

Globalization: Theoretical Perspectives
Professor R Santhosh
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

Lecture 14
Arjun Appadurai - 2

(Refer Slide Time: 0:15)

mental disjunctures between economy, culture, and politics that we have only begun to theorize.¹

I propose that an elementary framework for exploring such disjunctures is to look at the relationship among five dimensions of global cultural flows that can be termed (a) *ethnoscapes*, (b) *mediascapes*, (c) *technoscapes*, (d) *financescapes*, and (e) *ideoscapes*.² The suffix *-scape* allows us to point to the fluid, irregular shapes of these landscapes, shapes that characterize international capital as deeply as they do international clothing styles. These terms with the common suffix *-scape* also indicate that these are not objectively given relations that look the same from every angle of vision but, rather, that they are deeply perspectival constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of actors: nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as subnational groupings and movements (whether religious, political, or economic), and even intimate face-to-face groups, such as villages, neighborhoods, and families. Indeed, the individual actor is the last locus of this perspectival set of landscapes. These landscapes are eventually navigated by agents



Welcome back to the class, and we are continuing with the essay by Arjun Appadurai and today's class is a continuation of the previous session. We are discussing his essay disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy. As I mentioned in the previous class, Appadurai is considered one of the foremost anthropologists of globalization and a scholar from India. So, we mentioned in detail about his background, his overall contributions.

So, let us get into the remaining part of this essay without spending much time. So, this is an essay titled disjuncture and difference and it is taken from this book *Modernity at Large* which was published in 1996. And I will not be discussing each and every part of this essay. It is slightly lengthy, around 27-page long essay. Rather, I will be highlighting only some of the core arguments, the most important arguments.

So, in the previous class, we saw how he provided a very interesting introduction to this essay. And then disagrees with almost every major theorization on cultural globalization. He disagrees with this argument of Americanization. He disagrees with world system theory; he disagrees with quite a lot of (1:39) arguments about the relationship between culture and capital.

And then he came up with his original ideas; that is where we stopped in the previous class. He is introducing these 4 or 5 themes. I propose that an elementary framework for exploring such disjunctures is to examine the relationship among five dimensions of global cultural flows: ethnoscape, mediascape, technoscape, finanscape, and ideoscape. And he says that these terms with the common suffix *scape* also indicate that these are not objectively given relations that look the same from every angle of vision.

But rather, they are deeply perspectival constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic and political situatedness of different factors. It is a very complex sentence, but it is very important. See when you talk about a landscape, it is the term 'landscape' from where he has taken this. So, when you look at landscape, what does it mean? The landscape you understand has a large expansion of land in front of you.

And that it just explores in front of you, you cannot see the other end of that. It is just a huge expansive land unfolding in front of you. And this landscape gets different forms or landscape offers you different views depending upon your position. If you move to some other place, it gives a different view. So, Appadurai is using that kind of an argument.

He argues these terms with the common suffix '*scapes*' are also indicates that these are not objectively given relations that look the same from every angle of vision. They are not objective instead, they are deeply perspectival constructs, they are constructs emerging from different perspectives inflected by historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of factors.

So, these perspectival constructs are constructed by agents inflected by historical, sociological, geographical, and other features. And who are these actors? These actors are nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as subnational groups and movements, whether religious, political, or economic, and even intimate face-to-face groups, such as villages, neighbourhoods, and families. So, you can imagine the kind of complexity that he brings in, in this entire theorization.

(Refer Slide Time: 4:30)

...and, irregular shapes of these landscapes, shapes that characterize international capital as deeply as they do international clothing styles. These terms with the common suffix *-scape* also indicate that these are not objectively given relations that look the same from every angle of vision but, rather, that they are deeply perspectival constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of actors: nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as subnational groupings and movements (whether religious, political, or economic), and even intimate face-to-face groups, such as villages, neighborhoods, and families. Indeed, the individual actor is the last locus of this perspectival set of landscapes, for these landscapes are eventually navigated by agents who both experience and constitute larger formations, in part from their own sense of what these landscapes offer.

These landscapes thus are the building blocks of what (extending Benedict Anderson) I would like to call *imagined worlds*, that is, the multiple worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe (chap. 1). An important fact of



Indeed, the individual actor is the last locus in this perspectival set of landscapes, for these landscapes are eventually navigated by agents who both experience and constitute larger formations, in part from their own sense of what these landscapes offer. These landscapes thus are the building blocks of what extending Benedict Anderson's I would like to call 'imagined worlds'.

(Refer Slide Time: 4:55)

tion-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as subnational groupings and movements (whether religious, political, or economic), and even intimate face-to-face groups, such as villages, neighborhoods, and families. Indeed, the individual actor is the last locus of this perspectival set of landscapes, for these landscapes are eventually navigated by agents who both experience and constitute larger formations, in part from their own sense of what these landscapes offer.

These landscapes thus are the building blocks of what (extending Benedict Anderson) I would like to call *imagined worlds*, that is, the multiple worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe (chap. 1). An important fact of the world we live in today is that many persons on the globe live in such imagined worlds (and not just in imagined communities) and thus are able to contest and sometimes even subvert the imagined worlds of the official mind and of the entrepreneurial mentality that surround them.

By *ethnoscape*, I mean the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting



That is the multiple worlds that are constituted by historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread across global, across the globe.

(Refer Slide Time: 5:06)

the world we live in today is that many persons on the globe live in such imagined worlds (and not just in imagined communities) and thus are able to contest and sometimes even subvert the imagined worlds of the official mind and of the entrepreneurial mentality that surround them.

By *ethnoscape*, I mean the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals constitute an essential feature of the world and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree. This is not to say that there are no relatively stable communities or networks of kinship, friendship, work, and leisure, as well as of birth, residence, and other filial forms. But it is to say that the warp of these stabilities is everywhere shot through with the woof

Disjuncture and Difference

≈ 33 ≈



Now, he then elaborates what does this ethnoscape means. So ethnoscape in simple sense is a term that indicates about the people, ethno is about people. Ethnoscape means the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live, not the native people who live in a particular geographic area; it is not that.


But rather, it is the shifting, changing, changing flow of people tourist, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers and others moving groups and individual constitute an essential feature of the world and appear to affect the politics of and between nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree. So, one of his components ethnoscape is about the people of whom you see as moving around. And that includes all these categories.

(Refer Slide Time: 5:59)

in South India as well as in Switzerland, just as the Hmong are driven to London as well as to Philadelphia. And as international capital shifts its needs, as production and technology generate different needs, as nation-states shift their policies on refugee populations, these moving groups can never afford to let their imaginations rest too long, even if they wish to.

By *technoscape*, I mean the global configuration, also ever fluid, of technology and the fact that technology, both high and low, both mechanical and informational, now moves at high speeds across various kinds of previously impervious boundaries.

Many countries now are the roots of multinational enterprise: a huge steel complex in Libya may involve interests from India, China, Russia, and Japan, providing different components of new technological configurations. The odd distribution of technologies, and thus the peculiarities of these technoscapes, are increasingly driven not by any obvious economies of scale, of political control, or of market rationality but by increasingly complex relationships among money flows, political possibilities, and the availability of both un- and highly skilled labor. So, while India



And we know that the movement of people is at a heightened pace in our contemporary era compare to any other periods. Second is the technoscape I mean the global configuration ever so fluid of technology and the fact that technology, both high and

low, both mechanical and informational, now moves at high speeds across various kinds of previously impervious boundaries.

I do not think that we need to reemphasize this whole point of how technology has changed the globe. How technology in the form of informationalism, the form of the internet, artificial intelligence, machine learning, the world wide web, and a host of new changes are completely transforming our social world. So, he is using the term technoscape to elaborate that.

(Refer Slide Time: 6:50)



stiles at blinding speed, with vast, absolute implications for small differences in percentage points and time units. But the critical point is that the global relationship among ethnoscap, technoscapes, and financescapes is deeply disjunctive and profoundly unpredictable because each of these landscapes is subject to its own constraints and incentives (some political, some informational, and some technoenvironmental), at the same time as each acts as a constraint and a parameter for movements in the others. Thus, even an elementary model of global political economy must take into account the deeply disjunctive relationships among human movement, technological flow, and financial transfers. Further refracting these disjunctures (which hardly form a simple, me-



And then it is useful to speak of finanscape, as the disposition of global capital is now a more mysterious, rapid, and difficult landscape to follow than ever before. Now from where does capital flow happen, what is the origin? what is its direction? where is it leading to? These all have become extremely difficult calculations, as currency markets, national stock exchanges, and commodity speculations move mega money through national turnstiles at blinding speed with vast absolute implications for smaller differences in percentage points and time units.

But the critical point is that the global relationship among ethnoscape, technoscape, and finanscape is deeply disjunctive and profoundly unpredictable because each of these landscapes are subjected to its own constraints and incentives. So, his argument is that the ethnoscape, technoscape, and finanscape their relationship is deeply disjunctive. They are not one and the same. You will not find groups of people and the technology and finance all coming together, and deeply sitting together or it existing together.

They are deeply disjunctive, deeply separated and profoundly unpredictable because each of these landscapes is subject to its own constraints and incentives, and some political, some informational, some technoenvironmental, at the same time as each act as a constraint and parameter for movements for others.

(Refer Slide Time: 8:28)

into account the deeply disjunctive relationships among human movement, technological flow, and financial transfers.

Further refracting these disjunctures (which hardly form a simple, mechanical global infrastructure in any case) are what I call *mediascapes* and *ideoscapes*, which are closely related landscapes of images. *Mediascapes* refer both to the distribution of the electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate information (newspapers, magazines, television stations, and film-production studios), which are now available to a growing number of private and public interests throughout the world, and to the images of the world created by these media. These images involve many complicated reflections, depending on their mode (documentary or entertainment), their hardware (electronic or preelectronic), their audiences (local, national, or transnational), and the interests of those who own and control them. What is most important about these mediascapes is that they provide (especially in their television, film, and cassette forms) large and complex repertoires of images, narratives, and ethnoscapings to viewers throughout



So, further refracting these disjunctures that hardly form a simple, mechanical global infrastructure case are what I call mediascape, and ideoscape that are closely related to the landscape of images. Mediascapes refer to both to the distribution of the electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate information newspapers, magazines, television stations, and film production studios which are now available to a growing number of private and public interest throughout the world, and to the images of the world created by this media.

Now, imagine he is not mentioning about the internet, he is not mentioning about Facebook, he is not mentioning about social media because this essay was written before these things became buzzwords and then imagine how Appadurai's prediction has come to effect in the contemporary field. So, he is talking about the capabilities of this media to produce and disseminate information.

And I do not need to explain that social media has a completely different, it has provided a completely different set of meanings to these arguments. Compared to the more traditional, conventional media, what does social media do to the people. And the relationship between larger multinational companies' corporations and with that of this new social media and the corporate connection behind it.

The corporate interest behind it. The whole debate and discussion about the post-truth world. The whole debate about misinformation about fault news, fake news, and fake

news is the most important one. There are accusations about Facebook involving directly or Facebook being manipulated in the American elections. So, we are living in a completely different world, and Appadurai was quite insightful in talking about that.

(Refer Slide Time: 10:43)

boards. The lines between the realistic and the fictional landscapes they see are blurred, so that the farther away these audiences are from the direct experiences of metropolitan life, the more likely they are to construct imagined worlds that are chimerical, aesthetic, even fantastic objects, particularly if assessed by the criteria of some other perspective, some other imagined world.

Mediascapes, whether produced by private or state interests, tend to be image-centered, narrative-based accounts of strips of reality, and what they offer to those who experience and transform them is a series of elements (such as characters, plots, and textual forms) out of which scripts can be formed of imagined lives, their own as well as those of others living in other places. These scripts can and do get disaggregated into complex

Disjuncture and Difference
≈ 35 ≈



So, discussing the importance of mediascape, how mediascape plays a very important role in this projection of imaginations. Mediascape whether produced by private or state interest tend to be image centered. Narrative-based accounts of strips of reality, and what they offer to those who experience and transform them is a series of elements such as characters, plots, and textual forms out of which scripts can be formed into imagined lives, their own as well as of others living in other places. So, talking about how these images are kept.

(Refer Slide Time: 11:13)

sets of metaphors by which people live (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) as they help to constitute narratives of the Other and protonarratives of possible lives, fantasies that could become prolegomena to the desire for acquisition and movement.

Ideoscapes are also concatenations of images, but they are often directly political and frequently have to do with the ideologies of states and the counterideologies of movements explicitly oriented to capturing state power or a piece of it. These ideoscapes are composed of elements of the Enlightenment worldview, which consists of a chain of ideas, terms, and images, including freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, representation, and the master term democracy. The master narrative of the Enlightenment (and its many variants in Britain, France, and the United States) was constructed with a certain internal logic and presupposed a certain relationship between reading, representation, and the public sphere. (For the dynamics of this process in the early history of the United States, see Warner 1990.) But the diaspora of these terms and images across the world, especially



And finally, the ideoscape are also concatenations of images, but they are often directly political and frequently have to do with the ideologies of the state and the

counter ideologies of movements explicitly oriented to capturing state power or a piece of that. So, he is talking about the power of ideologists. Why have certain ideologists become so powerful? Why these ideologists have become being part of these state narratives. And why certain other ideologists have become the part of ordinary people or counter movements fighting against the state's power.

These ideoscape are composed of elements of the enlightenment worldview, consisting of a chain of ideas, terms, and images, including freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, representation, and master term democracy. These terms have become more institutionalized, entrenched because they emerged in the European enlightenment context and then later spread across the globe.

So, it is very interesting to see how these terms are liberal democratic terms. These liberal enlightenment terms have been appropriated, have been used by different sections of people. So, he has very interesting discussions that maybe you could read explaining again how these ideas get transformed, how these ideas get misused or disused in different contexts, and how different powerful groups manipulate them.

So, none of these terms or none of these ideas exist in a vacuum; none of these ideas exist as ideal types which can be seen in other places. So, it is a very fascinating argument that he comes up with many examples of illustrations from across the globe.

(Refer Slide Time: 13:14)

rhetoric encoded in a political document. The very relationship of reading to hearing and seeing may vary in important ways that determine the morphology of these different ideoscapes as they shape themselves in different national and transnational contexts. This globally variable synaesthesia has hardly even been noted, but it demands urgent analysis. Thus democracy has clearly become a master term, with powerful echoes from Haiti and Poland to the former Soviet Union and China, but it sits at the center of a variety of ideoscapes, composed of distinctive pragmatic configurations of rough translations of other central terms from the vocabulary of the Enlightenment. This creates ever new terminological kaleidoscopes, as states (and the groups that seek to capture them) seek to pacify populations whose own ethnoscaes are in motion and whose mediascapes may create severe problems for the ideoscapes with which they are presented. The fluidity of ideoscapes is complicated in particular by the growing diasporas (both voluntary and involuntary) of intellectuals who continuously inject new meaning streams into the discourse of democracy in different parts of



So, now for example, this democracy has become a master term with powerful echoes from Haiti and Poland to the former Soviet Union and China, but it sits at the centre of a variety of ideoscape, composed of distinctive pragmatic configurations of rough translations of other central terms such as vocabulary of the enlightenment. And you know what does democracy means in a country like China?

What does democracy mean in different contexts? What does democracy mean in India is very different from what does democracy mean in other countries? So, he is talking about those kinds of differences.

(Refer Slide Time: 13:54)

fluidity of ideoscapes is complicated in particular by the growing diasporas (both voluntary and involuntary) of intellectuals who continuously inject new meaning-streams into the discourse of democracy in different parts of the world.

This extended terminological discussion of the five terms I have coined sets the basis for a tentative formulation about the conditions under which current global flows occur: they occur in and through the growing disjunctures among ethnoscape, technoscape, financescape, mediascape, and ideoscapes. This formulation, the core of my model of global cultural flow, needs some explanation. First, people, machinery, money, images, and ideas now follow increasingly nonisomorphic paths; of course, at all periods in human history, there have been some disjunctures in the flows of these things, but the sheer speed, scale, and volume of each of these flows are now so great that disjunctures have become central to the politics of global culture. The Japanese are notoriously hospitable to ideas and are stereotyped as inclined to export (all) and import (some) goods, but they are also notoriously closed to immigration. Like the Swiss, the



Now, the most important theorization is the central theme of his argument. If somebody asks you what the central theme of Appadurai's argument about disjuncture and difference is it. He mentions a term clearly. He argues that this extended terminological discussion of the five terms I have coined sets the basis for a tentative formulation about the conditions under which current global flows occur.

So, his way of theorization talks about five different scapes: ethnoscape, technoscape, financescape, mediascape, and ideoscape. And he qualified it. What does he mean by this term scape and how complex the terms itself is, their perspectival and constructs of individual state, powerful groups, and social actions inflected by a host of historical, political, social, cultural, and geographic factors?

And he argues this is a tentative formulation about the conditions under which global current global flows occur. So, he is going to define what is, how does cultural current global flow happen. What kind of current cultural global flow happens? What is the kind of transformation happening in the contemporary globalized society? They occur in and through the growing disjunctures among ethnoscape, technoscape, financescape, mediascape, and ideoscape.


So, he argues that current global flows of whether it is of money, of people, of ideas anything they happen through growing disjunctures among these things. These things are not the same; there is an increase in differences, an increase in separations, and

This formulation is the core of my model of global cultural flows, which needs some explanation.

First, people, machinery, money, images, and ideas now follow increasingly nonisomorphic paths, and they do not go together alone. You will not see all of them sitting together, all of them existing together, of course, all periods of human history have been some disjunctures in the flows of things, but the sheer speed, scale, and volume of each of these flows are now so great that the disjunctures have become central to the politics of global culture.

So, the differences through which the cultural flows happen are happening through an increase in disjuncture between these five important scapes that define the contemporary global scenario.

(Refer Slide Time: 16:38)



... politics of global culture. The Japanese are notoriously hospitable to ideas and are stereotyped as inclined to export (all) and import (some) goods, but they are also notoriously closed to immigration, like the Swiss, the Swedes, and the Saudis. Yet the Swiss and the Saudis accept populations of guest workers, thus creating labor diasporas of Turks, Italians, and other circum-Mediterranean groups. Some such guest-worker groups maintain continuous contact with their home nations, like the Turks, but others, like high-level South Asian migrants, tend to desire lives in their new homes, raising anew the problem of reproduction in a deterritorialized context.

Deterritorialization, in general, is one of the central forces of the modern world because it brings laboring populations into the lower-class sectors and spaces of relatively wealthy societies, while sometimes creating exaggerated and intensified senses of criticism or attachment to politics in

Disjuncture and Difference
≈ 37 ≈

So, he gives examples and talks about an example of this deterritorialization. Deterritorialization, in general, is one of the central forces of the modern world because it brings labouring populations into the lower-class sectors and spaces of relatively wealthy societies while sometimes creating an exaggerated and intensified sense of criticisms or attachment to the politics in the home state.

(Refer Slide Time: 17 :05)



the home state. Deterritorialization, whether of Hindus, Sikhs, Palestinians, or Ukrainians, is now at the core of a variety of global fundamentalisms, including Islamic and Hindu fundamentalism. In the Hindu case, for example, it is clear that the overseas movement of Indians has been exploited by a variety of interests both within and outside India to create a complicated network of finances and religious identifications, by which the problem of cultural reproduction for Hindus abroad has become tied to the politics of Hindu fundamentalism at home.

At the same time, deterritorialization creates new markets for film companies, art impresarios, and travel agencies, which thrive on the need of the deterritorialized population for contact with its homeland. Naturally, these invented homelands, which constitute the mediascapes of deterritorialized groups, can often become sufficiently fantastic and one-sided that they provide the material for new ideoscapes in which ethnic conflicts can begin to erupt. The creation of Khalistan, an invented homeland of the de-



Deterritorialization, whether Hindu, Sikhs, Palestinians, or Ukrainians, is now at the core of the variety of global fundamentalism, including Islamic and Hindu fundamentalism. So, what does he mean to be deterritorialized? Look at the case of diasporic communities, communities say the Indian diaspora in Europe or Indian diaspora in the US. These are the people born and brought up in India but those who decide to live somewhere else.

So, there is a substantial section of the Indian population there in the US. And they are according to Appadurai and others they have a deterritorialized sense of Indian identity. They are Indian, but they live somewhere else. And then, for them, Indian tradition is something that they will have to really recreate very consciously out there. And that can take very different forms.

He says that in the Hindu case, for example, it is clear that the overseas movement of Indians has been exploited by a variety of interests both within and outside India to create a complicated network of finances and religious identifications by which the problem of cultural reproduction of Hindus abroad has been tied to the politics of Hindu fundamentalism at home. Many Hindu organizations in the US support the rise of Hindu nationalism back in India because they see it as a part of political activities.

(Refer Slide Time: 18:28)

The Gulf, Bombay, and Kerala are other theaters for the enactment of the bloody negotiation between existing nation-states and various deterritorialized groupings.



It is in the fertile ground of deterritorialization, in which money, commodities, and persons are involved in ceaselessly chasing each other around the world, that the mediascapes and ideoscapes of the modern world find their fractured and fragmented counterpart. For the ideas and images produced by mass media often are only partial guides to the goods and experiences that deterritorialized populations transfer to one another.¹ In Mira Nair's brilliant film *India Cabaret*, we see the multiple loops of this fractured deterritorialization as young women, barely competent in Bombay's metropolitan glitz, come to seek their fortunes as cabaret dancers and prostitutes in Bombay, entertaining men in clubs with dance formats derived wholly from the prurient dance sequences of Hindi films. These scenes in turn cater to ideas about Western and foreign women and their looseness, while they provide tawdry career alibis for these women. Some of these women come from Kerala, where cabaret clubs and the porno-



So, he says that it is in the fertile ground of deterritorialization, in which money, commodities, and persons are involved in ceaselessly chasing each other around the world, that the mediascapes and ideoscape of the modern world find their fractured and fragmented counterpart. The ideas and images produced by mass media are often partially guided to the goods and experiences that deterritorialized populations transfer to one another.

So, he is talking about the constant flow of people and how this constant flow of people also accompanies the flow of different ideas, images, media, and a host of other things. He gives an example of Mira Nair's film *Indian Cabaret*. He provides an example of people from the gulf returning to Kerala, bringing Cabaret cassette of soft phonography cassette. A whole lot of illustrations and examples are given in this section. So please read that.

(Refer Slide Time: 19:30)

about the Other, the conveniences and seductions of travel, the economics of global trade, and the brutal mobility fantasies that dominate gender politics in many parts of Asia and the world at large.

While far more could be said about the cultural politics of deterritorialization and the larger sociology of displacement that it expresses, it is appropriate at this juncture to bring in the role of the nation-state in the disjunctive global economy of culture today. The relationship between states and nations is everywhere an embattled one. It is possible to say that in many societies the nation and the state have become one another's projects. That is, while nations (or more properly groups with ideas about nationhood) seek to capture or co-opt states and state power, states simultaneously seek to capture and monopolize ideas about nationhood (Baruah 1986; Chatterjee 1986; Nandy 1989a). In general, separatist transnational movements, including those that have resorted to terror in their methods, exemplify nations in search of states. Sikhs, Tamil Sri Lankans, Basques, Moros, Quebecois—each of these represents imagined communities that



So, while far more could be said about the cultural politics of deterritorialization and the largest sociological displacement that it expresses, it is appropriate at this juncture to bring in the role of the nation state in the disjunctive global economy of culture today. So, what does the global state do in this kind of a scenario? Where people are moving across the globe, many people are coming and then settling down in your place, and many of your own population live somewhere else and imagine the case of European societies.

The contemporary, for example, the case of Germany. So, Germany has quite a lot of refugee populations. Germany has a quite a lot of asylum seekers. Germany has many people from countries like India or Pakistan who have come there as skilled laborers. So, a country like Germany or most Western European countries is forced to deal with many populations from other places. Britain is an excellent example in that sense.

The relationship between states and nations is everywhere an embattled one. And it is a very interesting point that he is talking about. It is possible to say that the nation and the state have become one another's projects in many societies. So, what does it mean? While nations or, more appropriately, groups with the idea about nationhood seek to capture or co-opt states and state power, states simultaneously seek to capture and monopolize ideas about nationhood.


So, he is talking about the kind of tension between the state and the nation. Usually, we talk about the nation as the people belonging to a particular geographic area and think that the state has complete authority over the people. So that is why you use the term nations state either as a single term or with a hyphen indicating that they are the same. The people who belong to a particular territory will have and identify themselves with the state.

But it is not the case different sections of people, different groups of people will have different ideas about their nationality. So, they will not agree with the state power. So that is why quite a lot of secessionist groups emerge across the globe. You had serious cases of Tamil secessionism in Sri Lanka, in India we had the Khalistan movement, we had secessions moments in the Northeast, in Kashmir we have still have, so these ideas are really put forward. This important tension between the idea of nation as celebrated harboured by small section of population and that of the state power.

So, the state tries to capture or co-opt the nation or, more appropriately, groups with the ideas about nationhood seek to capture or co-opt states and state power. States simultaneously seeks to capture and monopolize ideas about nationhood.

(Refer Slide Time: 22:30)

and nations is everywhere an embattled one. It is possible to say that in many societies the nation and the state have become one another's projects. That is, while nations (or more properly groups with ideas about nationhood) seek to capture or co-opt states and state power, states simultaneously seek to capture and monopolize ideas about nationhood (Baruah 1986; Chatterjee 1986; Nandy 1989a). In general, separatist transnational movements, including those that have included terror in their methods, exemplify nations in search of states. Sikhs, Tamil Sri Lankans, Basques, Moros, Quebecois—each of these represents imagined communities that seek to create states of their own or carve pieces out of existing states. States, on the other hand, are everywhere seeking to monopolize the moral resources of community, either by flatly claiming perfect coequality between nation and state, or by systematically museumizing and representing all the groups within them in a variety of heritage politics that seems remarkably uniform throughout the world (Handler 1988; Herzfeld 1982; McQueen 1988).



In general, he gives quite a lot of examples about these separatist national movements.

(Refer Slide Time: 22:39)

1982; McQueen 1988).

Here, national and international mediascapes are exploited by nation-states to pacify separatists or even the potential fissiparousness of all ideas of difference. Typically, contemporary nation-states do this by exercising taxonomic control over difference, by creating various kinds of international spectacle to domesticate difference, and by seducing small groups with the fantasy of self-display on some sort of global or cosmopolitan stage. One important new feature of global cultural politics, tied to the disjunctive relationships among the various landscapes discussed earlier, is that state and nation are at each other's throats, and the hyphen that links them is now less an icon of conjuncture than an index of disjuncture. This disjunctive relationship between nation and state has two levels: at the level of any given nation-state, it means that there is a battle of the imagination, with state and nation seeking to cannibalize one another. Here is the seedbed of brutal separatisms—majoritarianisms that seem to have appeared from nowhere and microidentities that have become political pro-



Nation-states exploit national and international mediascapes to pacify separatists or potential fissiparousness of all ideas of difference. And he invites your attention to how nation-states manipulate the media to talk about the kind of a singular nationalist idea. One important new feature of global cultural politics tied to the disjunctive relationship among the various landscapes discussed earlier is the state and the nation are at each other's throats, and the hyphen that links them is now less an icon of conjuncture than an index of disjuncture.

So, he is saying that the political power as represented by the state and the people's aspirations as represented by the nation need not go together. So, they are at each other's throat. This disjunctive relationship between the nation and state has two levels at the level of any given nation-state. It means that there is a battle of imagination, with the state and nation seeking to cannibalize one another. Here is the seedbed of brutal separatism majoritarianism that seem to have appeared from nowhere and micro identities that have become political projects within nation state.

(Refer Slide Time: 24:09)

jects within the nation-state. At another level, this disjunctive relationship is deeply entangled with the global disjunctures discussed throughout this chapter: ideas of nationhood appear to be steadily increasing in scale and regularly crossing existing state boundaries, sometimes, as with the Kurds, because previous identities stretched across vast national spaces or, as with the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the dormant threads of a transnational diaspora have been activated to ignite the micropolitics of a nation-state.

In discussing the cultural politics that have subverted the hyphen that links the nation to the state, it is especially important not to forget the mooring of such politics in the irregularities that now characterize disorganized capital (Kothari 1999a; Leach and Ullrich 1997). Because labor forces



S

At another level, this disjunctive relationship is deeply entangled with the global disjuncture discussed throughout this chapter. Ideas of nationhood appear to be steadily increasing in scale and regularly crossing existing state boundaries, sometimes, as with the Kurds, because previous identities stretched across vast national spaces or with the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the dormant threads of a transnational diaspora have been activated to ignite micropolitics of a nations-state.

So, he is looking at this tension at two levels one within the geographical region of the nation, which mostly takes the form of majoritarianism, where the majority of the people who live in that particular country want to define it after them. They want a national culture, for example, in the case of India, you can say that there is one kind of argument that Indian culture must be defined on the basis of the dominant religion, or there are similar arguments in Germany.

Similar arguments in America or in Poland or in different countries that their national culture needs to be defined on the basis of the dominant majority communities. So that is one type of this kind of a struggle or tussle that is going on. The other one, he says that these diaspora communities provide the spread of such kind of imagination for example the Tamil, Eelam moment in Sri Lanka was heavily benefited by the diasporic Tamils in say for example in Canada, or in other places, or who live in the UK, or Germany, or other places. So, there are quite a lot of illustrations and examples you can go through that.

(Refer Slide Time: 25:51)

state security, in terror, and in police and military activity, is a reminder that apparently simple technical uniformities often conceal an increasingly complex set of loops, linking images of violence to aspirations for community in some imagined world.



Returning then to the ethnoscape with which I began, the central paradox of ethnic politics in today's world is that primordia (whether of language or skin color or neighborhood or kinship) have become globalized. That is, sentiments, whose greatest force is in their ability to ignite intimacy into a political state and turn locality into a staging ground for identity, have become spread over vast and irregular spaces as groups move yet stay linked to one another through sophisticated media capabilities.

This is not to deny that such primordia are often the product of invented traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) or respective affiliations, but to emphasize that because of the disjunctive and unstable interplay of commerce, media, national policies, and consumer fantasies, ethnicity, once a genie contained in the bottle of some sort of locality



Returning then to the ethnoscape I began, the central paradox of ethnic politics in today's world is primordia. Primordia means it is your primordial affinity to the things you are born into, your cast, your religion, your ethnic identity, your nationality, and other stuff. Primordia, whether of language or skin colour or neighborhood or kinship have become globalized. That is, sentiments, whose greatest force is in their ability to ignite intimacy into a political state and turn the locality into a staging ground for identity have become spread over vast and irregular spaces as groups move yet stay linked to each another through sophisticated media capabilities.

This is a central theme of his argument and not only his argument that of the cultural understanding of globalization. The primordia, the very strong sense of affinity that we feel towards our own people. So, does it mean to be our own people? Our own people with whom we share this kind of ethnic identity, skin color, language, cast, religion, ethnicity, and tribe. And these people if once they use to historically, they use to live in a given geographic area.

And then that used to be quite fine because they constitute a community. They live together, and now they have spread across the globe and yet from these different localities of the globe they are able to connect with each other with the help of this media and then communication facilities. And they reignite different kinds of passion. They reignite a different kind of imagination. And these imaginations as social practices are extremely potential, according to Appadurai.

(Refer Slide Time: 27:36)

interplay of commerce, media, national policies, and consumer fantasies, ethnicity, once a genie contained in the bottle of some sort of locality (however large), has now become a global force, forever slipping in and through the cracks between states and borders.

But the relationship between the cultural and economic levels of this new set of global disjunctures is not a simple one-way street in which the terms of global cultural politics are set wholly by, or confined wholly within, the vicissitudes of international flows of technology, labor, and finance, demanding only a modest modification of existing neo-Marxist models of uneven development and state formation. There is a deeper change, itself driven by the disjunctures among all the landscapes I have discussed and constituted by their continuously fluid and uncertain interplay, that concerns the relationship between production and consumption in today's global economy. Here, I begin with Marx's famous (and often mined) view of the fetishism of the commodity and suggest that this fetishism has been replaced in the world at large (now seeing the world as




So, then he brings in the relationship between cultural and economic levels of this new set of global disjuncture is not a simple one. What is the relationship between the kind of a cultural and economic level? It is not a one-way street in which the terms of global cultural politics are set wholly, or confined wholly within the vicissitude of international flow of technology labour and finance, demanding only a modest modification of existing neo-Marxist models of uneven development of state information.

So, where does the kind of tension between culture and economy come from? Is it that the economy completely decides everything and then the culture has to adjust with that? No, here he says that the disjunctures drive a deeper change among all the landscapes I have discussed and constructed by their continuously fluid and uncertain interplay that concerns the relationship between production and consumption in today's global economy. So here there is some very interesting argument about the whole idea of production and consumption.

(Refer Slide Time: 28:40)

within, the vicissitudes of international flows of technology, labor, and finance, demanding only a modest modification of existing neo-Marxist models of uneven development and state formation. There is a deeper change, itself driven by the disjunctures among all the landscapes I have discussed and constituted by their continuously fluid and uncertain interplay, that concerns the relationship between production and consumption in today's global economy. Here, I begin with Marx's famous (and often mined) view of the fetishism of the commodity and suggest that this fetishism has been replaced in the world at large (now seeing the world as one large, interactive system, composed of many complex subsystems) by two mutually supportive descendants, the first of which I call production fetishism and the second, the fetishism of the consumer.

By production fetishism I mean an illusion created by contemporary trans-




He says that here I begin with Marx's famous and often mined view of the fetishism of a commodity and suggest that this fetishism has been replaced in the world at large. Now seeing the world as one large interactive system composed of many complex systems by the two mutually supportive descendants, the first of which I call production fetishism and the second fetishism of the consumers.

I hope that you have some familiarity with the Marxian idea about the fetishism of a commodity. So, Marx argued that a commodity very efficiently masks the human labour involved in the capitalist era. And it efficiently masks the human labour involved in it and it became a fetish. For example, some of these high brand value are not used for its utilitarian purpose, things are not used or valued for their utility rather it becomes a fetish, certain brands become a fetish, certain items certain consumer items become a fetish.

So, once things become a fetish it really prevents or it really masks the kind of a real economic relations behind its production. That is the Marxian argument about the fetishism of commodities. Now Appadurai is arguing that that is not the predominant tendency now of course it exists but more important is the fetishism of production and fetishism of the consumer itself. So, what does he mean by that? By production fetishism, I mean an illusion created by contemporary transnational production loci

(Refer Slide Time: 30:25)



national production loci that masks translocal capital, transnational earning flows, global management, and often faraway workers (engaged in various kinds of high-tech putting-out operations) in the idiom and spectacle of local (sometimes even worker) control, national productivity, and territorial sovereignty. To the extent that various kinds of free-trade zones have become the models for production at large, especially of high-tech commodities, production has itself become a fetish, obscuring not social relations as such but the relations of production, which are increasingly transnational. The locality (both in the sense of the local factory or site of production and in the extended sense of the nation-state) becomes a fetish that disguises the globally dispersed forces that actually drive the production process. This generates alienation (in Marx's sense) twice intensified for its social sense is now compounded by a complicated spatial dynamic that is increasingly global.

that masks trans-local capital, transnational earning flows, global management, and often faraway workers engaged in various kinds of high-tech-putting out operations in idiom and spectacle of local sometimes even worker control national productivity, and territorial sovereignty. So, he is saying that this whole production has become so what should I say, so difficult to discern, so difficult to disentangle in a globalized form of production.

For example, any product that comes to you whether it is mentioned, it is made in China, or made in India most of time we get to see things electronic stuff made in China. So, what does it mean 'made in China'? Does it mean that it is completely made by the people of China in China? Or is it because it is made by a company owned by Chinese? Where does this capital flow come from? What is the role of Indian companies in importing them?

Who are the people who actually worked there? So, these are things completely opaque. It is absolutely difficult for us to discern what is the kind of network of production. For iconic company like Apple, their most important manufacturing hub is in China. So, what is the kind of a production process involved in American iconic company like Apple.

So, similarly, he argues that these modern forms of capitalism completely mask this production process, it is completely opaque. It is not like the earlier place where you see a company owned by a family or by a man and he is the bourgeoisie and he has all the workers and their particular product is completely produced there from scratch. That has completely disappeared and we are in an extremely complicated form of production.


And he says to the extent that various kinds of free trade zones have become the modes of production at large, especially high-tech commodities, production has itself become a fetish, obscuring the social relations as such but the relations of production which are increasingly transnational. The relations of production between the people who owned the means of production and the people who do not own.

The locality both in the sense of the local factory or site of production and in the extended sense of the nation state becomes a fetish that disguises the globally dispersed forces that actually drive the production process. So, he is saying that there is a production fetishism.

(Refer Slide Time: 33:16)

ing flows, global management, and often faraway workers (engaged in various kinds of high-tech putting-out operations) in the idiom and spectacle of local (sometimes even worker) control, national productivity, and territorial sovereignty. To the extent that various kinds of free-trade zones have become the models for production at large, especially of high-tech commodities, production has itself become a fetish, obscuring not social relations as such but the relations of production, which are increasingly transnational. The locality (both in the sense of the local factory or site of production and in the extended sense of the nation-state) becomes a fetish that disguises the globally dispersed forces that actually drive the production process. This generates alienation (in Marx's sense) twice intensified, for its social sense is now compounded by a complicated spatial dynamic that is increasingly global. *

As for the *fetishism of the consumer*, I mean to indicate here that the consumer has been transformed through commodity flows (and the mediascapes, especially of advertising, that accompany them) into a sign, both



It generates alienation in Marx's sense which is twice intensified for its social sense is now compounded by a complicated spatial dynamic that is increasingly global.

(Refer Slide Time: 33:28)

for its social sense is now compounded by a complicated spatial dynamic that is increasingly global.

As for the *fetishism of the consumer*, I mean to indicate here that the consumer has been transformed through commodity flows (and the mediascapes, especially of advertising, that accompany them) into a sign, both in Baudrillard's sense of a simulacrum that only asymptotically approaches the form of a real social agent, and in the sense of a mask for the real seat of agency, which is not the consumer but the producer and the many forces that constitute production. Global advertising is the key technology for the worldwide dissemination of a plethora of creative and culturally well-chosen ideas of consumer agency. These images of agency are increasingly distortions of a world of merchandising so subtle that the consumer is consistently helped to believe that he or she is an actor, where in fact he or she is at best a chooser.

The globalization of culture is not the same as its homogenization, but globalization involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization



We know that many of our people, many of our relatives, or friends who have working in companies they may not even know what they are producing, they may not even know for whom they are producing, it becomes a completely different scenario now. Then as for fetishism of the consumer, I mean to indicate here that the consumer has been transformed through the random, through commodity flows and the mediascapes especially advertising that accompany them into a sign, both in Baudrillard's sense of simulacrum that only asymptotically approaches the form of a real social agent. And in the sense of a mask for the real seat of agency, which is not the consumer but the producer and the many forces that constitute process.


So, he is talking about Baudrillard's sense of simulacrum that we are always, we are, he is talking about the hyper realities. We are always in a sense of simulacrum. The argument is that the advertisements provide you with a sense of empowerment. Advertisement is asking you to choose from the wider options that are available, and advertisements tell you that the consumer is the king, consumer has the ability to choose from whatever the available options.

But ultimately the consumer is not the chooser, the options are already laid out, your needs are already laid out, your demands are already laid out by the corporates. And the advertisements are only to lure you, only to attract you to these available spaces and then ask me to choose whatever is required for you.

(Refer Slide Time: 35:11)

ally well-chosen ideas of consumer agency. These images of agency are increasingly distortions of a world of merchandising so subtle that the consumer is consistently helped to believe that he or she is an actor, where in fact he or she is at best a chooser.

The globalization of culture is not the same as its homogenization, but globalization involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization (armaments, advertising techniques, language hegemonies, and clothing styles) that are absorbed into local political and cultural economies, only to be repatriated as heterogeneous dialogues of national sovereignty, free enterprise, and fundamentalism in which the state plays an increasingly delicate role: too much openness to global flows, and the nation-state is threatened by revolt, as in the China syndrome; too little, and the state exits the international stage, as Burma, Albania, and North Korea in various ways have done. In general, the state has become the arbitrageur of this repatriation of difference (in the form of goods, signs, slogans, and styles). But this repatriation or export of the designs and commodities of difference continuously exacerbates the internal politics of majoritarianism and homogenization.



So, the globalization of culture is not the same as homogenization, but globalization involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization armaments, advertising techniques, language hegemonies, and clothing styles that are absorbed into local political-cultural economies only to be repatriated as heterogeneous, a dialogue of national sovereignty, free enterprise fundamentalisms in which state plays an increasingly delicate role.

Too much openness to flows, and the nation-state is threatened by revolt. Too much openness to global flows then the nation state is threatened by revolt because you are welcoming too much of a radical ideas and people and other things as in the China syndrome, too little, and the state exist the international stage, as in Burma, Albania, and North Korea in various ways have done.


So, you have to really strike a balance about the opening up of your borders, you cannot survive without opening up of your borders because you require international capital. And if you open too much then quite lot of powerful ideas, cultures, various stuffs will come and then blow your way. If you shut yourself completely you will be outside this whole global flow. So that is the kind of argument that he puts forward.

(Refer Slide Time: 36:31)

The globalization of culture is not the same as its homogenization, but globalization involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization (armaments, advertising techniques, language hegemonies, and clothing styles) that are absorbed into local political and cultural economies, only to be repatriated as heterogeneous dialogues of national sovereignty, free enterprise, and fundamentalism in which the state plays an increasingly delicate role: too much openness to global flows, and the nation-state is threatened by revolt, as in the China syndrome; too little, and the state exits the international stage, as Burma, Albania, and North Korea in various ways have done. In general, the state has become the arbitrageur of this repatriation of difference (in the form of goods, signs, slogans, and styles). But this repatriation or export of the designs and commodities of difference continuously exacerbates the internal politics of majoritarianism and homogenization, which is most frequently played out in debates over heritage.

Disjuncture and Difference

≈ 42 ≈



In general, the state has become the arbitrageur of this repatriation of differences in the form of goods, signs, slogans, and styles. But this repatriation or export of the designs of commodities of differences continuously exacerbate the internal politics of majoritarianism and homogenization which is most frequently played out in debates over heritage.

(Refer Slide Time: 37:01)

Thus the central feature of global culture today is the politics of the mutual effort of sameness and difference to cannibalize one another and thereby proclaim their successful hijacking of the twin Enlightenment ideas of the triumphantly universal and the resiliently particular. This mutual cannibalization shows its ugly face in riots, refugee flows, state-sponsored torture, and ethnocide (with or without state support). Its brighter side is in the expansion of many individual horizons of hope and fantasy, in the global spread of oral rehydration therapy and other low-tech instruments of well-being, in the susceptibility even of South Africa to the force of global opinion, in the inability of the Polish state to repress its own working classes, and in the growth of a wide range of progressive, transnational alliances. Examples of both sorts could be multiplied. The critical point is that both sides of the coin of global cultural process today are products of the infinitely varied mutual contest of sameness and difference on a stage characterized by radical disjunctures between different



So, this we will take up later. When you talk about this majoritarianism, as I mentioned in his work 'Fear of Small Numbers', we will take up that particular idea. So, the central feature of global culture today is the politics of the mutual effort of sameness and difference to cannibalize one another and thereby proclaim their successful hijacking of the twin enlightenment ideas of the triumphantly universal and the resiliently particular.

Its brighter side is in the expansion of many individual horizons of hope and fantasy, in the global spread of oral rehydration therapy and other lower-tech instruments of wellbeing in the susceptibility even of South Africa to the force of global opinion; he is talking about the abolition of apartheid, in the inability of the Polish state to repress its own working class and the growth of a wide range of progressive transnational alliances.

(Refer Slide Time: 38:02)

brighter side is in the expansion of many individual horizons of hope and fantasy, in the global spread of oral rehydration therapy and other low-tech instruments of well-being, in the susceptibility even of South Africa to the force of global opinion, in the inability of the Polish state to repress its own working classes, and in the growth of a wide range of progressive, transnational alliances. Examples of both sorts could be multiplied. The critical point is that both sides of the coin of global cultural process today are products of the infinitely varied mutual contest of sameness and difference on a stage characterized by radical disjunctures between different sorts of global flows and the uncertain landscapes created in and through these disjunctures.



¹
The Work of Reproduction in an Age of Mechanical Art

I have inverted the key terms of the title of Walter Benjamin's famous essay (1969) to return this rather high-flying discussion to a more manageable level. There is a classic human problem that will not disappear however



So, there is one more section which I have not discussed 'the work of reproduction in an age of mechanical.' I am not discussing it, there are one or two more sections but this is his core argument when he talks about the disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy. And I hope you must have understood that Appadurai is presenting a far more complicated, I cannot sufficiently emphasize enough the kind of complexity that he brings in this single essay.

The kind of multiple perspectives that he brings in, the number of actors, and the role of contingency that he brings in, it is a brilliant essay. That is why he is one of the most cited and read essays on cultural globalization and that too of an Indian scholar. So let us just stop here, and I would strongly urge you to read this essay completely, maybe a couple of times to understand it well.

So, we will meet again in the next session. We will discuss Appadurai's remaining important argument, especially the production of locality we will discuss in the coming class. So, thank you, we will stop here.