

Introduction to Cultural Studies
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Lecture - 27
Hannah Arendt - The Human Condition II

So hello and welcome to this Introduction to Cultural Studies NPTEL course where we were reading Hannah Arendt's Human Condition. So we started with the text. We have had one lecture already on it. So this is going to be the second lecture on this particular text. So in this lecture we will start with the second chapter, chapter 2 in this book which is entitled The Private and the Public Realm.

So as I mentioned in the opening in the introduction to this particular book that one of the many interesting things which this book does is that it talks about the idea of the public space and the private space and how the boundaries blur away in modern times in 20th century and that is how that becomes a part of the human condition and by human condition of course Arendt means an entanglement of 3 different categories; labor, work and action.

And we saw the distinctions that she had made in these 3 categories earlier, the opening the introduction to this book. So in chapter 2, she talks about and this should be on your screen highlighted in yellow.

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MAN: A SOCIAL OR A
POLITICAL ANIMAL

The *vita activa*, human life in so far as it is actively engaged in doing something, is always rooted in a world of men and of man-made things which it never leaves or altogether transcends. Things and men form the environment for each of man's activities, which would be pointless without such location; yet this environment, the world into which we are born, would not exist without the human activity which produced it, as in the case of fabricated things; which takes care of it, as in the case of cultivated land; or which established it through organization, as in the case of the body politic. No human life, not even the life of the hermit in nature's wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or indirectly testifies to the presence of other human beings.

All human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live together, but it is only action that cannot even be imagined outside the society of men. The activity of labor does not need the presence of others, though a being laboring in complete solitude

She talks about a man, a social or a political animal. So she talks about man as an animal which works, which build culture through an activity, a cultural activity etc. and then she goes on to say and I quote Arendt over here, the beginning of chapter 2, the *vita activa*, the human life in so far as it is actively engaged in doing something, is always rooted in a world of men and of man-made things which never leaves or altogether transcends.

So this is a very interesting statement. I mean she talks about the impossibility of transcending materiality, right. So no matter where we are, no matter what activity we are engaged in with we are always so entangled with materiality. So the thingness of the world is something which she highlights. So it is impossible to transcend the thingness, right. It is impossible to transcend the materiality and of course related to materiality is the idea of discursivity.

Because as we know by now this course is mediated or manufactured you know manufactured and mediated by materials. So materials come with meanings, materials take up different semantic possibilities and as human beings, as social animals, as cultural subjects, we are always enmeshed in this materiality in this semantic traffic of you know true objects. So it is impossible to transcend the thingness of our existence.

Things and men form the environment for each of man's activities, which would be pointless without such location. Yet this environment the world into which we are born would not exist

without the human activity which produced it, as in the case of fabricated things which takes care of it as in the case of cultivated land or which established it through organization as in the case of the body politic.

So again we are talking about this dialogic nature between man and things, between the human beings, the human kind, the human self and the artificial object and how each creates the other, each feeds the other, each informs the other in a loop of activity, so in a loop of cultural production. So this in a way brings us back to one of the first thesis, one of the first tenets that we started with in this course, the idea of culture as an activity of production, production, reproduction, deproduction etc.

So culture becomes a productive activity and Arendt obviously dramatizes the productivity of culture. She talks about how human beings manufacture objects and how objects manufacture meanings which she relate it to human beings and how this kind of a loop is always operative, no matter where we go, no matter how we live, we are always surrounded by things and the thingness of our existence, the materiality of existence is something which becomes a part of the discursive architecture as it were.

And she gives examples of two kinds of things. One is cultivated land which is a land which is made into a commodity, made into a viable object through an activity which is agriculture of course and she talks about organization such as in body politic which is also is a manufactured object, the body politic which is manufactured through activity, through work, through organization etc.

And then she says something which is very interestingly related to what something similar Lyotard had said in the postmodern condition. I will just state this first and then we will go back to Lyotard and see how these two may be connected structurally as well as functionally. No human life, not even the life of the hermit in nature's wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or indirectly testifies to the presence of other human beings.

So even if you are the remotest hermit, even if you are the completely cut off and secluded from everyone else you still are interacting with some human kind, with some human self, some human subject. So no matter how much of a recluse you are if even if you are cut off in the extreme wilderness of things you know it is impossible to be not directly or indirectly interacting with other human beings.

So what Lyotard had said in a more explicit example in postmodern condition is that he talked about man being, man inhabiting certain nodal points and if you remember that phrase which Lyotard had used, nodal points meaning those positions, those spaces through which information crisscrosses through which data crisscrosses through which meanings are mediated and manufactured and remanufactured.

So nodal points become this epistemic size for Lyotard and something similar is being said by Arendt over here where she says that no matter how reclusive you are, no matter how much you know wilderness we are living in we are always in some kind of a intersubjective activity and intersubjective loop. So this idea of intersubjectivity is related to the idea of culture in many interesting ways and Arendt obviously is highlighting it quite graphically.

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human activity which produced it, as in the case of fabricated things; which takes care of it, as in the case of cultivated land; or which established it through organization, as in the case of the body politic. No human life, not even the life of the hermit in nature's wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or indirectly testifies to the presence of other human beings.

All human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live together, but it is only action that cannot even be imagined outside the society of men. The activity of labor does not need the presence of others, though a being laboring in complete solitude would not be human but an *animal laborans* in the word's most literal significance. Man working and fabricating and building a world inhabited only by himself would still be a fabricator, though not *homo faber*: he would have lost his specifically human quality and, rather, be a god – not, to be sure, the Creator, but a divine demiurge as Plato described him in one of his myths. Action alone is the exclusive prerogative of man; neither a beast nor a god

And then she goes on to say, all human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live together, but it is only action that cannot be imagined that cannot even be imagined outside the

society of men. So culture as an action, culture as an activity is something that Arendt is highlighting and of course this is an interactional activity an intergenerational activity, an intersubjective activity. So this intersubjectivity this intergenerational quality of culture is something that Arendt is constantly highlighting.

So what it does in a very interesting sense it takes away the romantic autonomy of the human subject and she says the human subject cannot exist as a vacuum, cannot exist alone as a recluse not matter how self-sufficient it is. It is always indirectly or directly interactive with other human subjects and this interactional activity is something which constitutes culture as a process, culture as a work that Arendt is quite clearly highlighting over here.

So you know it cannot be imagined outside society of men, so society itself is a construct, society itself is a thing which depends, which relies ontologically on the plurality of men, the plurality of human beings interacting together in a intersubjective environment. The activity of labor does not need the presence of others, though being laboring in complete solitude would not be human but an animal laborans in the word's most literal significance.

Man working and fabricating and building a world inhabited only by himself would still be a fabricator, though not homo faber. He still have lost his specifically, he would have lost his specifically human quality and rather be a god not to be sure the creator but a divine demiurge as Plato described him in one of his myths.

So it she talks about 2 different kinds of labor, the homo faber, the human worker is someone who works not in isolation but in an activity, in a group, in a society and this societal quality, this societal activity that Arendt is pointing to over here is quite clear is quite important because therein lies the distinction between you know the animal laborer and the human laborer. A human laborer is the entire idea of humanness.

The entire human condition as Arendt defines it is dependent ontologically on interactional activity of the men with plurality with intersubjectivity etc. So society is a condition, a precondition for the human culture and of course I mean she draws on Plato over here and she


says if a human being works on isolation that will still be labor but that will be labor in a divine sense not in the human sense.

So she draws on she alludes to Plato and the platonic idea of the divine demiurge which is one of Plato's many myths. So action alone is the exclusive prerogative of man neither a beast nor a god is capable of it and only action is entirely dependent upon the constant presence of others. So action as an activity is something that Arendt you know is constantly highlighting and she says that this action is something that only men are capable of.

And this action gives a degree of valiancy a degree of cultural quotient to man and you know and she talks about how if you are a man you have to be in an action, in an activity which constitutes, which includes others. So what we see over here is a very interesting idea of plurality, plurality as a process, plurality as a production process and the entire idea of culture according to Arendt you know relies on this plurality, relies on this production of plurality.

So the plural production is a production process where many people come together and is also production of plurality, right. So culture as a plurality, culture as a process is something Arendt talks about quite clearly throughout the human condition and you know therein lies the really radical nature of this book.

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So in page 38, which should be on your screen again she has this subsection entitled The Rise of The Social where she talks about you know the social category, the social as a space, the social as an epistemic site, the social as a location, the social as a state of being, as a lifestyle and how this entire idea of social is of course a manufactured idea and it depends on a series of activities which constitute which entail plurality.

It produces plurality as well as produced by plurality and this is the very essential condition that Arendt would constantly highlight throughout this book. So what is the rise of a social? So how does the social come into being? What is the ontologization, the ontological process through which the social comes into being as an activity as a production process and this is what she says and I quote her.

The emergence of society, the rise of housekeeping, its activities, problems and organizational devices from the shadowy interior of the household into the light of the public sphere has not only blurred the old borderline between the private and political, it has also changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life of the individual and the citizen.

So this is interesting because this is a very 20th century phenomenon Arendt would argue where the entire borderline between the private and the public blurs away where the private becomes the side of individuality. The private becomes the place where you can derive meaning where you can have different kinds of semantic significance the interior becomes important and this is of course related to the loss of the public sphere and something that Habermas mourns and something that Lyotard sort of celebrates in the postmodern condition.

So again, there is some similarity to be drawn between Arendt and Lyotard over here. So and she goes on to say this is the entire ontological you know differences blurred away into and essentially between the private and the political. It has also changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life of the individual and the citizen.

Not only would we not agree with the Greeks that a life spent in the privacy of one's own outside the world of the common is idiotic by definition or with the Romans to whom privacy offered but a temporary refuge from the business of the *res publica*. We call private today a sphere of intimacy whose beginnings we may be able to trace back to the late Roman though hardly to any period of Greek antiquity.

But whose peculiar manifoldness and variety were certainly unknown to any period prior to the modern age. So she alludes the Roman culture where the private life or person who kept you know privacy and not had a public profile would be considered to be an idiot right. She says the modern world rejects that kind of a reading, rejects that kind of a interpretation. It rejects the idea of the public that was prevalent in the Greek times and the Roman times.

Of course being a public figure was of supreme importance and she says that idea of the public figure that prestige associated with the public figure that has gone away and instead what we have is a degree of intimacy, intimacy becomes an affective identity in modern times and that becomes prestigious by its own right in its own right. So intimacy as an ontological category has become very important in the modern world where and of course this is related to consumerism, this is related to rise of capitalism in many sense.

This brand of individuality where you can consume things and enjoy things in the intimacy and the privacy of your home is a very 20th century phenomenon as Arendt could argue here and others argue elsewhere Lyotard for instance talks about the same thing in the postmodern condition, the rise of capitalism, the rise of consumerism where you become a consumer in the intimacy, in the privacy of your home.

And no longer do you require the sanction or the you know the validation of the public spare in order to be respectable. You can be respectable inside your private spare and no need to walk out or emerge in the public space. So in that kind of sense the entire prestige quotient of the public spare goes away and that prestige quotient which is so high, so premium during Roman times and Greek times. We are talking about the Roman and Greek public spaces where people who come and give speeches and the crowds would gather and you can take many examples in

literature, Julius Caesar, the speech of Mark Antony and the speech of Caesar you know so you know all those were really rebel rousing tactics and of course those dependent on a very stable definition of the public space or public space. So that kind of a specialty is gone in 20th century and instead what we have is a series of intimacy which is related to consumerism and the rise of capitalism as Arendt would argue.

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life spent in the privacy of "one's own" (*idion*), outside the world of the common, is "idiotic" by definition, or with the Romans to whom privacy offered but a temporary refuge from the business of the *res publica*; we call private today a sphere of intimacy whose beginnings we may be able to trace back to late Roman, though hardly to any period of Greek antiquity, but whose peculiar manifoldness and variety were certainly unknown to any period prior to the modern age.

This is not merely a matter of shifted emphasis. In ancient feeling the privative trait of privacy, indicated in the word itself, was all-important; it meant literally a state of being deprived of something, and even of the highest and most human of man's capacities. A man who lived only a private life, who like the slave was not permitted to enter the public realm, or like the barbarian had chosen not to establish such a realm, was not fully human. We no longer think primarily of deprivation when we use the word "privacy," and this is partly due to the enormous enrichment of the private sphere through modern individualism.

So this is not merely a matter of shifted emphasis. It is more complex than that. It is not really a matter of shifted emphasis. In ancient feeling the privative trait of privacy indicated in the word itself was all-important. It meant literally a state of being deprived of something. So the ancient meaning of privacy comes from privation, privative trait which means we are deprived of something, deprived of you know human touch, deprived of human respect, deprived of human recognition, that was the original etymological origin of the word privacy.

It literally meant a state of being deprived of something and even of the highest and most human of man's capacities. A man who lived only a private life, who like the slave was not permitted to enter the public realm or like the barbarian had chosen not to establish such a realm was not fully human. So you know this is a very interesting historical, historicized analysis rather of the idea of the public and the private.

And she talks about in ancient times and classical times and ancient Greek and Rome. The slaves for instance, the people who are brought in, I mean you know the entirety of Greek and Roman civilization relied on slavery that was really the backbone, the very ugly obscene backbone of exploitation which really fuelled and formed those civilizations. But anyway, the slaves were completely barred, forbidden from entering the public square, from taking up any position in the public square.

So oftentimes they were completely anonymized, did not have any names. So the entire idea of public recognition was limited to some very exclusive citizens. Obviously this is highly racialized as well. So when you talk about slaves and barbarians over here we are making a very neat racial binary. So obviously the white people are the white Romans and Greeks, the philosophers, the elite politicians they belong to the public square.

And the slaves and barbarians would you know beaver away, work away inside the house, inside the ship inside a factory of some sort. So they were never able to see the day of the daylight the light of the public square. So public square was limited. It had very limited and exclusive access only for people who are qualified racially to enter it. So that was the condition in ancient times.

But of course now there is almost a reversal of it. So people who can enjoy completely the privacy of their house, people who are consumerist, people who are privileged financially in terms of buying everything, in terms of accumulating and acquiring everything, every object of pleasure and in some sense like all great philosophers Arendt too is quite prophetic and make sense.

I mean if you look at the world today, the world we live in today, the entirety of interactions can be done quite comfortably and quite effectively from the privacy of our intimate spaces of our household, of our homes. We do not even need to step out. I mean we can order things online. We can interact with people online. We can chat with people online. We can see people from the privacy of our home. Do not need to step out.

So different kinds of technology have emerged in recent years, over the years to make the private space more and more self-sufficient. So the prestige quotient is almost reversed now. So people who are very prestigious, people who are really wealthy, people who are really sort of agentic would be you know would be very comfortable, would be completely entitled to be inside their private spaces all the time and would not require to step out in a public zone.

So that kind of a prestige with the public zone is now depleted and now instead what we have is the rise of the private spare, okay; the private realm, the intimate realm that has become more important, that has become much more agentic you know that obviously is related to the rise of capitalism, the rise of consumerism, the rise of a certain kind of economy policy right okay. So to be not public was to be not fully human in ancient times.

So the idea of humanness with public presence was a very easily and very interestingly equated in ancient Rome, in ancient Greece and that is something that Arendt keeps alluding to only to you know draw, underline the fact that, that condition is gone now. There is no private and public spare. There is no public space that is as prestigious as it was in ancient times and this is what she says quite clearly over here.

We no longer think primarily of deprivation when we use the word privacy. So when we say I want some privacy now. So privacy almost becomes a commodity in modern times. The more (()) (18:58) you are, the more privileged you are the more privacy you enjoy. So privacy is almost a commodity for enjoyment. A commodity you know that you are entitled to if you have the resources.

It is a complete ontological opposite of what privacy used to mean in ancient times where to be you know private was to be privative, to be deprived of something you know and so it was so the entire ontology of privacy was based on a lack based on some kind of a you know missed chance, an absence, an absence of the public spare an absence from the public limelight and absence from public attention. So it was based on a lie but not anymore.

Because today privacy obviously means a very prestigious and coveted commodity. So people who are more wealthy, people who are more agentic they enjoy more privacy than other people who got to share spaces, okay. So the entire ontology of privacy has changed in modern times according to Arendt and is a very interesting analysis that she offers here, okay. So we no longer think primarily of deprivation when we use the word privacy and this is partly due to the enormous enrichment of the private sphere through modern individualism.

So again the idea of the enrichment of the private sphere has come due to modern individualism and this individualism obviously come related to a certain kind of an economic policy certain kind of an economic order which is capitalism and you know the consequent consumerism from capitalism. So we can consume everything from the privacy of your home, the privacy of your house without stepping out into the public space.

So privacy becomes a coveted commodity in modern times quite unlike the sense of deprivation, the sense of absence, the sense of lack that it connoted in ancient times.

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assumed one interest of society as a whole in economics as well as the assumed one opinion of polite society in the salon, does not cease to rule for having lost its personality. As we know from the most social form of government, that is, from bureaucracy (the last stage of government in the nation-state just as one-man rule in benevolent despotism and absolutism was its first), the rule by nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it may indeed, under certain circumstances, even turn out to be one of its crudest and most tyrannical versions.

It is decisive that society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, which formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to "normalize" its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement. With

Okay, so now we come to this section, this is again highlighted on your screen you know in yellow where she says it is decisive that society on all its levels excludes the possibility of action which formerly was excluded from the household. Instead society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior imposing innumerable and various rules all of which tend to

normalize its members to make them behave to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement. So this is the numbing effect of society.

So the idea of being numbed is related to the idea of being normative. So normativity and numbness are equated over here in a very interesting way where she says that you know a very good functioned society would require of its citizens to be numb, require of its citizens to be passive conformists, will make rules and then normalize rules level away any constructed quality that may appear in the rules and you know turn these rules into natural given.

So naturalization and normalization these are parts of any kind of functional society. These are very functioning, effective functioning mechanisms of any society whereby you normalize and normativize rules whereby basically you consume and conform to the rules without even questioning them and this is obviously the way in which society works in most occasions according to Arendt.

So again we have an idea of society which is obviously a construct, a constructive category which relies on naturalization, which relies on normalization, which relies on normativization for its functioning and you know as human beings we are constantly being conditioned into this kind of an existence. So conditioning becomes a very important factor in Arendt's analysis.

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THE PUBLIC REALM: THE COMMON

The term "public" signifies two closely interrelated but not altogether identical phenomena:

It means, first, that everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity. For us, appearance—something that is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves—constitutes reality. Compared with the reality which comes from being seen and heard, even the greatest forces of intimate life—the passions of the heart, the thoughts of the mind, the delights of the senses—lead an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance.⁴¹ The most current of such transformations occurs in storytelling and generally in artistic transposition of individual experiences. But we do not need the form of the artist to witness this transfiguration. Each time we talk about things that can be experienced only in privacy or intimacy, we bring them out into a sphere where they will assume a kind of reality which, their intensity notwithstanding, they never could have had before. The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of the

Now on page 50 she talks about it is the continuation of this debate on the public realm and this should be on your screen again highlighted in yellow where she talks about the public realm, the common, so you know again breaking away from the original ontology of the public realm which was you know prevalent in ancient Greek and in the Roman times where the public realm was inhabited, was only accessible to exclusive people of a certain race and of course of a certain gender.

Woman not really allowed to be part of the public realm as much as men were. It was very much a white masculine hegemony which was informed, invested into the public realm. So what is the public realm now. What is the ontology of the public realm and this is something she analysis and examines in page 50 which should be on your screen. The term public signifies two closely interrelated but not altogether identical phenomena. What are those?

It means first that everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible publicity, right. So one of the conditions of being public is publicity. It should be visible, it should be consumable, it should be spreadable you know and is disseminated across people, across generations, across spaces quite rapidly. That is one of the conditions of being public, one of the ontological conditions of you know publicness.

For us appearance, something that is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves constitutes reality. So this idea of appearance and reality or visibility and reality is something that Arendt talks about and of course more extreme postmodern thinkers such as Baudelaire and Lyotard were talking about the idea of visibility as a construct, the visibility as a manufactured commodity which is deliberately designed in order to confirm to certain kind of reality, to produce reality right to manufacture reality through visibility.

So compared with the reality which comes from being seen and heard even the greatest forces of intimate life the passions of the heart, the thoughts of the mind, the delights of the senses lead an uncertain shadowy kind of existence unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized, and deindividualized as it were into a shape to fit them for public appearance.

So she talks about the potency of public appearance, the spreadability of public appearance and how you know the public appearance can only happen if you transform your individuality into a deindividualized self. So there is a degree of leveling away in public appearances which will then connect to the idea of spreadability. So if you are too individual, too unique then you are not really fit to be a public persona, a public individual, a public entity.

So public commodity relies on this idea of leveling away, this idea of sort of democratization or normativization right. So you have to be normative in order to be public and again this whole idea of public and normative are brought back by Arendt, okay.

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formed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance.⁴¹ The most current of such transformations occurs in storytelling and generally in artistic transposition of individual experiences. But we do not need the form of the artist to witness this transfiguration. Each time we talk about things that can be experienced only in privacy or intimacy, we bring them out into a sphere where they will assume a kind of reality which, their intensity notwithstanding, they never could have had before. The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of the world and ourselves, and while the intimacy of a fully developed private life, such as had never been known before the rise of the modern age and the concomitant decline of the public realm, will always greatly intensify and enrich the whole scale of subjective emotions and private feelings, this intensification will always come to pass at the expense of the assurance of the reality of the world and men.

Indeed, the most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of blotting out all other experiences, namely, the experience of great bodily pain, is at the same time the most private and least

So the presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of the world and ourselves and while the intimacy of a fully developed private life such as had never been known before the rise of the modern age and the concomitant decline of the public realm, and the concomitant sorry, the concomitant decline of the public realm will always greatly intensify and enrich the whole scale of subjective emotions and private feelings.

This intensification will always come to pass at the expense of the assurance of the reality of the world and men. So this is obviously a pointer to the postmodern times where the public realm is disappearing, the public space is disappearing to a great extent despite the normativity, despite the urge towards naturalization etc. and what we have instead is intimacy. So again this whole

idea of publicity and intimacy I mean these are very sort of interesting categories used by Arendt over here.

She talks about the, the rise of the modern age and the concomitant decline of the public realm. So the decline of the public realm and the rise of the modern age is almost synchronous and simultaneous with each other in Arendt's analysis and this will greatly intensify and enrich the whole scale of subjective emotions and private feelings. The subjective emotions and private feelings, these become very important over here.

So as a result what happens in modern times and postmodern times, the feelings become commodities, emotions become commodities and this is something that Arendt does not quite spell out quite as clearly because obviously she is writing right before you know these things really begin to happen. But we can see her anticipating that age in which we are living while emotions such as love, you know romance, you know affection etc. are sort of marketed into commodity.

So think of all these the entire card industry, the entire gift industry, the entire love gift industry which have emerged over the years purely on the basis of how they have transformed feelings into commodity, the intimacy into a commodity, right. So when intimacy begins to become more important it is essential to convert them into commodity for the market to become viable. So instead of a public realm, a public square we have intimacy becoming an industry in the postmodern age.

So indeed the most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of blotting out all other experiences, namely the experience of great bodily pain is at the same time the most private and least communicable of all.

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The Public and the Private Realm

communicable of all. Not only is it perhaps the only experience which we are unable to transform into a shape fit for public appearance, it actually deprives us of our feeling for reality to such an extent that we can forget it more quickly and easily than anything else. There seems to be no bridge from the most radical subjectivity, in which I am no longer "recognizable," to the outer world of life.⁴² Pain, in other words, truly a borderline experience between life as "being among men" (*inter homines esse*) and death, is so subjective and removed from the world of things and men that it cannot assume an appearance at all.⁴³

Since our feeling for reality depends utterly upon appearance and therefore upon the existence of a public realm into which things can appear out of the darkness of sheltered existence, even the twilight which illuminates our private and intimate lives is ultimately derived from the much harsher light of the public realm. Yet there are a great many things which cannot withstand the implacable, bright light of the constant presence of others on

Not only is it perhaps the only experience which you are unable to transform into a shape fit for public appearance it actually deprives us of our feeling for reality to such an extent that we can forget it more quickly and easily than anything else. So now she talks about a very interesting subject, the idea of pain and how bodily pain which is a very private phenomenon, a very private experience, a very private experiential notion and how that is completely and the ontological opposite of publicity, of the public realm.

We cannot communicate pain, we cannot communicate pain in a sematic structure which is publicly shared. So pain as an intimate feeling, pain as an emotion of suffering, pain as an emotion of loss, so how this emotion is deeply intimate and deeply inward looking and how inwardness of pain is ontologically opposite to the you know the public quality of publicity or the public space.

So pain versus you know publicity is something which talks about over here, okay. There seems to be no bridge from the most radical subjectivity in which I am no longer recognizable to the outer world of life. Pain in other words, truly a borderline experience between life as being among men and death is so subjective and removed from the world of things and men that it cannot assume an appearance at all.

Okay, so she talks about the liminal quality of pain, right. So pain being completely ontologically opposite to the public life, ontologically opposite to the cognized public life, it is not recognizable at all. So it becomes very a form of radical subjectivity. So pain as a radical subjective becomes important in Arendt's analysis because that is a subjectivity that cannot be transformed into a public meaning, into a public space, into a an experience between men okay.

So it is something akin to death, it is something akin and by death over here she means the opposite of this interactional activity that goes on between men. So death as the opposite of culture, death as an opposite of production. So pain becomes an example of deproduction, right. As example of absence, example of loss, okay and that becomes an important analysis in Arendt's thesis over here.

So it is so subjective and removed from the world of things and men that it cannot assume an appearance at all. So we started this lecture by looking at the discursive significance of things and how we are always surrounded by thingness and this thingness of existence is something Arendt constantly highlights but pain is an experience which does away in a way with thingness. Pain is an experience which basically you know it does not allow the thingness to come into being.

It is a pure form of subjectivity, it is a radical form of subjectivity which is divorced from awareness of thingness around us. So pain becomes a bit of an insular intimacy. A category which cut us off from or cuts us off from our interaction, our navigation with things and thingness around us which constitutes culture. So pain over here becomes the ontological opposite of what Arendt means by work and activity and therein lies the radical quality of pain as a subjective feeling.

So I will just end this lecture here today but as a reference I would ask you to read really which reference in relation to this Virginia Woolf's essay called On Being Ill, I will say it again. It is an essay called On Being Ill by Virginia Woolf where she (()) (31:12) this where she says how being ill or being in bodily pain basically cuts you off from your familiar world around you and everything is defamiliarized.

Everything it becomes unrecognizable and you know it becomes a form of rewriting, the entire parameter is changed, the entire coding is changed and you instead of looking outside and interacting or navigating with the familiar things and the familiar thingness of your life, you begin to look inward and then when you look around the familiar things become defamiliarized because of the bodily pain.

So bodily pain becomes a form of transformation which is called radical in its subjective quality and it does away with the objective understanding of the world, with the objective understanding of the thingness of the world which constitutes culture and cultural activity. So I will stop this lecture here today and we will continue with Arendt in the lectures to come. Thank you for your attention.