


Globalization: Theoretical Perspectives
Professor R. Santhosh
Department of Humanities and Social Science
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Lecture 25
Continuation of Reflexive Modernity: Ulrich Beck-1

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Forms of Meta-change

As stated above, the theory of reflexive modernization maintains that we are now experiencing a meta-change in the formation of Western industrial welfare states, a formation that had been stable for a long time. A meta-change means that the experiential and theoretical coordinates are changing at the same time as the basic institutions. Other theories that have examined the same phenomena have also put forth the notion that the present represents a structural break with the past. Most of the others, however, trace this break back to developments in autonomous subsectors of society, for example to developments in the sphere of information technology (as with the theories of post-industrial society, information society and network society) or to the loss of key certainties in the cultural sphere (as in the theory of postmodern society).

In contrast to such narrow or even monocausal theories, the model of reflexive modernization tries to take into account the whole breadth of the modernization process. The structural break is explained not as a result of exogenous factors but as a consequence of modernization itself. Once modernization has been radicalized, it affects all spheres of society. It has a pervasive effect on the historical formations of the post-war modern world. They have become by this time traditions in their own right, and, like previous traditions, they are in need of justification and amenable to rationalization.

Let us continue and let us conclude this essay on reflexive modernization by Ulrich Beck. So, this is a continuation from the previous class and for the last two sessions we have been discussing on the same essay. Indeed, we are spending quite a lot of time on this because it is an important essay and not also very easy to comprehend.

So, we are now in the previous class he was talking about the kind of larger argument about how a new understanding that the which entails the kind of ontological transformation to understand the transition from first modernity to second modernity or even from traditional society to the modern society. So, the discussion is a continuation of that.

So, he talks about forms of meta change, as stated above the theory of reflexive modernization maintains that we are now experiencing a meta change in the form of western industrial welfare state. In the formation of western industrial welfare state, a formation that has been stable for a long time. A meta change means that the experiential and theoretical coordinates are changing at the same time as the basic institutions.

So, he says that in contrast to, what are the kinds of arguments that are put forward by other scholars as the reasons for these changes and he says that there could be a lot of changes, because of information technology because of post-industrial society, but Beck says that, those mono causal explanations as recent, as depending upon a single set of reasons, are not really helpful.

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with the theories of post-industrial society, information society and network society) or to the loss of key certainties in the cultural sphere (as in the theory of postmodern society).

In contrast to such narrow or even monocausal theories, the model of reflexive modernization tries to take into account the whole breadth of the modernization process. The structural break is explained not as a result of exogenous factors but as a consequence of modernization itself. Once modernization has been radicalized, it affects all spheres of society. It has a pervasive effect on the historical formations of the post-war modern world. They have become by this time traditions in their own right, and, like previous traditions, they are in need of justification and amenable to rationalization.

Meta-change has many aspects which need to be grasped in their interrelation. But because this model of change is so complex, it is best to start by separating them analytically. The more we can clarify these distinctions, the more focused our empirical research can be. With that in mind, we propose to initially restrict our considerations to only those developments that can be traced back to the following types of meta-change.

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Rather, you need to this argument about modernization is that once modernization has been radicalizes, it affects all spheres of society. So, that is why he is using this term meta change as which is changing not only the systems, but even our understanding about this very existence of these very systems.

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Meta-change Resulting from the Unintended Consequences of Simple Modernization

Change by means of side-effects is one of the classical mechanisms of sociological theory (see, e.g., the work of Norbert Elias, or rational choice theory). But the term usually refers to how the unintended consequences of individual action combine to create a collective framework, which in turn sets the initial conditions for individual action. In the context of reflexive modernization, the term 'side-effects' refers less to this sort of action and more to the transformation of social structures and the categories of social thought. The focus is more on what might be called second-order side-effects, where the side-effects of social institutions result in new conditions that call them into question. Central among these side-effects of side-effects has been the politicization of side-effects, which has been a central problem for modern society since the 1960s. A good example is the manner in which the catastrophic risks of new technologies have caused institutional turbulence. The turbulence, in turn, has brought forth a global environmental



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This theorem of institutional side-effects has broad acceptance in the current sociological literature, but it can be interpreted in very different ways. One interpretation (Beck, 1995) starts from the 'power of danger to produce institutional opposition'. A subset of this is the idea that institutions built on such second-order dangers – such as European private insurance schemes – grow up exactly where previous means no longer serve, and



So, the first one is meta changes resulting from the unintended consequences of simple modernization. So, what were the kind of consequences that we were talking about, in the context of reflexive modernization the term side effects refer less to the sort of action and more to the transformation of social structures and categories of social thought.

So, not the kind of a conventional understanding of side effects that those things we anticipated, but he is talking about how there are different, sort of actions and more transformational social structures and the focus is more on what might be called the second order side effects, where the side effects of social institutions that result in new conditions that call them into question.

Central, among them, among the side effects of side effects has been the politicization of side effects, which has been a central problem for modern society since the 1960s. So, it is not only that the new institutions bring in side effects, but the side effects have created further side effects especially that of a politicization of that and that he argues, which are not amenable to be resolved or using the older frameworks.

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
has been the politicization of side-effects, which has been a central problem for modern society since the 1960s. A good example is the manner in which the catastrophic risks of new technologies have caused institutional turbulence. The turbulence, in turn, has brought forth a global environmental politics that constitutes a new agent and process of transformation.

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This theorem of institutional side effects has broader acceptance in the current sociological literature, but it can be interpreted in a very different way. One interpretation Beck starts from the power of danger to produce institutional position. A subset of this is the idea that the institution's built on such second order changes such as European private insurance schemes grew up exactly where previous means no longer served and where the system is having difficulty taking... I think, let us keep it there and then go into the other sections.

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institutional innovation, while legitimation crises may possibly be straightened out by changing decision-making procedures, and by balancing out opposing interests.

Radicalized Modernization

The principles of modern society were not until very recently applied to every sphere of social life. What happened instead in the beginning was that countermodern social structures were generated in reaction, and combined with specifically modern ones to fill out the full form of first modern society. Parallel to the processes of marketization, rationalization and the increase of productivity was the re-invention of tradition and community structures. First modern society was set in a kind of counter-modern base that damped the dynamics of modernization. The nuclear family, the non-market roles of woman, ascriptive modes of class assignment, and the nation-state all performed social integration functions in first modern society. All were originally beyond any need for justification. And all were eventually called into question by the process of reflexive modernization. Under the influence of an increasingly radicalized and all-encompassing modernization (which includes phenomena as different as globalization, the freeing of markets and the prospect of manipulable human genes), each of these institutions has lost its taken-for-granted character. They have become experienced as variable, mouldable, and as the product

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Where he talked about the radicalized modernization. So, the principle of modern society was not until very recently applied to every sphere of social life. What happened instead in the beginning was this counter mode and social structures were generated in the reaction and combined with specifically modern ones to fill out the full form of fast modern society. Parallel to the process of marketization, rationalization and increase of productivity was the reinvention of traditional community structure.

So, he is talking about earlier a scenario when modernity came with full force that also created quite a lot of anti-modern institutions, and anti-modern sentiment and the modernity was really forced to be to coexist with them. The first modern society was set in a kind of counter modern basis that damn the dynamics of modernization. The nuclear family, the non-market role of women, ascriptive modes of class assignment and nation-state all performed social integration function in the first modern society.

We know that even in the status of women change very slowly and even in many of the industrial societies, the domestic role of woman is still something very important. So, these complicated dynamics really coexisted between the first and then second one.

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from youth culture to fundamentalist ethnic groups. Reflexive modernity can be seen as a vast field of social experiment where, under the pressure of globalization, various types of post-traditional social bonds and post-national imagined communities are being tried out in competition with each other (Keupp et al., 2001). Whether this process will produce reflexive solutions, that is, community structures that can stabilize themselves without depending on an appeal to naturalness for their legitimacy, is still an empirically open question.

Questioning the Cognitive Basis of First Modern Society

Rationalization, the process of increasing the rationality of action and thought, accomplishes much of its task through the application of unquestioned criteria and assumptions. It is these which determine what, in any given case, in any already differentiated sphere of action or research, will count as rational. A key component of reflexive modernization is that this



from youth culture to fundamentalist ethnic groups reflectivity or Flexi modernity can be seen as a vast field of social experiment where under the pressure of globalization, various types of post traditional social bonds and post national imagined communities are being tried out in competition with each other, whether this process will produce a reflective solutions, that is community structures that can stabilize themselves without depending on an appeal of naturalness or their legitimacy, still is an empirically opened question.

So, this is something similar to what we discussed in Arjuna Appadurai argument, when he talks about the emergence of new neighbourhood and locality. So, you know that in a highly industrialized society, an individual gets socialized or an individual identifies his or her group, not with the kind of ascriptive group that he or she is born into.

And the internet offers quite a lot of possibilities for this person to find a membership, find a home or identify herself with a with n number of communities which are operating at the global level. So, that could be from youth culture to fundamental ethnic groups or even terrorist groups or environment groups and n number of groups.

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...the process of increasing the rationality of action and thought, accomplishes much of its task through the application of unquestioned criteria and assumptions. It is these which determine what, in any given case, in any already differentiated sphere of action or research, will count as rational. A key component of reflexive modernization is that this unquestioned basis of modernization is itself examined in terms of its rationality. This is part of why we characterize it as second-order rationalization or reflexivity. In the course of this reflection on reflection, the assumptions that guaranteed the rationality of various subsystems lose their obviousness and persuasiveness. It becomes ever more abundantly clear that every given is in fact a choice, and that at the level of fundamental propositions, such ultimate starting points can only be normatively grounded, or defended as useful a priori constructs. When applied rigorously, the modern principles of rational justification simply do not work all the way down to the ground.

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To the extent that this erosion of the bases of certainty is publicly recognized, space is opened up for alternative forms of knowledge to come into play. In retrospect, these might always have been at work latently justifying actions and decisions. But they could not previously be used as public justifications. They were considered illegitimate as long as they could not



Next one is questioning of cognitive basis of first modern society. rationalization, the process of increasing rationality of action and thought accomplishes much of its tasks to the application of unquestioned criterion assumption. In this which determine what in any given case is an ordinary differentiated space, sphere of action or research will be counted as a rational. A key component of reflexive modernization is that this unquestioned basis of modernization is itself examined in terms of its rationality, it is part of why we characterize its second order rationalization or reflexivity.

Now, what is the cognitive basis for a modern society or what basis do we take into decision on what basis do we place our decision making our knowledge making processes and we know that modernity is always equated with the rise of rationality, the rise of reason, the argument that human beings are now capable of using their reason to make sense of the world, they do not need to depend upon the theological or religious interpretation.

So, rationality or scientific knowledge and rationality human reason was seen as the basis for everything, basis for your creation of knowledge, basis for your action and all these things and this particular pre-eminence given to rationality is now been brought into question according to Beck, and it is not only Beck, almost every social scientist including, postmodernist and others, they agree to this question that the monopoly enjoyed by science or rationality is now being questioned.

It becomes even more abundantly clear that every given is, in fact a choice and that at the level of fundamental proposition, propositions such ultimate starting points can only be normatively grounded or defended as useful a priori constructs.

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ultimate starting points can only be normatively grounded, or defended as useful *a priori* constructs. When applied rigorously, the modern principles of rational justification simply do not work all the way down to the ground.

To the extent that this erosion of the bases of certainty is publicly recognized, space is opened up for alternative forms of knowledge to come into play. In retrospect, these might always have been at work latently justifying actions and decisions. But they could not previously be used as public justifications. They were considered illegitimate as long as they could not be squared with the dominant model of rationality.⁸ The result of this sort of second-order rationalization is a situation in which there is no longer 'one best way' to solve every problem, but rather several equally valid modes of justification that operate simultaneously. Such a loosening up of the foundations of rationality could lead to a multitude of alternative optimization strategies and/or to an expansion in scientific and technical knowledge.

In science, this process of putting foundations into question was mostly carried out by an external subfield that specialized in reflection on science, namely the philosophy and sociology of science. This reflection on scientific reflection has demonstrated that the choice between alternate methods of solution does not flow of itself from scientific method. Instead it is generally derived from a variety of extra-scientific criteria, including public recognition, personal experience, aesthetic judgment and the procedures that allocate money and resources. But in other fields, the same



So, very, closely, you know are referring to the kind of a postmodernist positions are to the extent that this erosion of the basis of certainties, publicly recognized, spaces opened up for alternative forms of knowledge to come into play, the result of this sort of second order rationalization is a situation in which there is no longer one best way to solve every problem, but rather several.

So, this I think you will understand it more clearly when we discuss Beck's notion of risk society, he makes very interesting connection between scientific knowledge and then alternative ways of understanding and how the scientific knowledge has really lost its ability to categorically say and to convince people about its authenticity and legitimacy. So, yeah, so, it is reflected in a philosophy and sociology science reflection on scientific reflection has been demonstrated. So, this is the elaboration of that.

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
pluralization of perspectives has been described in all cultural fields by the theory of post-modernism. But reflection on fundamental principles can also be seen in practical fields as diverse as organizational theory, technical engineering and legal thought.

The classical paradigm of first modern society is that intellectual progress along a diversity of fronts will in the end yield a unified picture of the world, and furthermore one that evidences the universality of common principles. This model now stands refuted. This is the lesson that can be drawn tangentially from such disparate phenomena as the greenhouse effect, mad cow disease and the potential risks of globalized financial markets. Each sets off heated arguments among experts that typically can't be resolved by gathering additional information, but instead deepen, widen and multiply themselves. New objects of investigation and new lines of research more often than not turn up new risks and side-effects, and in the process undermine not only the claims of rationality but also those of control. Rather than focusing on and resolving the crises, the established processes of 'crisis resolution' set off new chain reactions - loss of confidence, the collapse of markets, the struggle over assigning blame and the virtual abolition of borders - that further jam those mechanisms and set off even more turbu-



The classical paradigm of first modernity is that the intellectual progress along diversity of front will in the end yield a unified picture of the world and furthermore, one that evidence the universality of common principles. Now, the model now stands refuted.

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borders - that further jam those mechanisms and set off even more turbulence, which has by this point become predictably unpredictable.

In contradistinction to many postmodern positions, the perspective of reflexive modernization does not posit an arbitrary multiplicity as an ultimate fact. Such a situation can only maintain itself over the long run in cultural spheres that are free from the burden of decision-making. In general, where decisions must be made, where legitimacy is demanded and where responsibility must be assigned, procedures must be worked out and criteria must be agreed upon at least to the degree that better solutions can be distinguished from worse. Such reflexive practical knowledge is constantly revisable. It arises from a diversity of sources and has foregone any pre-existing claims to certainty. But it offers a context-determined and temporally limited orientation for action that makes learning through experience possible.

Dissolving Fundamental Distinctions

This topic relates mainly to the cognitive aspects of the side-effect theorem. Certain scientific and technical developments can - according to the hypothesis - create a situation in which some of the fundamental distinctions of modern society no longer hold true. But this can happen not only through the second-order process of reflection described above, but also through side-effects of technical innovation that blur reality. This is



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In general, where decisions are must be made, where legitimacy is demanded and where responsibility must be assigned, procedures must be worked out and criteria must be agreed upon at least to the degree that better solutions can be distinguished from worse, such an influx of practical knowledge is constantly revisable.

So, this is the point where they make a distinction between the postmodernist position and reflexive modernity, when the postmodern position any they would say that any basis any agreeable basis for a position or a decision is impossible, they talk about a kind of a complete arbitrariness which reflects the modernist do not agree.

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Dissolving Fundamental Distinctions

This topic relates mainly to the cognitive aspects of the side-effect theorem. Certain scientific and technical developments can – according to the hypothesis – create a situation in which some of the fundamental distinctions of modern society no longer hold true. But this can happen not only through the second-order process of reflection described above, but also through side-effects of technical innovation that blur reality. This is especially clear in the case of the boundary between nature and society (Lau and Boschen, 2001). This division came into being in a specific form with modern society and was for a long time a constitutive part of its institutional order. So long as it was clear that there was a sphere of reality that was 'natural', and which could be distinguished from everything social and cultural, it limited the extent to which certain social arrangements had to

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Now, another section, where Beck talks about is this dissolving fundamental distinctions, a host of fundamental distinction, again this point will come up when we discuss his argument about risk society, the distinction between individual and collective, the public and private, the nature and culture.

So, these things are the one which are the cornerstones of modern social theory. So, now, the argument that puts that, Beck puts forward is that these it is not that these boundaries are becoming invisible or these boundaries are simply dissolving, he does not say that.

But he says that there is a multiplicity of such boundaries, we still work with these boundaries, but there are multiple proliferation of such boundaries and once you have a proliferation of boundaries, then you get much more latitude, you get much more opportunity and freedom and to maneuver around in this whole situation, you can fix the kind of boundary as you want and this is again something distinctly different from the kind of a postmodernist positions. He talks about the relation, the boundary between nature and society.

So, this division came into being in specific form with the modern society and was for a long-time constitutive part of the institutional order. So, long as it was clear that there is a sphere of reality that was natural in which could be distinguished from everything from social and cultural, it is limited to the extent to which certain social arrangements had to...

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answer for themselves. Anything considered natural was relieved from the need to justify itself. It was self-legitimizing. But this ontological division can no longer maintain itself in the light of new technological developments. All institutions and systems of action that functionally base themselves on 'natural' definitions like that between life and death, between health and sickness, or between risk and danger have been brought into difficulty by the growth of what Bruno Latour has called 'hybrids' (Latour, 2001). One reason it is unlikely there will ever be a complete overthrow of the distinction between nature and society (as has been postulated and celebrated by some representatives of postmodernism) is precisely because it would destroy the ability of such institutions to function. The theory of reflexive modernization starts from the more realistic assumption that there will be a pluralization of natural definitions, and thus of the fictional pictures of nature that each implies.

It remains to be investigated whether other fundamental distinctions are affected by forms of meta-change that are independent of the process of double reflection described above. One key question that remains to be taken up is whether the distinction between gainful employment and other forms of activity is beginning to blur in favour of an extension and plural-



answer for themselves, anything considered natural was relieved from the need to justify itself and we know that this how this term natural has been used, maybe one of the sites, where this term natural has been used, was in terms in terms of this questions related to sexuality. So, homosexuality was penalized in India during the colonial time and even after that, because it was seen as unnatural, it was seen as an unnatural sexual act.

So, this so, anything that is unnatural was seen as something negative, something bad which needs to be discouraged. Some even needs to be some kind of a punished. So, Beck argues that we have not traversed much further into dissolving this distinction between what is natural and what is cultural.

So, now we know that there something that we consider as natural, there is even the sphere of nature in which we thought that are clearly beyond the purview of human beings are now being encroached upon, when we are talking about the genetic engineering, when we are talking about, the recent advancements in in microbiology or artificial intelligence, we are actually encroaching, we are actually moving into the realms which once were considered to be the realm of the nature.

If you can create a child with genetic engineering with a particular set of dispositions with the guarantee that the child will be free from certain kinds of genetic disorders, then definitely we are moving into that kind of era. The theory of reflexive modernization starts from the more realistic assumption that there will be pluralization of natural definitions and that this the fictional picture of nature that it implies.

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are affected by forms of meta-change that are independent of the process of double reflection described above. One key question that remains to be taken up is whether the distinction between gainful employment and other forms of activity is beginning to blur in favour of an extension and pluralization of what counts as work. Given the key role that gainful employment plays in modern society, this would have widespread ramifications. Another important boundary that awaits investigation is that between public and private, which appears to be blurring under the influence of new means of communication and to be losing its ability to orient people. A similar melting of the distinction between global and local (expressed in the literature by the term 'glocal') has also been the subject of several empirical and theoretical investigations. Other candidates for fundamental distinctions of independent importance that are beginning to blur are the distinctions between market and hierarchy (Döhl et al., 2001), fiction and reality, the distinction between any given sociological We and the Others that are its structuring absence (Beck-Gernsheim, 1999), life and death, and, last but not least, war and peace (Beck, 2001b; Kaldor, 1999).

To illustrate this again in relation to the world after 11 September 2001: today, instead of an either-or, we face a this-as-well-as-that world: national security is no longer national security; foreign and domestic policy, national security and international cooperation are now interlocked. Not only have the walls between inside and outside, military and police, secret



Another example that he gives is the whole question of gainful employment and other form of activities beginning to blur in favour of an extension and pluralization of what counts as work. Another example that he gives is that the whole argument that our conventional understanding of work at starting at nine and ending at five is under is undergoing significant change. So, he has a very interesting argument about how these boundaries are becoming more and more fluid.

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to formulate some analytic test criteria. These will first be expounded in general terms, and then applied to the example of subjectivity in order to bring out some implications and make them more concrete.

General Criteria

The Multiplicity of Boundaries (or of Attempts to Draw Boundaries). An operational definition of reflexive modernization is that the boundaries between social spheres are multiplied. This is also true for the boundaries between society and nature, between knowledge and superstition, between life and death and between Us and the Others. Each of these boundaries becomes pluralized. And this entails three things:

1. Boundaries cease to be given and instead become choices. Drawing boundaries becomes optional.
2. Simultaneous with that, there is a multiplication of the plausible ways in which boundaries can be drawn, as well as the ways in which they can be brought into doubt; and
3. The existence of multiple boundaries changes not only the collectivity defined by them but the nature of boundaries themselves. They become not boundaries so much as a variety of attempts to draw boundaries. In a similar manner, border conflicts are transformed into conflicts over the drawing of borders.



Now, a kind of a summary of this test criterion for the presence of reflexive modernization, the general criteria the multiplicity of boundaries or attempts to draw boundaries, an operational definition of reflexive modernization is that the boundaries between social spheres are multiplied, this is also true for the boundaries between society and nature, between knowledge and superstition between life and death and between us and the others. Each of these boundaries become pluralized and this entails three things.

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To sum that all up in another way: the more boundaries increase, the easier it becomes to draw new ones.

The Pressure to Draw Contextually Determined Boundaries. While



Boundaries cease to be given and instead become choices, drawing boundaries become optional. Simultaneously that there is a multiplication of the plausible ways in which boundaries can be drawn, as such the ways in which they can be brought into doubt and the existence of multiple boundaries exchange not only the collectivity defined by them, but the nature of boundaries themselves. So, this point that we discussed earlier.

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To sum that all up in another way: the more boundaries increase, the easier it becomes to draw new ones.

The Pressure to Draw Contextually Determined Boundaries. While

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postmodernism celebrates this multiplication and opening up of boundaries, reflexive modernization posits that every individual and institutional decision presupposes that boundaries have somehow been drawn on a practical basis. Things have been included or excluded and a line drawn between them. In reflexive modern society, however, there is not a limited array of already available options. Instead, the boundaries have to be created



While post modernism celebrates the multiplication and opening up of boundaries, reflexive modernization posits that every individual and institutional decision presupposes those boundaries have somehow been redrawn on a practical basis. So, this is the distinction that again, he makes between post modernism and reflexive modernism.

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can be made to restore the authority of the old boundaries, or the interaction with uncertainty and insecurity can be incorporated into an institutional learning process.



Beyond Certainty: The Multiplying of Rationalities. Another reason that boundaries become harder to maintain is that the multiplication of valid means of justification leads in a multiplication of claims to knowledge. The boundaries of knowledge – that is, the boundaries between scientific and unscientific, between science and politics, and between experts and laymen – have now been drawn in several places at the same time. So the conclusion of a dispute over what counts as knowledge can no longer have the same finality. The most striking consequence is that the established sciences no longer have the definitive power to end disputes. In the first place, scientists themselves have publicized their own disputes about fundamental principles. And, in the second place, even when there is consensus in a field, scientists from other fields can jump in and contradict the resultant conclusions once they enter the public arena. And then on top of all this is the fact that perspectives once considered illegitimate have won recognition and importance.

This could be understood as a postmodern situation. What would make it a reflexive modern situation, by contrast, is when the conclusion of such a debate is reached explicitly, but without recourse to the authority of scientific knowledge. The needed motto is no fallacy: "Even when we don't know



Second one is the 'Beyond Certainly: Multiplying of Rationalities'. Again, a summary of what we discussed so far. Another reason that boundaries become harder to maintain is that the multiplication of valid means of justification leads to multiplication of claims to knowledge. So, the monopoly of rationality, monopoly of scientific rationality is seriously compromised. Alternative rationality is based on say, wisdom based on tradition based on religion, based on other sorts of indigenous knowledge are equally valid or they are perceived to be equally valid.

The most striking consequence is that the established sciences no longer have the definitive power to end disputes. In the first place, scientists themselves have publicized their own disputes about fundamental principles. So, this again, we will discuss we take a piece argument about world risk society or the whole idea of risk society, we will we will discuss that in detail, so I am not going into the depth.

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and agents of advocacy. The debate begins based on the recognition that science offers a multitude of options; that there are controversies among scientists as well as within the public; and that the problem is how to resolve all these differences democratically. In this new situation, the foremost public task of science is no longer to silence controversies, but rather to enable them, that is, to enable different public voices to be heard and to make themselves count. Or, in other words, to enable democracy (Latour, 2001).



Expecting the Unexpected. The main result of this shift is that the decision-making process becomes dominated by the expectation of unexpected side-effects. When this goes so far as to reverse the sequence of decision-making – when the expectation of unexpected consequences precedes the decision itself – then, in the language of economics, externalities have been internalized. What was once cordoned off from the decision-making process as below the level of significance has now become integral to that process. It has also become integrated into the objects of thought. Side-effects become in practice inseparable from the meaning of initial facts. The result is that the more we know, the more our facts, decisions and objects become dominated by the unexpected consequences that are now an integral part of them. And this means that a growth in objectivity no longer produces a growth in consensus. Rather it entails the opposite: more objectivity



Third, the next one is this being the expecting the unexpected. Again, he is bringing back Koselleck and try to see that, the main result of this shift is that the decision-making process

becomes dominated by the expectation of unexpected side effects, which this goes so far as to reverse the sequence of decision making, when the expectation of unexpected consequence precedes the decision itself, then the language of economics externalities have become internalized.

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internalized. What was once cordoned off from the decision-making process as below the level of significance has now become integral to that process. It has also become integrated into the objects of thought. Side-effects become in practice inseparable from the meaning of initial facts. The result is that the more we know, the more our facts, decisions and objects become dominated by the unexpected consequences that are now an integral part of them. And this means that a growth in objectivity no longer produces a growth in consensus. Rather it entails the opposite: more objectivity produces more dissent. In order to resolve the chronic disputes that result from this reality, ad hoc decision-making institutions emerge of necessity in subpolitical arenas. In such a situation, there can be no generally universalizable solutions. For ad hoc problems, only ad hoc solutions are suitable.

The Consequences for Subjectivity: The Birth of the Quasi-subject

The arguments sketched above apply to a very diverse set of boundaries that are constitutive for both theory and experience, including the boundaries between nation-states, the national and the international, society and nature, between economy and state, etc. In order to clarify these arguments let us examine how they apply to subjectivity (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001).

Scott Lash (2001: ix-x) writes:



So, this is mainly because our past offers very little cue about what lies ahead. The past becomes less effective in equipping us to meet the front, meet the future, the future appears absolutely unexpected and our actions to tame or to prepare ourselves for that becomes highly, temporary and insufficient.

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Scott Lash (2001: ix-x) writes:

The individual of the first modernity is reflective while that of the second modernity is reflexive. The idea of reflective belongs to the philosophy of consciousness of the first modernity. And, to be fair, Habermas was one of the first to note this. To reflect is to somehow subsume the object under the subject of knowledge. Reflection presumes apodictic knowledge and certainty. It presumes a dualism, a scientific attitude in which the subject is in one realm, the object of knowledge in another. Beck's work from the very



Another major area that he looks into is the consequence of this reflexive modernization on subjectivity, on the whole question of trying to define who we are, how do we perceive ourselves? How do we understand ourselves? Can we have a more crystallized understanding

of who we are. So, those kinds of questions and it is very interesting points where he is kind of quoting Scott Lash, another important sociologist who summarized Beck himself.

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RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INDIVIDUALIZED, SOCIETY AND NATURE, between economy and state, etc. In order to clarify these arguments let us examine how they apply to subjectivity (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001).

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
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So, this is Scott Lash's summarization or summary of Beck himself, the individual, the first modernity is reflective, this is a very important point, I hope will give you some clarity about what is the distinction between reflexivity and reflectivity. So, usually, we say that sociology is a reflective science or modernity helps you to be a reflective, ability to think about to reflect on certain thing and then bring that and then constantly think about certain thing and then bring that information upon your action, so that you are always in that kind of thinking process.

The individual of the first modernity is reflective, while that of the second modernity is reflexive, the idea for reflective belonging to the philosophy of consciousness of the first modernity, and to be fair, Habermas was one of the first to note this, to reflect is to somehow subsume the object under the subject of knowledge.

So, in order to reflect, you have a subject and then you have a knowledge about it and then you try to understand that particular thing and then reflect over that, it presumes a dualism, a scientific attitude in which subject is in one realm, the object of knowledge in another. So, you keep yourself away and then you try to understand certain things objectively. So, this dualism was a very important premises of the first modernity,

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start has presupposed a critique of such objectivist knowledge, a critique of such dualisms, be they Cartesian or Kantian. Thus the objectivity of simple-modernity individualism is replaced by the intentionality of knowledge in the second modernity. This intentionality is again at centre stage in *Risk Society*.

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Beck's work from the very start has presupposed a critique of objectivist knowledge, a critique of such dualism, be they have Cartesian or Kantian. Thus is the objectivity of simple- modernity individualism is replaced by intentionality of knowledge in the second modernity. This individuality is again a centre stage of risk society. He is summarizing the risk society now tied with the ecological problematique

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now tied up with the ecological problematique. Science and industry for all their claims to objectivity, and to being somehow objective and outside of the world, are indeed in the world with their own proper interest-constituted intentionality. The problem here, although it is at the same time its saving grace, is that what is intended leads to the most extraordinary unintendedness, to side-effects, to unintended consequences.

The Cartesian subject of simple modernity, of Descartes' *Metaphysical Meditations* is reflective. So is the Kantian subject of determinate judgement. Beck often describes today's non-linear individual in terms of: not the 'I think therefore I am', but instead in terms of 'I am I'. 'I think, therefore I am' has to do with reflection. 'I am I' has more to do with reflex. And Beck often indeed works from the contrast of 'reflex' with 'reflection'. Reflexive he argues has more to do with reflex than reflection. Reflexes are indeterminate. They are immediate. They do not in any sense subsume. Reflexes cope with a world of speed and quick decision-making. The contemporary individual, Beck never tires of saying, is characterised by choice, where previous generations had no such choices. What Beck often omits to say is that this individual must choose fast, must – as in a reflex – make quick decisions. Second-modernity individuals haven't sufficient reflective distance on themselves to



The Cartesian subject of simple modernity or Descartes metaphysical meditations is reflective. So, is the Kantian subject of determinate judgment. Beck often describes you know the very or famous thing 'I think, therefore, I am'. So, here the ability of I think as entity and then to define themselves as a thinking entity he says is distinctly that of the modern period and in the reflective modernity, that is in something simply unavailable or impossible.

Today's nonlinear individual in terms of not the 'I think therefore I am', but instead in terms of 'I am, I think therefore', I am having to do with reflection, 'I am I' has more to do with reflex and beck often indeed work from the contrast of reflects with reflection. Reflexive, he argues

has more to do with reflex than reflection, reflexes are indeterminate. We often talk about the reflexive action when you, when somebody hits here, your hand moves and that is a reflexive action that that is not a product of your conscious thinking.

So, the argument of Beck is that in late modernity, everybody is in that permanent state of reflexivity. So, we do not get enough time or we are rather incapable of thinking and processing and reflecting over and then taking decision rather the pace of social change or the scenario of uncertainty is so large that we are forced to resort to these reflexive decisions immediately.

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us and so is knowledge. Only knowledge itself is of uncertainty. What happens now is not non-knowledge or anti-reason. Indeed the reflexive-modern individual is better educated, more knowledgeable than ever. Instead the type of knowledge at stake changes. It is itself precarious as distinct from certain, and what that knowledge is about is also uncertain – probabilistic, at best; more likely 'possibilistic'.

So what does the distinction between a first modern and a second modern subjectivity refer to?

Limited Sovereignty and Calculable Subjectivity. In first modern society, the subject was conceived of in terms of limited sovereignty and calculable subjectivity. The fundamental assumption was that certain boundaries were independently assigned and beyond an individual's control. Such non-optional boundaries were thought to provide the only framework that made

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So, what this distinction between first and modernity, second modernity subjectivity refers to? Limited sovereignty and calculable subjectivity was the first modern feature of first modern society. In first modern society the subject was conceived of in terms of limited sovereignty and calculable subjectivity, because you could think of, your sovereignty is limited, because you are a part of a society, but at the same time, you had a subjectivity which was something more crystallized.

And at the same time, in the second modernity that is different. The fundamental assumption was that certain boundaries were independently assigned and beyond and individual's control such non-optional boundaries were thought to provide only framework that made...

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stable identity and individuality possible. These unalterable, taken-for-granted boundaries were all based on various essentialist pictures of the world. Some of these world pictures based themselves on biology, like sexual differences, or differences in skin colour, or disparities inherent in human nature. Some were based on society and culture, like class differentials and differences in family structure. Some were even based on differences in technological development, like the differences between industrial and agricultural ways of life, or between degrees of involvement in transnational networks.

Under this scheme, individuals are supposed to create their lives by building upon pre-given patterns of occupation, family, gender, neighbourhood and nation. Subjectivity develops within the boundaries assigned by



stable identity and individual possible, these unalterable taken for granted boundaries were all based on various essentialist pictures of the world, some of the world pictures based on themselves on biology, like sexual differences or difference of skin colour. disparities inherent in human nature, somewhere based on society and culture like class differentials and differences in family structures.

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Under this scheme, individuals are supposed to create their lives by building upon pre-given patterns of occupation, family, gender, neighbourhood and nation. Subjectivity develops within the boundaries assigned by the life situation accompanying a given social position. Transgressions of these boundaries do not call them into question but rather confirm them through being regarded as deviances or exceptions. The inclusion of the individual in diverse social, institutional and cultural networks does not as a rule lead to contradictions, but rather to a single, well-defined, unambiguous social identity.

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A Multiplicity of Subject Boundaries. In reflexive modern society, such pre-given boundaries are undermined and overturned through the technological, economic, political and cultural processes of radicalized modernization. The end result is that the subject no longer has firm boundaries. There is instead a multiplicity of inclusionary and exclusionary practices, and, according to context, a multiplicity of ways that things are bounded off. The question 'What groups do I belong to?' can no longer be answered collectively



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Characterized thus, the situation fits the usual description of 'post-modern'. What would make it distinctively 'reflexive modern' would be if:

1. the multiplicity of subject boundaries were recognized and this recognition led to institutional turbulence (e.g. in the adjudication of citizenship rights or in the compiling of official statistics);
 2. the necessity of constructing fictional but consequential subject boundaries were accepted; and
3. a distinction arose to separate institutions of de facto exclusion and of de facto inclusion.



Now that situation he says is now leading to a multiplicity of subject boundaries. In the reflexive modern societies, such pre given boundaries are undermined and overthrown through the technological economic and political and cultural process of radical modernization.

So, anything that was crystallized, that would provide you some certain sense of a central subjectivity, Beck says he is now completely disturbed or scrambled or dismantled in the second modernity. The end result is that the subject no longer has firm boundaries; there is instead a multiplicity of inclusionary and exclusionary practices and according to context, a multiplicity of ways in which, they are bounded off.

The question, what group do I belong? Can no longer be answered collectively according to pre given social pattern, but must instead be answered individually with the reference to change probabilities and new stereotypes? Absolutely, you know, that the whole course of who am I? It is a very complicated question in the era of second modernity or reflexive modernity.

You cannot be defined or you will not be defined on the basis of your nationality or class or your caste, you could be born in a particular family, but you can end up as a very, very different person. In terms of your, for example, in terms of your sexual orientation, in terms of your orientation towards certain political ideologies, your orientation towards consumption, your orientation towards environment, a host of things, you could turn out to be very, very different position.

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Consequently, then, the question of the usual description of 'post-modern'. What would make it distinctively 'reflexive modern' would be if:

1. the multiplicity of subject boundaries were *recognized* and this recognition led to institutional turbulence (e.g. in the adjudication of citizenship rights or in the *compiling of official statistics*);
2. the necessity of constructing fictional but consequential subject boundaries were accepted; and
3. a distinction were to emerge between a *de jure* subject and a *de facto* one. That is to say, the idea of an acting and deciding subject were preserved as a legal fiction because decision-making would otherwise be impossible, but at the same time the impossibility and unreality of the 'sovereign subject' would be acknowledged as the underlying reality.

The Agents of Individualization Are Also Its Victims. Reflexive individualization is no longer, so to speak, 'autistic'. Instead it is conceived in terms of networks and interaction. And it produces side-effects on many levels, because what for one individual is the overstepping or overthrowing

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So, those are points, he says as the multiplicity of subject boundaries were recognized and this recognition led to institutional turbulence in the adjudication of citizenship rights and the compilation of official statistics, we know that now, every state is forced to have a category of others, male, female, and other.

So, such kind of things are becoming important and the necessity of constructing fictional but consequential subject boundaries were accepted and the distinction would emerge between a degenerate subject and a de facto one that is to say, the idea of an acting and deciding subject were preserved as a legal fiction because decision making would otherwise be impossible.

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conceptualization. The guiding assumption must be that the reflexive modern subject creates her network (and maintains it), where the simple modern subject interprets her network (through pre-given boundaries).

The multiplicity of subject boundaries can also be understood as the dissolution or displacement of the boundaries of individual responsibility. If it is no longer clear what group a person belongs to or where they reside, conflicts over responsibility are inevitable. Procedures that attempt to solve these problems have to grapple with conflicting rules, procedures and background information. The fact that the lines of responsibility are blurred and the subject unclearly defined means such procedures are of necessity complex. The attempt to reconcile such contradictory spheres of responsibility can lead to ethical dilemmas and a collective undecidability in which cases are decided at best arbitrarily. This is exactly the sort of situation in which the first modern ideal of a universal rationality that can successfully orient itself on the basis of clear principles proves itself to be an illusion.

The Quasi-subject. Against this new background, the individual can no longer be conceived of as a stable and unchangeable subject, but rather as a 'quasi-subject', the result as well as the producer of its networks, situation, location and form. The subject can no longer be conceived of as master of its surroundings within prescribed boundaries. Its rational action no longer constitutes nor guarantees a secure social order. But, paradoxically, the



So, all the time, you need a legal idea of a person, but in reality you might come across people who are very different and constantly at odd with this kind of illegal definition of human being.

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complex, the attempt to reconcile such contradictory spheres of responsibility can lead to ethical dilemmas and a collective undecidability in which cases are decided at best arbitrarily. This is exactly the sort of situation in which the first modern ideal of a universal rationality that can successfully orient itself on the basis of clear principles proves itself to be an illusion.

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The Internet is the obvious example of a de-spatialized means of societal inclusion that has been made possible by technological advance. It also provides an excellent example of the double character of sovereignty and dependency that characterizes the reflexive subject. The subject comes with a constellation that simultaneously constitutes it and renders it with



Now, another point is about the Quasi subject, a subject against this new background, the individual can no longer be conceived as a stable and unchangeable subject, but rather as a Quasi subject, the result as well as the producer of its network situation, location and form. But paradoxically, the individual remains and may only be more than ever effective decision maker, the author of his own self and his biography.

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enable self-expression, and reinforce it through public recognition. Both the self and the public develop in tandem.

In this way the tension between role expectations and role distance is replaced by a different dynamic. The subject becomes part of a self-selected network which allows connection and communication, but also makes it the object of the choices and decisions of others. Instead of being the planner and ruler of its own life, guided by pre-given principles, the subject is transformed into a constitutive part of a context that determines its subjectivity, and within which it exercises joint decision-making power. Quasi-subjectivity thus describes a situation of *socially constructed autonomy* that is understood and experienced as such.

The ambivalence and contradictory nature of this situation were well captured by Richard Sennett (1998). He summarized the very different reactions people have to the new situation of flexible employment by positing two different personality types, the 'surfer' and the 'drifter'. 'Surfers' accept as a given that there will be rapid changes of context, and that they need to respond to them actively. They try to be actively conscious of change as a means of steering. Surfing is the model of an activity that accepts that decisions must and can be made under conditions of uncertainty. It also rests on the idea that everything can be straightened out in the long run.

'Drifters', by contrast, experience the contingency and non-continuity of life as a loss and a threat. The multiplicity of subject boundaries appears



The argument is the whole idea that you are the master of your own actions, you are the author of your own actions, these only appear very, very hollow words, you realize that you are becoming increasingly incapable of taking your own decisions. So, the whole idea of agency, the whole idea of agency becomes problematic. So, he gives the example of from a surfer and a drifter, the surfer as in the case of first modernity and drifter in the case of a second modernity, just read it.

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decisiveness and too little can lead to pathologies. The first can lead to an overburdening of the decision-making process, or to an illusion of control where it does not in fact exist. The latter results in apathy. And both can be reinforced from small beginnings through repeated experience.

Periodization as a Heuristic Device

Against this background, it is possible to clarify the distinction between first modern and second modern society. Once again, the goal of this division is *not* to introduce a problematic new evolutionary periodization according to which one era comes abruptly to an end and a new one begins. It is not as if, at one point in time, all the old social relationships disappear and are replaced by brand new ones. The purpose of distinguishing between first and second modern society is methodological and pragmatic. In the first

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And the second next one is periodization of a heuristic as a heuristic device; there is a summary that is given.

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Table 2 Consequences for Subjectivity

	Simple, or first modern society	Reflexive, or second modern society	Postmodern society
<i>Institutional and subject boundaries</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Clearly assigned and indisputable subject boundaries defining all aspects of social life, including its institutional, cultural and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multiplicity of possible subject boundaries Recognition of the multiplicity of subject boundaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multiplicity of possible subject boundaries Necessity for the subjective drawing of boundaries not recognized





	Simple, or first modern society	Reflexive, or second modern society	Postmodern society
<i>Institutional and subject boundaries</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Clearly assigned and indisputable subject boundaries defining all aspects of social life, including its institutional, cultural and technical aspects Life trajectories steered within the limits set by these subject boundaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multiplicity of possible subject boundaries Recognition of the multiplicity of subject boundaries A necessity for the subjective drawing of boundaries, and their recognition as positive fictions Institutional, collective and individual difficulties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multiplicity of possible subject boundaries Necessity for the subjective drawing of boundaries not recognized Bricolage mentality: a pluralized, defoundationalizing subjectivity



And maybe this, these two tables, there is one more table one, which might help you to understand it simple or fast modern society, reflexive or second modern society and postmodern society. So, these tables will help you institutional and subject boundaries. They were clearly assigned and indisputable subject boundaries, defining all aspects of social life, including its institutional, cultural and technical aspects, here whether it is multiplicity both same recognition of the multiplicity are subject boundaries necessity, here necessity for the subjective drawing of boundaries not recognized.

So, the kind of difference between postmodernist and reflective modernity positions are given here. So, I think I will conclude here, you might have found this slightly difficult, but it is, I spent so much time on this because it is something important, maybe as a very important example of the sociological theorization against the postmodernist positions.

As you know, represented by a host of thinkers. So, read it again and if there are doubts or clarifications, you could always get in touch with me during either a live session or through the internet or emails or other things. So, see you in the next class and thank you.