itself and your present condition itself as being inside a mould. So, this mould is flexible and depends upon the power relations and political ideologies, and another thing is that it has the mechanisms ingrained in itself or reshaping itself. And, so, we do not even realise that we are inside these kinds of moulds. So, that is why it is inscribed in your mind; it is marked in your body; it is cut in your social, psychological, and cultural resources that every community has.

(Refer Slide Time: 16:47)

They argue that resistance to globalization based around place or localization is futile. Because, globalization is a process of the creation of identity and difference where it is impossible to re-establish local identities that are outside the global flows of capital and the Empire. Resistance to globalization 'must come from the within to confront its 'homogenizing and heterogenizing flows in all their complexity.

The second component to their argument in effect corresponds to the mechanism by which Empire works. For this they draw on two of Foucault's concepts in relation to power: 'biopower' and the 'society of control'. In relation to the former, the concept refers to 'a form of power that regulates social life from its interior' (ibid.: 23) whereas the latter corresponds to the kind of society that 'is able to adopt the biopolitical context as its exclusive terrain of reference' (ibid.: 24). It is a society where power is expressed 'as a control that extends through the depths of the consciousness and bodies of the population' (ibid .

They argued the resistance to globalization, elaborating on these notions of disciplinary societies and biopower. So, let us come back to these arguments of Hardt and Negri and see what it means now. For this, they draw on two of Foucault's concepts of relation to power, biopower and the Society of control. About the former, the concept refers to a form of energy that regulates social life from its interior. In contrast, the latter corresponds to a society that can adapt the biopolitical context as the exclusive reference terrain.

It is a society where power is expressed as control that extends through the depth of the consciousness and bodies of the population. So, this is exactly what we mentioned in a society of power; these control mechanisms work through the consciousness of the people and work to the bodies of the population. Though it does not replace the other institutions, the significance of these institutions become less because the society has successfully ingrained or developed a lot more mechanisms that are already built-in in this whole process.

So, Hardt and Negri argue that resistance to globalization based on the place or localisation is futile. Because globalization creates identity and difference, it is impossible to re-establish local identities outside the global flows of capital and the Empire. The resistance to globalization must come from within and confront its homogenising and heterogeneity flows in their complex— fascinatingly compelling argument. One of the essential strategies to oppose globalization was to claim that we are local, we are different from the global, and we do not have anything to do with the international. So, that particular approach, that particular ideological as well as a political

system, Hardt and Negri argues that it is futile. First, it is pointless because you will not survive this whole global process. After all, the Empire has completely taken over.

And secondly, your definition of what is local is always defined by what is global. So, they argue that their resistance to globalization is based on the place, saying that this is local, our site. We are unconnected with that, or localisation is futile because there are attempts to create self-sufficient communities, self-sufficient localities to say that they do not; they have nothing to do with the big global thing.

And they need to produce whatever they want. They need to regulate their own lives, which could effectively combat globalization, but Hardt and Negri argue that that will not work. Globalization creates identity and difference, where it is impossible to reestablish local identities outside the global flows of capital and Empire because it is so pervasive.

Resistance to globalization must come from within. To confront its homogenising and heterogeneous inflows in all the complexity. So that is their argument that you cannot resist globalization by claiming to stand outside. Still, it would help if you worked within the logic of globalization yet tried to fight the process of homogenisation and heterogenisation.

Relating this analysis of the 20th century and the emergence of new nationalisms and nations, they conclude that the very concept of liberatory national sovereignty is ambiguous, if not downright contradictory. The same idea of liberatory national sovereignty or the nation as the sovereignty repertoire is contradictory. Because while nationalism seeks to liberate the multitude from foreign domination, it erects domestic structures so equally extreme power.

It is a very, that it is an important argument. So, here, imperialism is not coming from outside; you are not worried about the invasion, political direct or indirect invasion of a foreign rule against which your nation is supposed to protect you, is not it? That is how the old logic works: you are nationalism; you commit your nationalism because it promises to keep you safe from external aggression.

But here, Hardt and Negri argue that in the era of globalization as Empire, the worry is not only about external aggression, but your domestic situation could be equally bad; it could be similarly exploitative. It erects domestic structures of domination that are similarly severe. National liberation and sovereignty are powerless against the global capitalist hierarchy, but they contribute to the organisational function.

They suggest that the rise in more recent times is a transformation of sovereignty from its modern nation-state basis to an imperial post-national form. This imperial form manages

hybridity and differences in the contemporary post-colonial world. So, they argue that your nation-state is of minimal help your nation-state is of minimal relevance in fighting globalization. Because first, no global nation-state can stand entirely outside the position of global flows and empire. Secondly, many nation-states are very active participants in the whole thing. So, the only possibility is to think of an imperial post-national form, something similar to what maybe Beck talks about, a nation-state that goes beyond the logic of conventional nation-state systems.

(Refer Slide Time: 23:04)

Multitudes; War and Democracy in the age of Empire (2004)

Vision for resistance and alternative

The multitudes must realise the operating mechanism of globalization and never allow it to re-establish order.

Now, another, so this is the book that they published in 2000, titled The Empire, as I mentioned, which created quite a lot of interest. And this was later followed by another book titled The Multitudes, War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, published in 2004, which offers a more kind of programmatic blueprint or illustration for the whole quest of resistance, what to do kind of questions.

And so, it has a vision for resistance and alternative; though there is nothing very paradigmatic or very, very clear in that sense, it has that kind of elements. So, the multitudes must realise the operating mechanism of globalization and never re-establish order. So, what is a multitude, in essence? Does it define its multitude as any particular thing? So, the multitude is usually understood, maybe very loose, related to the proletariat.

It is not the only proletariat, but the people who, the have nots, the ordinary people, the usual the voiceless people, who are always in the margins of globalization. So, he sees the tremendous possibility of them coming together and uniting to fight against globalization. And when he says that it is a very unfounded optimism, unfounded wish, unfounded idea, utopia, romantic idea, they have reposed tremendous faith in the possibility of human beings coming together, joining the hands and then fighting this process of empire or this entity of Empire.

(Refer Slide Time: 24:52)

The first of element of this is a demand for 'global citizenship'. This entails the multitude gaining 'control over the movements' of people – i.e. migration. The multitude thus 'must be able to decide if, when, and where it moves', as well as having 'the right to stay and enjoy one place rather than being forced constantly to be on the move' (ibid.: 400). This amounts for Hardt and Negri to the multitude's power 'to re-appropriate control over space' (ibid.). The second element is 'a social wage and guaranteed income for all' (ibid.: 403). This social wage should extend 'well beyond the family to the entire multitude, even those who are unemployed, because the entire multitude produces' (ibid.). The implication is that this 'extends to the entire population the demand that all activity necessary for the production of capital be recognized with an equal compensation' (ibid.). Thirdly, Hardt and Negri argue that the global multitude's political project entails 'a right to re-appropriation' (ibid.: 406). This is a right first of all 'to the re-appropriation of the means of production' that transcends its traditional (communist) sense. They argue the multitude must 'configure itself as a telos' – essentially a kind of consciousness – that 'not only uses machines to produce, but also becomes increasingly machinic itself' as the means of production are increasingly integrated into the minds and bodies of the multitude. (ibid.: 406). This re-appropriation thus means 'having free access to and control over knowledge, information, communication and affects' (ibid.: 407).

What are these kinds of specific demands for these multitudes here? Please keep in mind that it is a complicated utopian concept. Still, it is a problematic concept; we will come back to those problems later. He thinks of the multitude as the people in the periphery of the whole system who are adversely affected.

So, it includes the proletariat, the workers, the farmers, the indigenous people, the minorities, the women, the transgender, the people you generally consider as non-elite or people at the receiving end of this economic and political system. So, what are the kinds of strategies that they need to adopt? One is the demand for global citizenship.

This entails multitudes gaining control over people's movements, that is, migration; the group thus must be able to decide if, when and where it moves and have the right to stay and enjoy one place rather than being forced constantly to be on the move.

For Hardt and Negri, this amounts to the multitudes power or re-appropriate control over space. He says that they must claim global citizenship, declare that they have the right over any place, move to any place they wish, and settle down any location they want to. And this is an active, taking control over the space or other kind of the real speciality.

The second element is a social wage and guaranteed income for all. This social wage should extend well beyond the family or the entire multitude, even those unemployed because the whole assembly produces. This implication extends to the whole population, the demand that all activity necessary for the production of capital we recognised with an equal compensation, and again an idea about the about a guaranteed, a social wage and guaranteed income for all.

So, irrespective of whether you are in the productive age or whether you are actively producing or not, multitude, they have the right to demand a universal income and universal, guaranteed income for all. It must extend to the entire population.

Thirdly, Hardt and Negri argue that the global multitudes political project entails a right to re-appropriation. This is the right first of all, to the re-appropriation of the means of production that transcend its traditional communist sense; they argue that the multitudes must configure itself as a telos, essentially a kind of consciousness that not only uses machines to produce but also become increasingly machinic itself as the means of production are increasingly integrated into the minds and bodies of the multitude.

This re-appropriation thus means having free access to and control over knowledge, information and communication effects. Again, a very radical idea maybe look very romantic, but very extreme because they say that your means of production must be re-appropriated. So, what this means of production here means? And this means a show, of course, it is borrowed from the will from the Marxian sense, but it is significantly different. For Marx, the means of production included your raw materials and your tools and your equipment and other stuff.

But here, maybe in an informational society, like what Hardt and Negri talk about, this means of production is knowledge. Because you can work if you are a computer programmer or somebody into the informational network, you require a computer system; you need the internet. A computer and that becomes your relations of production.

So, you need to re-appropriate the whole knowledge system; thus, re-appropriation means having free access to and control over knowledge, information, communication and effects. So, this kind of a re-appropriation of the means of production, not in the conventional sense, but re-appropriation of the knowledge, of the information, of the Internet, and anything that defines the modern, late-capitalist informational society that must be re-appropriated is another third strategy that Hardt and Negri argue is maybe a significant political project for the multitudes.

(Refer Slide Time: 29:40)

The analysis in the book sets out three further elements to Hardt and Negri's thinking about the contemporary globalized world. First, they elaborate a thesis that a global state of war exists, that global terrorism linked to 9/11 is part of this general state 'that erodes the distinction between war and peace' (ibid.: 5) and that 'the traditional military power structure is no longer capable of defeating or containing its enemies' (ibid.: 63). Second, they expand the concept of the 'multitude' as a new global class formation that supplants previous ideas of the international proletariat. Importantly, they suggest that it 'is also a concept of race, gender and sexuality differences' (ibid.: 101), and that it is 'the common subject of labor . . . the real flesh of post-modern production'. When this 'flesh' is 'imprisoned and transformed into the body of global capital, it finds itself both within and against the processes of capitalist globalization' (ibid.). Third, they argue that despite the fact that 'the end of the Cold War was supposed to be the ultimate victory of democracy . . . today the concept and practices of democracy are everywhere in crisis' (ibid.: 231). This crisis is 'not only to do with the corruption and insufficiency of its institutions and practices' but also 'with the concept itself' (ibid.: 232). Furthermore, they contest the 'social democratic' argument that 'democracy is threatened or debilitated by globalization' (ibid.: 233–4), arguing instead that it is more a failure of existing democratic forms 'to represent the opinion of the multitude. What is needed, they argue, is a new form of democracy that draws on 'the decision-making ability in common' of the multitude (ibid.: 340) which should be based around principles that 'must counter the force of violence' (ibid.: 341).

The analysis of the book sets out three different elements to Hardt and Negri thinking about the contemporary globalized world. First, they elaborate on the thesis that the global state of war exists. The international terrorism linked to 9/11 is part of this gender state that erodes the distinction between war and peace. And that the traditional military power structure is no longer capable of defeating or containing its elements.

So, they argue that with this 9/11, which we also discussed in the previous class, the 9/11 act 9/11 was an act of war, but that act of war was waged in a very, very unconventional way. And after that, you had the battle of terror invasion into Iraq, then invasion into Afghanistan. So, we are perpetually in a state of war, almost an everyday kind of war. So, this conventional distinction between normalcy and the state of war is wholly eroded.

Second, they expand the concept of the multitude as a new global class formation that supplants previous ideas of the international proletariat. Importantly, they suggest that it is also a concept of race, gender and sexuality differences, and that is the common subject of labour, the actual flesh of postmodern production. When this flesh is imprisoned and transformed into a body of global capital, it finds itself both within and against the process of capitalist globalization.

So, they expand this definition of the multitude because even in the Gramscian or Marxian arguments, the have-nots or the natural agents of social change were the conditional proletariats, the working-class people. But we know that when Hardt and Negri theorised, they theorised in the 1990s when all these identity politics made a vast noise or massive impact on social theorisation. So, they include class and sexuality, race, gender as a part of that, and then included in the definition of multitudes.

Third, they argue that, even though the end of the Cold War was supposed to be the ultimate victory of democracy, today, the concepts and practices of democracy are everywhere in crisis. I do not think I need any explanation on that. This crisis does with the corruption and insufficiency of the institutions and practices and the concept itself. Furthermore, they contest the social democratic argument that democracy is threatened or debilitated by globalization.

You are arguing instead that it is a more failure of the existing democratic forms to represent the opinion of the multitude. What is valid, they argue, what is needed, they claim, is a new form of democracy that draws on the decision-making capability typical of the multitude, which should be based around the principle that must counter the forces of violence. Again, very radical ideas, but the whole question of how do you put it in detail, how do you put it into practice becomes very difficult.

Because they argue that the crisis of democracy is not only because of corruption or some die-hard autocrats, but the corruption or the problem of democracy is because of the inherent weakness in representing the ideas of the multitudes, the contemporary democracy no longer means the genuine interest of the multitudes.

'Empire' has been a highly influential book.

Criticisms: Atilo Boron 'Empire and Imperialism'
Too narrow, a juridical conception of imperialism

The claims of deterritorial nature is flawed, old forms of conquest and
exploitation on geographical basis continues

Conception of Multitudes is too problematic as it is an assemblage of
social groups with often conflicting interests and ideologies

So, as I mentioned, we are just summing up, Empire has been an extremely influential work, undoubtedly, the most celebrated work on anti-globalization campaigners and anti-globalization activists. But at the same time been heavily criticised by many people; for example, Atilo Boron wrote a book titled Empire and imperialism only basically to attack this, the scholars. So, you can refer to this book, but let me summarise a couple of points.

One is they argue that Hardt and Negri's understanding of the Empire, as a juridical conception is too narrow because they say that these new forms of juridical power have come into the transnational picture, international agencies and these people would or Boron would argue that it is you are giving too much of weightage to these international agencies, and actually, they are powerless.

And a second point or point that they claim of deterritorial nature is flawed, old forms and conquest on exploitation on a continuous geographical basis. So, this all argument of Hardt and Negri that the conventional distinction between core-periphery of the first world and second world has wholly been scrambled, and they no longer are relevant. It is a very problematic statement.

Because even now, you know that the significant movements' major decisions and geopolitical events are heavily influenced by the very situatedness, very old-fashioned geographical

calculation of the places itself, whether it is about the Iraq invasion or invasion in Afghanistan. All these things have very retro calculations based on geography and resources. So, that, they say, is a highly problematic argument that now the territory has become insignificant.

That is too farfetched an argument; that is what Atilio Boron argues. And then the conception of multitudes is too problematic as it is an assemblage of social groups with often conflicting interests and ideologies, which I do not think that I need to, elaborate this, an imagination of the multitude as a singular body or a distinct entity, which consisting of so many different social groups and to imagine that they will act uniformly, or they can act with the kind of a singular political agenda is simply utopian.

That is the kind of examples that we, illustration, see from across the globe. Even though there are movements, even though there are resisting movements or social movements happening, we also know that they tend to be fragmented because the people who participate in that they no longer represent an undivided constituency, their constituencies have been very severely fragmented, especially in this era of postmodern explosion of identity politics, where everything is reduced to identity politics, so whether it is feminism or about questions of racism, or questions of the economic situation, what you are seeing is constant stories of fragmentation.

So, in such a situation, to think of multitude as a disaggregate category and having political agency capable of doing anything substantive at a global level is a very problematic point. Maybe you will talk about particular instances in national scenarios, in national places. We may be able to operationalise this whole concept of the multitude in a given space.

But thinking of a global or regional multitude becomes highly problematic. So, Atilio Boron lists out maybe seven to eight critical points of criticism. So, take up or possibly lookup for the material and then read that. But let me again summarise and conclude by saying that their work is a very influential Empire thesis. And so let us stop here, and we will meet again for the coming class to complete this discussion for this particular week. Thank you.