

**Introduction to Cultural Studies**  
**Dr. Avishek Parui**  
**Department of Humanities & Social Sciences**  
**Indian Institute of Technology-Madras**

**Lecture - 30**  
**Foucault – What Is An Author - II**

So hello and welcome to this NPTEL course Introduction to Cultural Studies where we are looking at Michel Foucault's essay, What is an Author. So we have already started with the essay. We had one lecture on the essay already and we will continue with this essay and this lecture as well looking at some of the key sections from this text. So we stopped, the last time we stopped at how Foucault examines the paradox in postmodern times.

The author is you know maintained, the author is preserved through an absence right. So the absence of the author becomes a transcendental signified which actually keeps him alive paradoxically. So it has a similar structural principle to the direct religious text. So he makes a commonality. He examines the commonality between religious criticism and you know literary criticism or critical Nazis over here which both rely on the absence.

Which both create the author in terms of looking at it from 2 different perspectives, religious perspective is almost to make him immortal and the critical perspective is to make him absolutely absent and by making him absolutely absent they make him they paradoxically produce the image of the author over and over again.

**(Refer Slide Time: 01:26)**

This usage of the notion of writing runs the risk of maintaining the author's privileges under the protection of the a priori: it keeps alive, in the gray light of neutralization, the interplay of those representations that formed a particular image of the author. The author's disappearance, which, since Mallarmé, has been a constantly recurring event, is subject to a series of transcendental barriers. There seems to be an important dividing line between those who believe that they can still locate today's discontinuities [ruptures] in the historico-transcendental tradition of the nineteenth century and those who try to free themselves once and for all from that tradition.

§

It is not enough, however, to repeat the empty affirmation that the author has disappeared. For the same reason, it is not enough to keep repeating that God and man have died a common death. Instead, we must locate the space left empty by the author's disappearance, follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings this disappearance uncovers.

So you know as he goes on to say and this should be on your screen. This usage of the notion of writing runs the risk of maintaining the author's privileges under the protection of the a priori. It keeps alive, in the gray light of neutralization, the interplay of those representations that formed a particular image of the author. So the author's image is maintained. The author's image is resurrected, is made alive with this idea of critical interplay.

The author's disappearance, which since Mallarmé has been a constantly recurring event, is subject to a series of transcendental barriers. There seems to be an important dividing line between those who believe that they can still locate today's discontinuities or ruptures in the historico-transcendental tradition of the 19th century and those who try to free themselves once and for all from that tradition.

Because of this disappearance of the author as something as an event, a phenomenon that you know Foucault traces back since Mallarmé's times, okay. Now, then he moves on the idea of the looking at the figure, the author, as a God-like presence, as commonality with God. So God over here obviously over here become a signifier, authority signifier of the maker, the creator, etc. and so it has some kind of functional and structural similarity with the way the author is situated apropos of the text.

**(Refer Slide Time: 02:35)**

It is not enough, however, to repeat the empty affirmation that the author has disappeared. For the same reason, it is not enough to keep repeating that God and man have died a common death. Instead, we must locate the space left empty by the author's disappearance, follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings this disappearance uncovers.

First, we need to clarify briefly the problems arising from the use of the author's name. What is an author's name? How does it function? Far from offering a solution, I shall only indicate some of the difficulties that it presents.

The author's name is a proper name, and therefore it raises the problems common to all proper names. (Here I refer to Searle's analyses, among others.) Obviously, one cannot turn a proper name into a pure and simple reference. It has other than indicative functions: more than an indication, a gesture, a finger pointed at someone, it is the equivalent of a description. When one says "Aristotle," one employs a word that is the equivalent of one, or a series, of definite descriptions, such as "the author of the *Analytics*," "the founder of ontology," and so forth. One cannot stop there, however, because a proper name does not have just one signification. When we discover that Arthur Rimbaud did not write *La Chasse spirituelle*, we cannot pretend that the meaning of this proper name, or that of the author, has been altered. The proper name and the author's

Now he says and it should be on your screen again, it is not enough, however, to repeat the empty affirmation that the author has disappeared. So you know it is a bit of a cliché to say the author has disappeared and you know by making him disappear transcendently we actually replicate the image, the presence of the author in a paradoxical sense. So you know this is a classic case in point where absence becomes paradoxical production, right.

So you know it is paradoxically produced by being absent. So something is produced by not being there; by not being absolutely there. So this absolute absence becomes the paradoxical presence over here in some sense. For the same reason, it is not enough to keep repeating that God and man have died a common death. Instead, we must locate the space left empty by the author's disappearance, follow the distribution of gaps and breaches and watch for the openings this disappearance uncovers.

So you know this is a very interesting and deeply poststructuralist analysis that Foucault is doing over here. So he is saying instead of just saying the author is dead, the author has disappeared completely which in a way paradoxically produces or reproduces the image of the author we shall look at the, the very interstitial relationship between the author and the text, the gaps between the author and the text, the gaps in disappearance.

So the very liminality of the author's absent presence. These are the things that you should be examining and so just giving a very blunt binary of the dead author first is the alive text. Because that would not work at all. That would just replicate the structures of ancient traditions by keeping the author alive through deadness, okay.

So instead of that Foucault is doing away with the binaries, doing away with this dead alive binary and looking at the liminal spaces where the author is half alive, the author is half present, the author is interstitially present as a category as a function etc. and therein lies the poststructuralist potential of this particular essay, okay. So what are the things we need to do? First, we need to clarify briefly the problems arising from the use of the author's name.

What is an author's name? How does it function? Far from offering a solution, I shall indicate some of the difficulties that it presents. So again, in a true-blue poststructuralist fashion Foucault is not interested in giving a solution. He is instead offering more problems, right. So he is saying one of things we should ask ourselves directly if we belong to primary question is the question of the author's name, Mallarme for instance or Kafka for instance.

So what is the author, so how did you find the author's name? What are the markings of an author's name? Is the author's name a proper name or is it more than that, is it more complex than that. These are the questions that Foucault is asking over here. So the author's name is a proper name of course. It is a proper name of someone's name and therefore it raises the problems common to all proper names.

Here I refer to Searle's analyses among others. So this psychology of the proper name and you know common name and author's name is something that Foucault is drawing on. Obviously, one cannot turn a proper name into a pure and simple reference. It has other than indicative functions. More than indication, a gesture, a finger pointed at someone. It is the equivalent of a description.

When one says Aristotle, one employs a word that is an equivalent of one, or a series of definite descriptions such as the author of the analytics, the founder of ontology and so forth. So the

name Aristotle is not just a proper name. It becomes a marker. It becomes an epistemic marker to a certain extent. It uncovers or evokes a series of, a range of indicative functions. You can think of Nicomachean ethics, you can think of you know politics, you can think of poetics, you can think of analytics, a series of referenced will come condensed in the name Aristotle over here.

So one employs a word that is the equivalent of one or a series of definite descriptions such as the author of the analytics, the founder of ontology and so forth. One cannot stop there, however, because a proper name does not have just one signification. When we discover that Arthur Rimbaud did not write *La Chasse spirituelle* we cannot pretend that the meaning of this proper name or that of the author has been altered.

**(Refer Slide Time: 06:40)**

First, we need to clarify briefly the problems arising from the use of the author's name. What is an author's name? How does it function? Far from offering a solution, I shall only indicate some of the difficulties that it presents.

The author's name is a proper name, and therefore it raises the problems common to all proper names. (Here I refer to Searle's analyses, among others.) Obviously, one cannot turn a proper name into a pure and simple reference. It has other than indicative functions: more than an indication, a gesture, a finger pointed at someone, it is the equivalent of a description. When one says "Aristotle," one employs a word that is the equivalent of one, or a series, of definite descriptions, such as "the author of the Analytics," "the founder of ontology," and so forth. One cannot stop there, however, because a proper name does not have just one signification. When we discover that Arthur Rimbaud did not write *La Chasse spirituelle*, we cannot pretend that the meaning of this proper name, or that of the author, has been altered. The proper name and the author's name are situated between the two poles of description and designation: they must have a certain link with what they name, but one that is neither entirely in the mode of designation nor in that of description; it must be a specific link. However - and it is here that the particular difficulties of the author's name arise - the links between the proper name and the individual named and between the author's name and what it names are not isomorphic and do not function in the same way. There are several differences

The proper name and the author's name are situated between the two poles of description and designation. They must have a certain link with which with what they name, but that one that is neither entirely in the mode of designation nor in that of description it must be a specific link. So you know he is looking at the author's name as a play between designation and description, right.

So when we designate someone, when we address someone of the proper designation but the author's name is more than this designation. It also becomes a description. And it is the play between description and designation that Foucault is unpacking over here in a very poststructuralist sense, okay.

**(Refer Slide Time: 07:34)**

The author's name is a proper name, and therefore it raises the problems common to all proper names. (Here I refer to Searle's analyses, among others.) Obviously, one cannot turn a proper name into a pure and simple reference. It has other than indicative functions: more than an indication, a gesture, a finger pointed at someone, it is the equivalent of a description. When one says "Aristotle," one employs a word that is the equivalent of one, or a series, of definite descriptions, such as "the author of the Analytics," "the founder of ontology," and so forth. One cannot stop there, however, because a proper name does not have just one signification. When we discover that Arthur Rimbaud did not write *La Chasse spirituelle*, we cannot pretend that the meaning of this proper name, or that of the author, has been altered. The proper name and the author's name are situated between the two poles of description and designation: they must have a certain link with what they name, but one that is neither entirely in the mode of designation nor in that of description; it must be a specific link. However - and it is here that the particular difficulties of the author's name arise - the links between the proper name and the individual named and between the author's name and what it names are not isomorphic and do not function in the same way. There are several differences.

If for example, Pierre Dupont does not have blue eyes, or was not born in Paris, or is not a doctor, the name Pierre Dupont will still always refer to the same person, such things do not modify the link of designation. The problems raised by

However, and it is here that the particular difficulties of the author's name arise, the links between the proper name and the individual named and between the author's name and what it names are not isomorphic and do not function in the same. There are several differences. So these are not straight isomorphic functions. These are very complex functions, the proper name and the author's name. So these are designations, descriptions, combination of both etc.

**(Refer Slide Time: 08:01)**

"Aristotle," one employs a word that is the equivalent of one, or a series, of definite descriptions, such as "the author of the Analytics," "the founder of ontology," and so forth. One cannot stop there, however, because a proper name does not have just one signification. When we discover that Arthur Rimbaud did not write *La Chasse spirituelle*, we cannot pretend that the meaning of this proper name, or that of the author, has been altered. The proper name and the author's name are situated between the two poles of description and designation: they must have a certain link with what they name, but one that is neither entirely in the mode of designation nor in that of description; it must be a specific link. However - and it is here that the particular difficulties of the author's name arise - the links between the proper name and the individual named and between the author's name and what it names are not isomorphic and do not function in the same way. There are several differences.

If for example, Pierre Dupont does not have blue eyes, or was not born in Paris, or is not a doctor, the name Pierre Dupont will still always refer to the same person, such things do not modify the link of designation. The problems raised by the author's name are much more complex, however. If I discover that Shakespeare was not born in the house we visit today, this is a modification that,

Okay, if for example Pierre Dupont does not have blue eyes or was not born in Paris, or is not a doctor, the name Pierre Dupont will still always refer to the same person, such things do not modify the link of designation, right. So when you look at a name as a purely designated

category, just a name of a person, it does not matter whether that person was not born in a particular time, was not born in a particular place, designation will be unaltered.

So Pierre Dupont is a random name that Foucault is offering over here and he is saying if Pierre Dupont does not have blue eyes, not born in Paris, or is not a doctor, the name Pierre Dupont will still always refer to the same person. So you know those factual inconsistency, those factual alterations will not matter at all. It is just a designated category that we are talking about. Such things do not modify the link of designation.

So this is purely a designated category, just a link of designation that will stay unchanged you know in this kind of a system. The problems raised by the author's name are much more complex, however. If I discover that Shakespeare was not born in the house we visit today, this is a modification that obviously will not alter the functioning of the author's name.

**(Refer Slide Time: 09:08)**

obviously, will not alter the functioning of the author's name. But if we proved that Shakespeare did not write those sonnets which pass for his, that would constitute a significant change and affect the manner in which the author's name functions. If we proved that Shakespeare wrote Bacon's Organon by showing that the same author wrote both the works of Bacon and those of Shakespeare, that would be a third type of change that would entirely modify the functioning of the author's name. The author's name is not, therefore, just a proper name like the rest.

Many other facts point out the paradoxical singularity of the author's name. To say that Pierre Dupont does not exist is not at all the same as saying that Homer

But if you prove that Shakespeare did not write those sonnets which pass for his, that would constitute a significant change and affect the manner in which the author's name functions. Now, obviously, now we are moving into a more functional category over here and Foucault says quite clearly that the author's name depends on not just on designation but also on description on performances, on utterances, on creation.

So suppose you find out that what we now call Shakespeare sonnets were actually written by someone else that would definitely alter or change the way we refer to Shakespeare as a writer, right. So the author's name becomes something more than just a proper name in this example, okay. So if you prove that Shakespeare wrote Bacon's Organon by showing that the same author wrote both the works of Bacon and those of Shakespeare, that would be a third type of change that would entirely modify the functioning of the author's name.

The author's name is not, therefore, just a proper name like the rest. So this particular passage is a magnificent description of the ontology of the author's name. So what function does the author's name carry? The author's name is not just a proper name. It is not just the male British flavor that we are talking about when we say Shakespeare. When we say Shakespeare, we have a range of texts in our mind, a range of works in our mind.

And those work constitute, those works constitute the author right and that is a very important category, that is a very important function, that is a very important construct. So the author's name becomes a construct of activities, construct of creations and if those constructs are changed, if the coordinates of the constructs change through a historical analysis, through a critical analysis then obviously the author's name change as well in a same way that in a way that the proper name or purely proper name would not change. But this purely proper name is just a designation, not a description, okay, right.

**(Refer Slide Time: 10:58)**



obviously, will not alter the functioning of the author's name. But if we proved that Shakespeare did not write those sonnets which pass for his, that would constitute a significant change and affect the manner in which the author's name functions. If we proved that Shakespeare wrote Bacon's Organon by showing that the same author wrote both the works of Bacon and those of Shakespeare, that would be a third type of change that would entirely modify the functioning of the author's name. The author's name is not, therefore, just a proper name like the rest.

Many other facts point out the paradoxical singularity of the author's name. To say that Pierre Dupont does not exist is not at all the same as saying that Homer or Hermes Trismegistus did not exist. In the first case, it means that no one has the name Pierre Dupont; in the second, it means that several people were mixed together under one name, or that the true author had none of the traits traditionally ascribed to the personae of Homer or Hermes. To say that X's real name is actually Jacques Durand instead of Pierre Dupont is not the same as saying that Stendhal's name was Henri Beyle. One could also question the meaning and functioning of propositions like "Bourbaki is so-and-so, so-and-so, and so-forth," and "Victor Eremite, Climacus, Anticlimacus, Prater Taciturnus, Constantine Constantius, all of these are Kierkegaard."

Many other facts point out the paradoxical singularity of the author's name. To say that Pierre Dupont does not exist at all you know is not all the same as saying that Homer or Hermes Trismegistus did not exist. In the first case, it means that no one has the name Pierre Dupont; in the second it means that several people were mixed together under one name or that the true author had none of the traits traditionally ascribed to the personae of Homer or Hermes.

So if for instance you know Foucault says quite clearly, if someone says Pierre Dupont does not exist it just means the person do not exist and nothing more. But if it is not the same as saying that Homer does not exist because you would say Homer does not exist you know Hermes you know Trismegistus does not exist, if you say those things that means actually that you know we the all the works that we ascribe to Homer, all the works attributed to Homer are probably written by different people at different points of time.

So that is a different kind of a change that actually invokes works that involves writing that invokes reception as well, okay which is not the case when we just name a person randomly who is not an author okay. And the same goes for any artist, you know you can talk about Picasso in this way, you can talk about (( )) (12:07) this way, filmmakers this way as well, okay. To say that X's real name is actually Jacques Durand instead of Pierre Dupont is not the same as saying that Stendhal's name was Henri Beyle. One could also question the meaning and functioning of

propositions like Bourbaki is so-and-so, so-and-so, and so-forth and Victor Eremita, Climacus, Anticlimacus, Prater Taciturnus Constantine, Constantius all of these are Keirkegaard.

**(Refer Slide Time: 12:35)**

---

the name Pierre Dupont; in the second, it means that several people were mixed together under one name, or that the true author had none of the traits traditionally ascribed to the personae of Homer or Hermes. To say that X's real name is actually Jacques Durand instead of Pierre Dupont is not the same as saying that Stendhal's name was Henri Beyle. One could also question the meaning and functioning of propositions like "Bourbaki is so-and-so, so-and-so, and so-forth," and "Victor Eremita, Climacus, Anticlimacus, Prater Taciturnus, Constantine Constantius, all of these are Kierkegaard."

These differences may result from the fact that an author's name is not simply an element in a discourse (capable of being either subject or object, of being replaced by a pronoun, and the like); it performs a certain role with regard to narrative discourse, assuring a classificatory function. Such a name permits one to group together a certain number of texts, define them, differentiate them from and contrast them to others. In addition, it establishes a relationship among the texts. Hermes Trismegistus did not exist, nor did Hippocrates - in the sense that Balzac existed - but the fact that several texts have been placed under the same name indicates that there has been established among them a relationship of homogeneity, filiation, authentication of some texts by the use of others, reciprocal explication, or concomitant utilization. The author's name serves to characterize a certain mode of being of discourse: the fact that the discourse has an author's name, that one can say "this was written by so-and-so" or "so-and-so is its author," shows that this discourse is not ordinary everyday speech that merely comes and goes, not something that is immediately consumable. On the contrary, it is a speech that must be received in a certain mode and that, in a

So you know he is giving absurd examples over here to hammer home the point that the author's name is related to style, it cannot be possibly divorced from the work. So if you are changing the works, you are also changing the author's name, but you can just change the, a normal proper name and nothing will change, okay. So these differences may result from the fact that the author's name is not simply an element in a discourse.

It performs a certain role with regard to narrative discourse. This is a very important fact that Foucault is point out that the author's name performs a certain role with regard to narrative discourse and it is the narrative discourse which is commonly consumed, commonly shared by generations of people. Assuring a classificatory function. Such a name permits one to group together a certain number of texts, define them, differentiate them from and contrast them to others.

So you know the author's name become an extension of range of texts which we can bring together, which we can classify together and which we can discuss in contrast to other texts written by other authors. So they all belong to different narrative discourses and the narrative

discursivity is something that must be highlighted when we take author's name according to Foucault's analysis over here, okay.

In addition, it establishes a relationship among the texts. Hermes, Trismegistus did not exist, nor did Hippocrates in the sense that Balzac existed. But the fact that several texts have been placed under the same name indicates there has been established among them a relationship of homogeneity, filiation, authentication of some texts by the use of others, reciprocal explication or concomitant utilization.

So I mean say for instance Homer did not exist in the same way as James Joyce did, right but at the same time there was certain Homeric works which have brought together, which have a certain filiation to a person called Homer or maybe a series of persons called Homer. So in that sense the author's name also functions as a homogenous construct as the construct of creation, right. So you know he is talking obviously what Foucault is mentioning as a difference between a preprint culture and a post print culture, right.

In a post print culture, the author's name is much more permanent, is much more attached to the text but if you go back to ancient times I mean no one quite knows if Homer was really a man, was he just a single person, or did he write, what are the different people who are writing by the name Homer exactly we do not know that. But that does not matter, because what matters is how the text which we now consider to be Homeric in tradition, they have a certain filiation, a certain homogeneity, a certain connectivity as a works of art, as a narrative discourses and that connectivity is what constitutes the author's name, okay.

The author's name serves to characterize a certain mode of being to a discourse. So this is a brilliant sentence really. The author's name is meant to characterize a certain mode of being you know a certain mode of being of discourse. So it becomes a marker for discursivity and marker for unique discursivity, a marker for unique discursive quality, right. So the author's name becomes a marker.

So a certain kind of writing is produced under the certain head, Homer or Balzac or Shakespeare or anyone for that matter, right and that marker has become very important in terms of looking at author's names as a discursive formation. So the fact that the discourse has an author's name, that one can say this was written by so-and-so and so-and-so is its author shows that this discourse is not ordinary everyday speech that merely comes and goes, not something that is immediately consumable.

On the contrary, it is a speech that must be received in a certain mode and that in a given culture must receive a certain status. So the status of a particular author becomes very important. It is not just a flash. It is not just a temporary thing. It is not just something which comes and goes, which is merely consumable right. So it is it is a particular mode, particular marker that in a particular given culture receive certain status.

So any author you know any big author, any person who is a big author you know recognized author exists in a certain status in society right and that status must be a marker for a certain discourse which the author is producing through his or her works, okay.

**(Refer Slide Time: 16:44)**

texts. Hermes Trismegistus did not exist, nor did Hippocrates - in the sense that Balzac existed - but the fact that several texts have been placed under the same name indicates that there has been established among them a relationship of homogeneity, filiation, authentication of some texts by the use of others, reciprocal explication, or concomitant utilization. The author's name serves to characterize a certain mode of being of discourse: the fact that the discourse has an author's name, that one can say "this was written by so-and-so" or "so-and-so is its author," shows that this discourse is not ordinary everyday speech that merely comes and goes, not something that is immediately consumable. On the contrary, it is a speech that must be received in a certain mode and that, in a given culture, must receive a certain status.

It would seem that the author's name, unlike other proper names, does not pass from the interior of a discourse to the real and exterior individual who produced it; instead, the name seems always to be present, marking off the edges of the text, revealing, or at least characterizing, its mode of being. The author's name manifests the appearance of a certain discursive set and indicates the status of this discourse within a society and a culture. It has no legal status, nor is it located in the fiction of the work; rather, it is located in the break that founds a certain discursive construct and its very particular mode of being. As a result, we

It would seem that the author's name, unlike other proper names does not pass from the interior of a discourse to the real and exterior individual who produced it. Instead the name always seems to be present, making off the edges of the text, revealing, or at least characterizing its mode of

being. So you know it is a name which characterizes the mode of being, the very ontology of the text is dependent on the author's name in a certain sense. The author's name manifests the appearance of a certain discursive set and indicates the status of this discourse within a society and a culture. It has no legal status nor is it located in a fiction of the work, rather it is located in the break that founds a certain discursive construct and its very particular mode of being.

**(Refer Slide Time: 17:28)**

could say that in a civilization like our own there are certain number of discourses endowed with the "author function" while others are deprived of it. A private letter may well have a signer – it does not have an author; a contract may well have a guarantor – it does not have an author. An anonymous text posted on a wall probably has an editor – but not an author. The author function is therefore characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society.

As a result we could say that in a civilization like our there are certain there are areas of number of discourses endowed with the author function while others are deprived of it. So you know Foucault says quite clearly we are in a civilization you know there are certain number of discourses which have author function and certain discourses do not have author functions right and we just looked at what author function is.

An author function becomes a mode, a marker for certain kind of for certain kind of discursivity, certain unique discursivity. So author becomes marker of a certain discursive category and certain narrative category and Foucault says in our civilization we have discourses which have that kind of an authorship and discourses which do not have any authorship at all.

We are marked by two different kinds of discourses; one with author function, one without author function, one deprived of author function in the civilization like our own that we live in today. A private letter may well have a signer. It does not have an author. A contract may well

have a guarantor. It does not have an author. An anonymous text posted on a wall probably has an editor but not an author.

The author function is therefore characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society. So what we see and we will conclude with this now, what we see over here quite clearly is that an author according to Foucault becomes you know, it designates a certain discursivity. It becomes a marker for a certain discursivity and this discursive quality is what Foucault is interested in and he says a letter can have a writer, a letter can have a signer, but that would not make an author.

A contract you know whatever contract that is, whether it is a you know tenancy contract or loan contract you know certain kind of a bond whatever contract that is you will have a guarantor but not an author. You will have someone who signs it. But that will not make the person the author of it. The anonymous text posted on the wall probably has an editor, someone who edits it, someone who changes it etc. but not an author. The author function is discursive in quality.

So you cannot take away the discursivity from the author function at all and again this brings us back to one of the key things which we have been interested in and we have been examining this from the very inception of the course, the relationship between corporeality, identity, and discursivity. So identity and discursivity are related to each other in very organic ways and Foucault is obviously very interested in the organicity of this entanglement between identity and discursivity. So author becomes a function for discursivity.

The author becomes a discursivity phenomenon and we cannot take away, a marker for discursivity, and we cannot take away the marker of the author you know if you change, if you change the text for instance, if you change the markers of discursivity then author function changes as well. So for instance if someone comes and tells us today Shakespeare did not write Hamlet, someone knows what Hamlet, Thomas Kyd wrote Hamlet.

If that kind of an argument is proved, then obviously the very ontology of Shakespeare as an author will change because it is dependent on discursivity which is created by the narrative

discourse which is the series of works that Shakespeare have created and Shakespeare is just an example that I offered you in term of understand what Foucault was saying. So we conclude with that in this lecture and will sort of hopefully wrap up this particular text in a couple of lectures to come.

So thank you for your attention. And please go back and read the text, read the sections which we have been examining in close details and I will see you in the next lecture. Thank you.