


Sociological Perspectives on Modernity
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Lecture – 13
Structuralist Interpretation II

Welcome to the 13th lecture of the mooc course on Sociological Perspectives and Modernity. In the last lecture I mean in the 12th lecture, we have started we started with ultra-modernity the structuralist case or the structuralist interpretation of critical modernist paradigm in sociology.

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Functionalism

- If we assume that the social world can be derived from an idea – the idea of the capitalist mode of production, the idea of difference – then in principle there is no possible explanation of how social change arises.
- The world is divided up like this because it is identical with the way the idea is organised; there is no reason why it should change.
- Another possibility is to develop a typology of different possible types of society, so that change is simply change from one way of expressing the idea to another one. A more interesting and widely-used approach, however, is what is known as functional explanations.

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Ok, I mean we are trying to examine the structuralist interpretation of critical modernist paradigm in sociology, against the backdrop of those four central pillars of modernity, central philosophical and political foundations of modernity. Namely holism or totality, reflexivity, rationality and social movements; I keep on repeating these things precisely, because it will be easier for the listener the learner to understand this ok.

In the last class, if you look at this.

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
Ultra-modernism: The Structuralist Interpretation

- Structuralism's claim to be considered a form to *critical* modernism – more *tenuous*.
- While much structuralism claims to be “Marxist”, very often it appears rather more as an incorporation of Marxism into a rather more affirmative form of modernism.
- This is particularly evident in the difficulties structuralist thought faces in coming to terms with reflexivity, as well as its consequent explicit or implicit flirtation with positivism.


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In the last class we discussed how structuralism or structuralist interpretation of modernity can be examined through the works of Levi Strauss and Louis Althusser.

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• Differences between Levi-Strauss and Althusser: can certainly be said to be critical in terms of their political positions and the implications of some of their work, if not always in terms of reflexivity.

• Structuralism intersects with the positivist and functionalist school deriving from Comte and Durkheim, which leads to Parsons' "Structural-Functionalism".

• Critique of Althusser: *The Poverty of Theory* by E. P. Thomson




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Differences between or distinctions between Levi Strauss and Althusser can certainly be said to be critical in terms of their political positions, because Levi Strauss was through and through a structural anthropologist. Whereas, Althusser was a new Marxist, but how structure always arises out of out of their works is very important to be executed.

Then we have also discussed how the intersectionality between structuralism and structuralism on the one hand and positivism and functionalism on the other ok.

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Holism

Relationalism and the death of the subject

- Distinction between "methodological individualist" approaches – individual as the starting-point for social theory – and "relational" approaches – which focus on the relations between individuals.
- Marx: the relational emphasis derives from a conception of the individual as essentially social in nature.
- Weber: what is relevant to the sociologist is action that is oriented towards the behaviour of others.
- In both cases (Marx and Weber), structure arises out of social interaction, geared particularly towards labour in Marx and towards meaning in Weber.

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
Then, when we when we started discussing structuralist interpretation of modernity, through the lens of holism or totality. We have discussed how structure always are the proponents of structuralism always dwell upon the aspect of relationalism or the depth of the subject or the death of the author. There we how we have discussed the distinction between Weber and Marx initially ok.

I mean for Marx the relational emphasis derives from a conception of the individual as essentially social in nature and for Weber what is relevant to a critical social species being is action, that is created towards the behaviour of others ok.

If you slightly recall the typology of social action, I mean tradition social action effective or emotive social action, value rational social action or goal rational social action goal oriented social action, which is alternatively known as instrumental rationality ok. And for Weber value rational social action and goal rational social action they contribute to the domain of meaningful social action ok.

In both cases of Marx as well as Weber structure arises out of social interaction geared particularly towards labour in Marx and towards meaning in Weber ok. I mean when I say labour it emanates from a specific social and economic mode of production ok. When I say meaning in Weber I mean meaning, which is which arises out of social action, namely value rationale social action and goal rational social action.

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
- In structuralism, relationship takes off and becomes fully independent: it is no longer human beings who relate with each other, but the fact of relationship which first creates the social and cultural individual out of an amorphous biological mass.
- What does it imply?
- We can only know the social, in other words the relational, and that "the individual" or "human nature" are therefore metaphysical concepts in the strict sense that we cannot know them.

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However, in structuralism what we have discussed that relationship takes off and becomes fully independent it is no longer human beings who relate with each other, but the fact of relationship which first creates the social and cultural individual out of an amormus amorphous biological mass ok.

That is why we have discussed I mean in structuralism, we can only know the social in other words the relational and that the individual or human nature are therefore, first structuralist are metaphysical concepts. In a strict sense that we cannot know them that is why I gave you this example that perhaps I do not know Lata Mangeshkar, as a person I do not know Lata mangeshkar, but I know through her performance through her singing.

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- For example, we cannot know X in her unique, individual internal experience (even if we believe it exists) – why? Because all we have available to us is our social interaction with her – what she says and what she does – this ultra-relationalism, in other words, leads to what is known by the slogan of “the death of the subject”
- Meaning, either the individual literally does not exist because they are only created by social interaction, and form simply an intersection between different social relations; or the individual is methodologically unknowable because we can only know the social.




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It is only through their through, I mean it is I mean what all we have available to us is our social interaction with Lata Mangeshkar. For example, what she says and what she does this is ultra relationalism. In other words leads to what is known by the slogan of the death of the subject or death of the author. It implies that either the individual literally does not exist because the individual is only created by social interaction, and forms simply an intersection between different social relations or the individual is methodologically unknowable, because we can only know the social. The individual is found in the world of unknowability.

Whereas the aspect of social can be found in the world of no ability, what we did not know? Ok.


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The argument that the individual does not exist that they are only the intersection of social relations or the “bearers” of social structure, is argued very strongly by Louis Althusser, who sees our belief that we are individuals to be a psychological illusion. What Althusser argues Althusser argues that, ‘the category of all the subject is the constitutive category of all ideology’, that is what we have discussed already that. So, our illusory subjectivity generates ideology and ideology reproduces our illusions of subjectivity.

From difference I mean from relationalism and death of the subject or death of the author, we have we have also discussed difference. I mean all that we can know, or all that exists is the relation.

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
The slide is titled "Difference" and contains a bulleted list of four points. The text is as follows:

- All that we can know, or all that exists, is the relational.
- If all that we can know about is relations, then we can think about the way in which those relations interact with one another in a very detached, and often very formalistic approach.
- We can also try and categorise the different types of relation which are possible; Weber's four types of social action are a move in this direction.
- Further, we have seen that despite his methodological individualism the concept of instrumental rationality in particular has a tendency to become dominant in his thinking.

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If all that we can know about is relations, then we can think about the way in which those relations interact with one another in a very detached or often very formalistic approach. I mean that is in this context we have we have revisited Weber, Weber's typology of social action.

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The slide contains a bulleted list of two points. The text is as follows:

- What relationalism is likely to lead us to, in other words, is a categorisation of different types of relation and different levels of relation, and an account of society in terms of the interrelation of these different relations.
- So, relational approaches tend towards this kind of categorisation, but they also tend to privilege intellectual consistency over empirical usefulness.


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Then we have discussed I mean what relationalism is likely to lead us to, in other words is a categorization of different types of relation as well as different levels of relation, and an account of society in terms of the interaction of these different relations, this is very

important not only types, but also levels of relation and how they interact with each other?.

So, relational approaches tend towards this kind of categorization, but they also tend to privilege intellectual consistency over empirical inference we have discussed this.

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
- As we generate more of these concepts describing **types** and **levels** of relations, we are going to want to make them as **consistent** as possible with each other, for very valid intellectual reasons.
- For equally valid reasons, we are likely to want to be able to generate all of them from as restricted a number of basic concepts as possible; in other words, to generate **typologies of possible variations and interrelations of particular types of relations**.
- The net effect of all of this is that relational approaches have a tendency towards what we can properly describe as **structuralist accounts**, that is, **accounts which derive all of social reality from the operation and permutation of a limited number of basic concepts**.

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As we generate more of these concepts describing types and levels of relations, we are going to want to make them as consistent as possible with each other, for very valid intellectual reasons. I mean for equally valid for equally valid intellectual reasons, we are likely to want to be able to generate all of them from as restricted a number of basic concepts as possible; in other words, to generate typologies of possible variations and interrelations of particular types of relations.

I mean the net effect of all these I mean I mean the entire gamut of structuralist accounts I mean accounts, which derive all of social reality from the operation and permutation of a limited number of basic concepts.

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- Because this core concept, from which our description of society is generated, is a highly intellectual one, this is very likely to produce **a form of philosophical idealism: a theory which treats the (social) world as generated from ideas, and in this case from a single idea.**
- While there are dramatic differences in the content, the **structure** of our account of society is likely to be very similar whatever idea we start from; in some ways **Althusser's** account, not of actual modes of production but of the **idea** of modes of production, and **Levi-Strauss'** account of culture oriented around **difference**, produce quite similar ways of thinking.

Because this core concept, which our description of society is generated, is a highly intellectual one, this is very likely to produce a form of philosophical ideology that we have discussed I mean what is philosophically idealism, it is a theory which treats the social world as generated from ideas and in this case from a single idea ok, unlike Marx and Weber.

For Marx and Weber our social world is a product of a multiplicity of ideas ok. For Weber particularly for Weber for Marx, it is not simply ideas rather our social world is generated from not ideas, but matter we have discussed this in materialist conception of history that matter is prior to the formation of ideas ok.

But for structurelist our social world is a product of only single light ok, I mean while there are dramatic differences in the content the structure of our account of societies likely to be very similar whatever, idea we start from in some ways Althusser's account that not of actual modes of production, but of the idea of modes of production and Levi Strauss's account of culture oriented around culture oriented around difference produced quite similar ways of thinking.


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Levi-Strauss performs **two** operations in his account of human culture:

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graph TD; A[Levi-Strauss performs two operations in his account of human culture:] --> B[Levi-Strauss employs a linguistic analogy to treat culture, not just as a system of relations, but as a system of symbolic relations, such as myths.]; A --> C[Using the same linguistic analogy, Levi-Strauss aims at a purely formal description of the various elements involved in particular myths; in other words, Levi-Strauss sets out to describe structure but not the content.];
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Levi-Strauss employs a linguistic analogy to treat culture, not just as a system of relations, but as a system of symbolic relations, such as myths.

Using the same linguistic analogy, Levi-Strauss aims at a purely formal description of the various elements involved in particular myths; in other words, Levi-Strauss sets out to describe structure but not the content.



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I mean that is how we have discussed how Levi Strauss performs two operations in his account of human culture. I mean on the one hand Levi Strauss employs a linguistic analogy to treat culture not a not merely as a system of relations, but as a system of symbolic relations namely myths ok.

And on the other hand using the same linguistic analogy Levi Strauss aims at a purely formal description of the various elements, involved in particular myths in other words Levi Strauss sets out to describe structure, but not the content ok.

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- What this leads to is an argument that there is an **objective meaning** in human culture (revealed by **structure**) which is other than the **subjective meaning** (revealed by **content**).
- Since, however, this objective meaning cannot be straightforwardly shown to be present in a particular myth once we bracket any question of the way people say they understand it or the contexts they tell it in, it has to be located within the unconscious. In other words, **from a description of social relations we move to a description of the nature of the human psyche**.
- To complete this account, what Levi-Strauss claims to be the central feature of the human unconscious – a claim which he believes to be backed up by linguistics – is naturally enough identical with the concept he uses to analyse the objective meaning of the form of myths; this concept is that of **difference** or **distinction**. For Levi-Strauss, then, the end of the intellectual journey is a description of the social and in particular cultural world as a reflection of the supposed tendency of the human brain to divide things up.

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Then, where does the problem lie I mean what this leads to is an argument there is an objective meaning in human culture, which is different from the subject subjective meaning revealed by content. I mean there is a difference between structure and content and structurelist always try to look at the objective meaning in human culture revealed by structure not the subjective meanings subjective perceptions ok, which are revealed by the content.

What this objective meaning? I mean which cannot be straight forwardly shown to be present in a particular myth or symbolic relation, once we bracket any question of the way people say they understand it or the contexts that they till it in it has to be located within the unconscious, because the content is removed from that only structure remains for the proponents of structuralism.

In other words the, I mean from a from a description of social relations we moved to a description of the nature of human psyche ok. What Levi Strauss claims to be the central feature of the human unconscious a claim, which he believes to be backed up by linguists is naturally enough identical with the concept he uses to analyse, the objective meaning of the form of myths this concept is that of difference or distinction.

For Levi Strauss for Levi Strauss then the end of the intellectual journey is a description of description of the social and in particular cultural world as a reflection of the supposed tendency of the human brain to divide things up ok.

In this context you see we are still within holism or totality, in this context 2 more components are going to be covered in today's lecture that how I mean both functionalism and modernity. They can also be clubbed under I mean they can also be examined when we examine structuralist interpretation of modernity through the lens of holism or totality. Now let us see what functionalism, what is that functionalism to just to start with what is functionalism in sociology?

Functionalism refers to the idea of complementarity and reciprocity of roles in the social division of labour ok. It may be cost it may be race it may be gender whatever you look or it may be classic also. In the social division of labour functionalism always argues for argues in favour of complementarity and reciprocity of roles ok.

I mean there is a problem with this approach suppose Marx said how can social I mean how is social change possible? Marx said social change is possible through conflicts through class contradictions and so on. For proponents of functionalism or structuralism ok, no social change is possible only through mutual cooperation ok.

That is why the idea of complementarity and reciprocity of roles in the social division of labour was argued by the proponents of functionalism. I mean there is a problem with this approach and it is it is it is not just it is not just a difficulty with only Levi Strauss. If we if we assume that the social world can be can be derived from an idea and not only an idea I mean a single idea.

I mean that the idea of suppose if I say the idea of there not the actual mode of production, but the idea of the idea of mode of production, I mean in this case the idea of the capitalist mode of production or the idea of difference. I mean the idea of not actual mode of production, but the idea I mean not the actual not the actual mode of production, but the idea of mode of production, which was seen in the works of Althusser, I mean the idea of difference or distinction is seen through the works of Levi Strauss, then in principle there is no possible explanation of how social change arises?

The world is divided up like this, because it is identical with the wage in which that particular that particular single idea is organized, there is no reason why it should not change ok, this is this is very important.

Now of course, now of course, one can one can develop adopt explanations of any changes in the structure and in practice this is very often done. These are very often done, I mean when you when you look at this if I say now only through cooperation mutual respect and so on. We have been able to make social change possible or development possible ok.

There is a problem I mean suppose how could Indians build a new social order against colonialism, it was not because of cooperation or mutual respect for each other, but it was only through conflicts in terms of classes, in terms of gender in terms of cast, in terms of nationality and so on ok.


I mean the imposition of western civilization on Indian population, the imposition of western development or mainstream development paradigms on India's population, the

imposition of slavery on India's population ok. That is why social change that is why I said there is a problem with this approach and it is not just a difficulty with a Levi Strauss, I mean if we if you if we say that if we assume that no social change has been made possible just because of such functionalist explanations I think there are certain problems.

Then that is why I said the wide is divided up like this, because it is identical with the way the idea is organized and there is no reason why it should not change? Another I mean I mean I mean one can one can develop dark explanations of any changes in this structure and in practice this is very often done.

Another possibility is to develop typology of different possible types of society. So, that change is simply change from one way of expressing the idea to another. One a more interesting and widely used approach; however, is what is known as functional explanations. What are these then if I say these are functional explanations? What do we mean by functional explanations? I mean functional explanations are explanations of events not of their causes, but of their effects. What causes this functionalists do not tend to explain functionalists always try to explain in terms of only effects.

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Functional explanations?

- Functional explanations are explanations of events in terms, not of their causes, but of their effects. For example, we might explain the fall of a government, not in terms of the events which led up to it, but in terms of what it led to. On the face of it this is simply unacceptable. The rules of logic do not allow us to reverse the flow of causality and say that an event A can be caused by an event B which has not yet happened. This form of explanation, which is known as teleological, can only make sense in one of two contexts.

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For example we might explain the fall of a government. Suppose colonial government to Indian government, British colonial government to India. We are I mean a structuralist will not be explaining this in terms of events, which led up to it, but where a functionalist

will be more interested in I mean in terms of what it led to that is why I repeat for example, we might explain the fall of a government, not in terms of the events which led up to, but in terms of what it led to ok.

I mean I can say that how Indians fought against the British we must examine the nature of events ok, that that led up to an anti-colonial social and political movements in India, that led to such anti-colonial movements, but I just do not look at only this is only in terms of 2 events this is colonialism and this is Indian government, British led colonial government as well and then Indian political government political state ok.


That is why it is very important to look at any change in terms of the events, which led up to it there the proponents of functionalism committed as a grave error that that they did not look at the social and political changes economic changes in terms of the events which led up to it, but in terms of what it played to?

On the face of it this is simply unacceptable, the rules of logic, do not the rules of any substantive argument ok. They do not allow us to reverse the flow of causality and say that an event a can be caused by an event b which has not yet happened. This form of explanation which is known as teleological can only make sense in 1 of 2 contexts ok.

Teleological I mean where I do not know what is the cause and what is the effect I just know what is the effect. Let me let me give you a few more examples I mean one each I mean I mean in 1 of 2 contexts when I say I mean this kind of functional explanation, which is known as teleological explanation can only make sense in one of 2 contexts.

And one is if event a is caused by a prior or event alpha. For example, which is somebody's intention with regard to the future, we can certainly argue that a government fail because someone wanted to form a different government and thus forced the collapse of the current government ok.

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- One is, if event A is caused by a prior event alpha, which is somebody's intention with regard to the future. We can certainly argue that a government fell because someone wanted to form a different government and thus forced the collapse of the current government.
- However, intention and effect are two different things: the intention to bring about event B may not in fact be realised, and our action in causing event A may have completely different results. This is generally characterised as "unintended consequences", and it is clear from Weber's account of instrumental rationality as a method we adopt as a means to a particular goal, but which then becomes an end in itself. So an intentional explanation can only work where the person with the intention is in fact not just all-powerful but has total knowledge of the context of their action; in other words, where they are God. Much mediaeval thought is teleological in this sense: events are explained in terms of God's plans for the future of the world.

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Nevertheless intention nevertheless intention and effect are 2 different things I mean purpose and objective I mean purpose and I mean intention when I say motive and effect I mean desired reject there are 2 different things. The intention to bring about event B may not, in fact be realized, and our action in causing event A may have completely different results.


This is generally characterized as unintended consequences it is an it is a Weberian term unintended consequences or un "unanticipated consequence", and it is clear from Weber's account of goal oriented social action or instrumental rationality as a method we adapt as a means to a particular goal, but which then becomes an end in itself.

So, on intentional or purposive explanation can only work where the person with the intention is in fact, not just all powerful, but has total knowledge of the context of their action; in other words where they are god much medieval thought is teleological in this sense events are explained in terms of gods plans or supernatural forces ok, that is I mean for the future of the world I mean that is what teleological stage suggested that that social change occurs because of supernatural forces ok.

This is very important I mean that is an intentional explanation can only work where the person with the intention is in fact not just all powerful, but has total knowledge of the context of their action ok. I mean in this sense all I mean I mean medieval thought provided us with provided such teleological or functional explanations, in this sense I

mean events were always explained in terms of some supernatural forces for the future of the world ok.

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- Apart from intentional explanations, there is one other form of potentially valid explanation in terms of effects, which is the argument known as **Functionalism**; it is represented, for example, by the claim that such-and-such a thing happens "because the economy needs it" or "because of the interests of capital"
- Note that this is quite different from an explanation in terms of the perceived needs of the economy (as seen by the government, by the electors or by individual managers). It is also different from a simple explanation in terms of compatibility: by definition, if a form of state is incompatible with a form of economic organisation, they will not coexist – **but this says nothing about the reasons for their incompatibility or the mechanism which prevents their coexistence.**

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
Apart from intentional explanations there is one other form of potentially valid explanation in terms of effects, which is the argument known as functionalism; it is represented for example, by the claim that such-and-such thing happens because the economy needs it "because of the interests of capital" and today the proponents of new liberalism also do this. That no our economy needs you our it is in the best interests of capital flows ok.

Please note this that that this is quite different from an explanation in terms of the perceived needs of the economy, as seen by the government by the by the electors or by individual managers. It is also different from a simple explanation in terms of compatibility ok. I mean when I say compatibility, I mean by definition if a form of state is incompatible with a form of economic organisation, they will not coexist.

I mean the nature of the state must be designed in such a way, that it must have some kind of compatibility with it is economic social and political organizations.

But when I when I mentioned this I do not I mean I mean I do not say anything about the reasons for that incompatibility or the mechanism, which prevents their coexistence ok.

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- Strict functionalist explanations are based on an analogy to Darwinian evolutionary theory. This argues in terms of competition for survival in a situation of relative scarcity. Over immense periods of time, genetic mutations and variations will occur. Some of these will be *functional* for survival, in the sense that they will either enable the new individual to survive more effectively or to breed more effectively.
- From the point of view of genetic reproduction, of course, what matters is that a plant or animal survives long enough to reproduce itself; the better its statistical chances of survival to this point, or the more successful it is at reproduction, the more individuals with this different genetic structure there will be. Over time, in other words, functional mutations will tend to reproduce themselves and spread; less functional mutations will survive less frequently (given competition for the same food etc.) or will be outclassed in terms of reproduction.

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I mean strict functionalist explanations are based on an analogy to Darwinian evolutionary theory. This argues in terms of competition for survival in a situation of relative scarcity, I mean principle of natural selection ok. The origin of species I am referring to the evolution of species I am referring to that is why we always try to argue in terms of, I mean we when I say I mean not we as such, but the proponents of functionalism the proponents of the not simply Darwinian evolutionary theory, but the proponents of functionalist interpretation of Darwinian evolutionary theory, that which argues in terms of competition for survival in a situation of relative scarcity.

Over immense periods of time genetic mutations and variations will occur, some of these will be functional for survival, in the sense that they will either enable the new individual to survive more effectively or to breed more effectively I mean people very often say that why human species though we are we are relatively physically weak as compared to a dinosaur for example, why we did not lose out I mean why we did not cease to exist or we have not yet ceased to exist rather dinosaurs or such big huge species they were subject to extinction why?


It people attribute it to reasoning capacity people, but, Darwin made two very important remarks scientific remarks, that that one is adaptability ok, that that the new individual I mean that which enables us the enables the new individual to survive; one is adaptability in a given topographic geographic cultural natural environment one. And secondly, the

capacity for reproduction the capacity for the capacity to reproduce further generations that is why to breed more effective.

From the from the point of view of genetic reproduction of course, what matters is that a plant or animal survives long enough to reproduce itself the better it is statistical chances to offer survival to this point or the more successful it is at reproduction, the more individuals with this different genetic structure there will be.

Over time, putting it succinctly over time functional mutations will tend to reproduce themselves and spread less functional mutations will survive less frequently given the competition for the same food and so on, I mean principle of natural selection and will be outclassed in terms of reproduction ok, that is very important ok.

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
- This argument does **Not** hold for social explanations, however, for **three** very important reasons.
- **First**, it assumes fixed units such as individual animals; in other words, its natural affinity is with a radical methodological individualism which takes the individual (or some other unit, perhaps the family or the enterprise) not just as the starting-point but effectively as the only reality: which does not examine, for example, the social origins of the individual's ways of thinking and definition of needs, and which does not consider the possibility of *interaction* between, for example, the individual and the family.

I mean such argument does not hold good for social explanations though ok, I said natural principle of natural selection ok, explanations were based on the basis of changes in nature, but this argument may not hold good for social explanations. I mean explanations for social change for three very important reasons.

Firstly, it assumes fixed units such as individual animals in other words it is natural affinity is with a radical methodological individualism, which takes the individual or some other unit perhaps the family or the enterprise, not just as the starting point, but effectively as the only reality, which does not examine for example, the social origins of

the individual ways of thinking. And definition of needs and which does not consider the possibility of interaction between for example, the individual and the family ok.

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- Secondly, it assumes that, whatever the unit is, it has a means of self-reproduction which is as exact and as stable as genetic transmission. Obviously enough, however, even when firms copy successful firms, they do not reproduce all features of the successful firms, and they cannot; all they do is import what they perceive to be the important features. So we can think of a general diffusion, for example of instrumental rationality, which is *intentional* in nature: people think that it is likely to be effective, and it happens that they are right. But we cannot say that this is a functional process.
- The continuing history of Anglo-American interest in Japanese management methods is a sufficient example of this: "Japanese management" is not a single fixed entity like a collection of genes, but is transmitted as a series of what may be very differing *assumptions* about its key elements; just as importantly, Anglo-American workers and managers and Japanese workers and managers have different **cultural backgrounds**, so that the assumption that the firm is a unit which is not influenced by other social realities falls.

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
Secondly it assumes that whatever the unit is it has a means of self-reproduction which is as exact as exact and as stable as genetic transmission. Obviously, enough; however, even when forms copy successful forms they do not reproduce all features of the successful forms and they cannot all they do is import what they perceive to be the important features? What I what I tell you do not copy me what you tell me, I do not simply copy you I perceive what is important for me you perceive what is important for you right.

So, we can think of a general diffusion for example, of instrumental rationality, which is intentional in nature goal oriented social action. I mean people think that it is likely to be effective and it happens that they are right, but we cannot say that this is a functional process rather an intentional process propoji process. That the continuing history of Anglo American interest in Japanese management methods is a sufficient is an adequate example of this. Japanese management is not a single fixed entity like a collection of genes, but is transmitted as a series of what may be very differing assumptions about it is key elements just as importantly Anglo American workers and managers and Japanese workers and managers have different cultural backgrounds.

If our cultures cultural backgrounds differ then our strategies will differ our management style will differ.

So, that the assumption that the form is a unit which is not influenced by other social realities faults the form is also a social reality and thirdly and thirdly and perhaps most importantly ok.

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- Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, not only do we not have straightforward units, and not only can they not reproduce themselves in a simple fashion, but we have to say that the Darwinian argument of the "survival of the fittest" can only be a metaphoric one when it is applied to society. We could not live like that, even if we felt it was desirable.
- This can be seen very clearly at the level of "societies": contemporary societies are not disputing a common living space; in fact the economically dominant societies are experiencing a population decline. More generally, conflict between contemporary societies is only very rarely expansionist; even where it is, it is generally a matter of the imposition of a new form of government, but not of the obliteration of the previously-existing society. Even where this is the case, as for example in the population movements of the Migration period around the fall of the Roman Empire, "functionality" is a fairly ambiguous concept.
- The societies which expanded into the declining Roman Empire were not in general technologically superior to the Romans, or even necessarily economically superior: indeed, their need to migrate may be seen as evidence of the problems they experienced in maintaining their way of life in the regions they originated from. Their superiority was partly demographic, and partly military. In other words, "functionality" in these terms is almost entirely destructive, and tells us very little about features of economic or social organisation.

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Not only do we not have straightforward units and not only can they not produce themselves in a in a simple fashion, but we have to say that the Darwinian argument of the survival of the fittest. Can only be a metaphoric one when it is applied to society. We could not live like that even if we felt it was desirable their survival of the fittest ok. That that the transmission I mean the transition from changes in biology to changes in our economic culture and quality perhaps, this such compatibility will is not I mean such compatibility does not hold good does it stand the litmus test.

This can be seen very clearly at the level of societies, I mean contemporary societies are not disputing the common living space. In fact, the economically dominant societies are experiencing a population decline. More generally conflict between contemporary societies is only very rarely expensive. Even where it is it is generally a matter of the imposition of a new form of government, but not of the obliteration of the previously existing society.

Even where this is the case as for example, in the population movements of the migration period around the fall of the Roman Empire functionality is a fairly ambiguous concept. The societies, which expanded into the declining Roman Empire for example, were not in general technologically superior to the Romans or even necessarily economically superior. Then what was that in fact their need to migrate may be seen as an evidence of the problems that they experienced in maintaining their way of life in the regions they originated from ah.

Their superiority was partly demographic and partly military in other words functionality in these terms is almost entirely destructive and tells us very little about features of economic or social organisation. In the context of critical modernist paradigm, in social then what about then what about the structuralist interpretation of modernity itself ok? How does radical relationalism.

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Modernity?

- How does radical relationalism lead to structuralism as a holistic account of society, and also indicate the well-known difficulty that structuralism has with explaining change?
- The last feature of holism that is worth mentioning here is the concept of modernity expressed in structuralism.
- While structuralism is strongly modernist in its approach, it does not treat modernity as a key term: it is itself modern, but it is not very interested in the specificity of the modern. There are obvious reasons for this: if society consists of a structure of relations deriving from a single key concept, it is hard to see how we can have dramatically different types of society.

Modernity


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I mean I have discussed what we have discussed we have discussed how radical relationalism leads to structuralism as a holistic account of society. And also indicated and also indicated the well-known difficulty that structuralism has with explaining change ok. The last feature of holism or totality that is worth mentioning here is the concept of modernity expressed in structure. I mean this will briefly though because while structuralism is strongly modernist in it is approach, it does not treat modernity as a key term it is itself modern, but it is not very interested in the specificity of the modern there

are obvious reasons for this I mean if society consists of a structure of relations deriving from a single key concept single idea ok.

It is hard to see how we can have dramatically different types of society ok. That is why though the proponents of structuralism or structuralism itself is a highly modernist approach, it does it does not treat modernity as a key term. It is in fact, it is itself modern, but it does not I mean it is not very much interested in the in the specificity of the elements, which constitute the idea of being modern, that that is that is very important.

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This is the I mean this is a problem for Levi Strauss who derives the organization of culture from the biological structure of the unconscious brain, in other words from something, which if it changes at all dose so, over enormously long periods long periods of time.

Not surprisingly though Levi Strausses work as was at the time the general practice among anthropologists was largely devoted to the study of what were seen as traditional societies and Levi Strauss concept of the modernist largely defined against these ok. To an extent it appears that Levi Strauss treats the modern as an embarrassing and unnatural separation of culture and nature and doomed to destruction for that reason.


By bringing about the critique to modernity, I mean what is what is what is so, important about being modern for Levi Strauss no it is not important to some extent he treats the

modern as an aberration. It is a deviant from the way we conceptualize nature individual nature as this is being. It is it is not a natural separation this separation between culture and nature is not and naturally separated. I mean not naturally mediated rather, it is an unnatural separation of culture and nature and hence doomed to destruction for that reason that is a modernity cannot right.

This may be appealing as a political position, but it does not really deal with the problem and later structuralists have tried to so that, modern culture can also be analyzed in the terms that Levi Strauss uses for traditional culture, this is one part.

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Althusser, by contrast, fits modernity into a static typology in which it is effectively simply one variant on a pattern. This derives from his version of Marxism, which replaces the crude version of economic determinism found in vulgar Marxism – the argument that everything else can simply be reduced to the economic – with a more sophisticated analysis of different levels of social life, including the economic, the political and the ideological. Each of these, for Althusser, can be described as “relatively autonomous”: in other words, it has a logic of its own, and cannot simply be reduced to the economic.



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On the other hand, Althusser by contrast fits modernity into a static typology I mean unchanging typology. In which it is effectively simply one variant of on a pattern this derives from his version of Marxism which replaces the crude version of economic determinism found in vulgar Marxism, let me put it this way that Marx never said this that, I mean the crude distinction between economic and non-economic institutions, it is only when people try to misconstrue Marxism that people say that no Marx said only economic considerations should be made, but it is not true that is why I used this done that that if everything is determined by economic Marx never said this. Rather Marx was trying more towards base and superstructure model and there also his analysis of economic and other social institutions was more philosophical ok.

Not economic as such that the way he tried to treat political economy was a part of his philosophical investigations ok. The argument that everything else can I mean when I say economic determinism I mean everything else can simply be reduced to the economic considerations, with a more sophisticated analysis of different levels of social life including the economic the political and the ideological.

Each of these for Althusser can be described as relatively autonomous. In other words it has a logic of its own and cannot simply be reduced to the economy this is very important, I mean with a more sophisticated analysis of the I mean the way Althusser tried to do this I mean I mean, it is very important to place economic political ideological and so on equal parlance not on a high pedestal these are the others ok, they this that is why it is very important.

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Thus, Althusser's model of the social totality is that of a "decentred whole". However, the economic is "determinant in the last instance", in other words, it has the final say. Since "the last instance never comes", though, it is the interaction which is most important. Incidentally, this tension between "determination in the last instance" and the insistence that "the last instance never comes" is one of the major theoretical problems of Althusser's holism.




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There thus Althusser's model of the social totality or social holism is that of a decentred whole, that nothing centres only on the economic, but political ideological factors they also save our economy ok. That is why that is why Althusser's model of the social reality is that of a decentred whole, nevertheless the economic the economic is determinant in the last instance for Althusser.

In other words it has the final say, since the last instance for Althusser what is that last instance now last instance never comes. Only we have this idea about the last instance, the way he said there is nothing called actual mode of production, but the idea about idea

of mode of production ok. That is why since the last instance never comes though it is the interaction between the economic political and ideological which is most important. Incidentally this tension between determination in the last instance and the insistence that the last instance never comes is one of the major theoretical problems of Althusser's holism or totality.

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- Determination by the economic level expresses itself primarily in the creation of these separate levels and the prioritising of one or the other at different historical periods.
- In other words, within a given mode of production, it is the economic level which determines which level is dominant in a more immediate sense.
- In feudalism, the political and ideological levels are dominant; in capitalism, it is the economic level itself which is dominant. In both cases, however, the economic level is ultimately determinant; in other words, it determines whether it will itself be dominant or whether some other level will be.

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Determination by the by the economic level expresses itself primarily in the creation of these separate levels and the prioritizing of one or the other at different historical periods. In other words within a given mode of production it is the economic level, which determines which level is dominant in a more immediate sense ok.

For example in feudalism the political and ideological levels are dominant, in capitalism it is the economic level which is economic level itself, which is dominant in both cases; however, the economic level is ultimately determinant in other words it determines whether it will itself will dominant or whether some other level will it is the economic which is going to determine.

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- What does it imply? The economic (for these purposes) can be thought of in terms of the relations of ownership and control. In feudalism, the landlord owns the land, but the peasant controls their agricultural production; so the appropriation of the peasants' surplus production by the nobility does not take place within the actual process of production, but as an effect of political or ideological structures which guarantee this transfer. In capitalism, on the other hand, the means of production are both owned and controlled by the capitalist; thus the appropriation of surplus value takes place within the process of production; the society is therefore said to be dominated by the economic. For Althusser, in other words, the difference between modern and other societies is that they represent different possible arrangements of the ownership - control situation.
- Thus structuralism is unable to do anything very interesting with the idea of modernity, or indeed of social change more generally; it tends to reduce history either to contingent change without any real meaning or to variations on a theme.

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This makes I mean what does it refer to this makes a certain kind of sense, I mean the economic for our purpose for these for these purposes can be thought of in terms of the relations of ownership and control in feudalism the landlord owns the land, but the peasant controls their agricultural production.

So, the appropriation of the present surplus products and by the nobility does not take place within the actual process of production, but as an effect of political or ideological structures which guarantee distrustful. On the on the contrary in capitalism the means of production are both owned and controlled by the capitalist thus the appropriation of surplus value takes place within the process of production the society is therefore, said to be dominated by the economic.

For Althusser in other words the difference between modern and other societies is that the that they represent different possible arrangements of the ownership and control situation.

In this way structuralism is unable to do anything very interesting with the idea of modernity or indeed of social change more generally. It tends to reduce history either to contingent change without any real meaning or to variations on a theme, that is why there is you will find the absence of content only structure is becoming more important. In I mean in this lecture in the last I mean in the 12th and the 13th lectures I mean these

in these two lectures, we have covered the structuralist interpretation of critical modernist paradigm against the framework of holism or totality.

In the next lecture we are going to discuss structuralist interpretation of modernity through the lengths of to start with social movements rationality, I mean when I say social movements I mean ideology and function political background I mean what kind of there is no one Marxism, but there are I mean in the structuralist case there are 2 Marxism's ok, but there are multiple Marxism's that we see today.

Then we will also see I mean under social movements we will see ideology and function and the 2 Marxism's I mean the political background, in rationality we are going to discuss the meaning of science in reflexivity will discuss Levi Strausses uncertainty principle I mean in the next lecture we are going to cover ok.

Thank you.