

Sociological Perspectives on Modernity
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Lecture – 12
Structuralist Interpretation I


Welcome to the 12th lecture of the course on Sociological Perspectives on Modernity. Till now we have covered two very important modules of this course namely thematic preliminary is and sociological modernity.

In another 3 lectures we are going to cover ultra-modernist perspective on modernity I mean that is the structuralist case, I mean the structuralist interpretation of critical modernist paradigm in sociology.

In this structuralist case we are going to discuss the works of Levis Strauss and Louis Althusser. Somebody may pose this question as a just as a prophet or a remark.

I mean somebody may pose this question that why Louis Althusser is a is a neo Marxist he belongs to the critical school, I mean I mean the Frankfurt school critical he belongs to the tradition of critical theory, why Althusser has been why has Althusser been clubbed under structure structuralist interpretation of modernity precisely, because he is verson he is account I mean Althussers account of modernity indicates, structural Marxism. In this sense even Althussers account of modernity comes under structuralist interpretation of critical modernist paradigm in sociology.

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Ultra-modernism: The Structuralist Interpretation

- Structuralism's claim to be considered a form to *critical* modernism – more *tenuous*.
- While much structuralism claims to be “Marxist”, very often it appears rather more as an incorporation of Marxism into a rather more affirmative form of modernism.
- This is particularly evident in the difficulties structuralist thought faces in coming to terms with reflexivity, as well as its consequent explicit or implicit flirtation with positivism.

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I mean structuralism like positivism is no longer of immediate interest in its own right and perhaps I will not be attempting to much to provide anything like a comprehensive account of it. Where it is of interest is in a historical perspective in that it represents one of the most thorough going versions of modernist thinking in sociology ok.

This is very important even if it is it does not arouse any interest in critical modernism, I mean structuralism does not arouse much interest in critical modernism ok. It does not arouse any much much interest in critical modernism it represents one of the most thorough going versions of modernist thinking in sociology and a series of ideas, which remain current in for example, much new Marxist as well as post structuralist.


This is very important we will, as we move on will find that how there they have significant implications not simply for the debates in new Marxism, but also post structuralism. I mean in this way structuralism imposes itself on us as a stage in social theory whose effects are still widely felt its period of dominance is now long since past, but what remains is very often a social theory, which has developed from structuralist approaches, which has defined itself against them and which bears the marks of this encounter.

Structuralism claim to be considered a form to critical modernity; however, is rather more tenuous ok. Well much structuralism claims to be Marxist ok. It very often appears more as an incorporation of Marxism into a rather more affirmative form of modernity

ok, that is why I said it is very difficult to say whether Marx or angles they were in favour of European modernity or not no it is not like that at I mean it is very difficult to say, whether they were absolutely in favour of European modernity or they absolutely rejected European modernity, it is very difficult to say, but in the case of structuralism I mean while much structuralism claims to be Marxist ok.


Very often it appears rather more as an incorporation of Marxism into a rather more affirmative form of modernity. I mean this is I mean I mean I mean this is particularly evident in the difficulties that that the structuralist thought is confronted with in coming to terms with reflexivity as well as it is consequent explicit or implicit flirtation with positivism.

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I will be mostly talking about if you look at it I mean I will be mostly talking about Levi-Strauss and Althusser.


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• Differences between Levi-Strauss and Althusser: can certainly be said to be critical in terms of their political positions and the implications of some of their work, if not always in terms of reflexivity.

• Structuralism intersects with the positivist and functionalist school deriving from Comte and Durkheim, which leads to Parsons' "Structural-Functionalism".

• Critique of Althusser: *The Poverty of Theory* by E. P. Thomson



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Who are the best known strict I mean were best known strictly a structuralist theorists and can certainly be said to be critical in terms of their political positions, and implications of some of their work if not always in terms of reflexivity ok.

I mean this structuralism intersects; however, with the positivist and functionalist frameworks deriving from Auguste Comte and Emilee Durkheim, which leads to parsons Parsounion structural functionalism let me let me give you I mean I mean if you if you look at this and how we shall see that there are good reasons for this kind of convergence.

Let me tell you what is this you know positivism. The supremacy of science is over non science is that science is distinct from all areas of human activity or creativity because it possesses a method you need to it that, there is only one method common to all sciences it is respective of their subject matter then what is that method know that the method of science is the method of induction ok.

That the hallmark of science lies in the fact that all scientific statements are systematically verifiable, that there must be a dichotomy between fact and value that observation always leads to theory, but the converse is not true in other words theories are observation dependent, where as observations are theory independent I mean there is that there is a unilateral relationship between observation and theory and so, we have discussed these things ok.

Then what is functionalism I mean complementarity and reciprocity of roles in the social division of labour. Social change has taken place only because of complementarity and reciprocity of roles and statuses in the social division of labour there is cooperation, there is no conflict ok. In contradistinction with Marxism, Marxism always suggests that there is always a class of contradictions there is there are always class conflicts, but, but were as functionalism always operates at the level of complementarity and reciprocity of roles in the social division of labour.

And such positivistic and functionalist explanations that we encounter in the works of content almost content and Emile Durkheim not only in their works which, but which has also led to the Parsounian structural functionalism ok. Suppose com comts analysis I mean positivistic analysis he can be can be explained in terms of the law of stages I mean the how the society has traversed, the society has traversed through 3 stages; namely the theological stage, the metaphysical stage, and the positivistic or scientific stage. The theological stage explains change or social, economic, political, cultural, legal, ethical, institutional, ideological changes on the basis of supernatural forces.

The metaphysical stage rejects the theological stage by explaining that that this that any social change which has taken place is because of natural forces, I mean change is naturally mediated were as positivistic or I mean in the metaphysical stage, why change is naturally mediated because human beings always try to contemplate on nature human beings always depend on nature.

Whereas, in the positivistic stage or scientific stage what we have seen that no human beings not only contemplate on nature, but also know how to master over nature how to control nature? Ok that is why we have discussed in the context of Marx that by acting upon nature human beings not only changed nature, but also change the social relationships involving it human by acting upon nature human beings not only changed nature, but also change themselves.

In a positivistic scheme that is what Marx used in the context of his materialist method of materialism. Now when we look at this I mean in materialism in the context of his reflections on the principles of dialectic, but, but when you and when you when we look at this these positivistic and functional schools deriving from the works of August Comte and Emile Durkheim suppose for Durkheim.

It is very important to understand the rules of sociological method and that method again is a positivistic one that method is again the method of induction ok. Whether you look at his works on division of labour in society or mechanical solidarity or organic solidarity or suicide and so on ok, that method has always been the positivistic one the method of induction ok.

I mean when I talk about mechanical solidarity organic. So, what is solidarity I mean solidarity is the assemblies of people in the performance of rituals this is very important ok. An in and such complementarity and reciprocity of roles in the social division of labour that we generally encounter in parsons structural functionalism I mean Talcott parsons.

I mean the entire Chicago school tradition if you look at this in the in the 1940's 50's 60's especially 1950's and 1960's this functionalist school became very dominant in the American social sciences American tradition of social sciences. I mean whether you look at a parson parsons work on the structure of social action or so, systems theory and so on, I mean within systems theory again pattern variables and so on. You will you will find that there is there is a deep imprison of Comte and Durkheim positivistic and functionalist physics ok.

I mean and it is and overtime I mean in these in these 12th 13th and 14th lectures. We will find there we will see that there are good reasons for this kind of convergence that how structuralism intersects with not only positivism, but also functionalism it is it is it is worth doing this kind of exercise that, we must be engaged in such intersection of structuralism with positivism on the one hand and functionalism of the other.

I will not be attempting to give a remotely comprehensive account of either Levi-Strauss or Louis Althusser. Who are in any case opposed on a very wide variety of research no doubt about it ok. Rather what I am interested in I am rather more interested in here I am more interested here only with those elements of their arguments. Which bear on our themes in this course? What are those themes?

What are the central themes of the critical modernist, paradigm in sociology? Holism or totality, reflexivity, rationality and social movements ok. I mean these 4 central pillars of modernity these 4 central philosophical and political foundations of modernity constitute the critical modernist paradigm in sociology.

Incidentally some of the best accounts of structuralism are critics rather than sympathetic expositions I mean I mean if somebody wants to live further and go into some more details. Even beyond this these lectures in this mooc course on sociological perspectives and modernity ok. You might be interested in the in the important critique of Louis Althusser by E P Thompson in the poverty of theory a which I will be discussing later in the course, because when I will be discussing deconstruction of modernity I mean well when I will be discussing those within deconstruction of modernity I mean feminism post colonialism and post mortem ok.

Now, it is now we can see I mean I am I am trying to set the stage here to reflect on or to reflect on those elements of their arguments, I mean whose arguments I mean the arguments posed by Levis-Strauss and Louie-Althusser ok. Which bear on our things I mean bear on our central philosophical and political foundations of critical modernist paradigm in sociology in this course ok.

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Holism
Relationalism and the death of the subject

- Distinction between “methodological individualist” approaches – individual as the starting-point for social theory – and “relational” approaches – which focus on the relations between individuals.
- Marx: the relational emphasis derives from a conception of the individual as essentially **social** in nature.
- Weber: what is relevant to the sociologist is **action** that is oriented towards the behaviour of others.
- In both cases (Marx and Weber), **structure** arises out of **social interaction**, geared particularly towards **labour** in **Marx** and towards **meaning** in **Weber**.

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Now, let us let us start with holism or totality, I mean we are trying to look at the works of we are trying to examine the works of Levis-Strauss and Louie Althusser in through the lenses of these 4 central philosophical and political conditions of modernity ok.

In holism or totality we are trying to see I mean we are we are looking at basically 4 things 4 yeah 4 4 3 or 3 3 things 3 to 4 things, that that relationalism and the death of the subject or death of the author difference ok, functionalism ok, and what kind of

modernity, in the context of structuralist interpretation ok. Then we will move on to social movements rationality and reflexivity and today in this lecture we will try to capture ok; two very important components within holism that is those one relationalism and the death of the subject and difference we will look it and in the next lecture we will discuss functionalism and what kind of modernity ok.

When I when we look at I mean I mean when we look at holism or totality and how the works of Levis-Strauss and Louie Althusser have contributed immensely to the debates on modernity through the lens of holism or totality. If you if you slightly recall we have made a distinction in the previous lectures between methodological individualists approaches, which take the individual as the starting point for social theory and relational approaches which focus on the relations between individuals.

When I say methodological individualist's approaches I refer to Max Weber; Weber treated individuals as primary not the relationships between individuals, for Weber individual is the starting point for any kind of social theory. And when I say relational approaches they focus on the relations between individuals I mean for example, Marx. Marx always said that humanity can always human humanity has always been evaluated or examined in it is social context social circumstances social conditions of labour products ok.


It is very important that is why for example, I mean I mean we have as we have seen in we have seen that in Marx the relational emphasis derives from a conception of the individual as essentially social in nature. And that in Weber what is relevant to the sociologist is action that is oriented towards the behaviour of others what kind of action no value rational social action and more importantly goal rational social action alternatively known as instrumental rationality ok.

Then what is the commonality that we can find in both in the works of both Marx and Weber in both cases, whether in the case of Marx or in the case of Weber structure arises out of social interaction geared particularly towards labour in Marx and towards meaning in Weber. Then I return at this point that as we have seen that in Marx the relational emphasis derives from a conception of the individual as essentially social in nature. And that in Weber what is relevant to the sociologists is action that is oriented towards the behaviour of others in both cases.

In the case of Marx as well as in the case of Weber structure arises of social interaction ok. That in the case of Marx humanity is situated humanity is examined in it is social context that is why structure arises out of social interaction. What is relevant to the for Weber what is relevant to the sociologist is action, that is oriented towards the behaviour of others there also structure arises out of social interaction whether it is value rational action social action or goal rational social action alternatively known as instrumental rationality.

I mean in the case of Marx such structure arises out of social interaction is geared particularly towards labour whereas, whereas, in the case of Weber structure arises out of social action is geared particularly towards many ok. I mean I mean in structuralism in structuralism relationship takes off and becomes fully independent.

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- In structuralism, relationship takes off and becomes fully independent: it is no longer human beings who relate with each other, but the fact of relationship which first creates the social and cultural individual out of an amorphous biological mass.
- What does it imply?
- We can only know the social, in other words the relational, and that "the individual" or "human nature" are therefore metaphysical concepts in the strict sense that we cannot know them.

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
In other words it is no longer human beings who relate with each other, but the fact of relationship which first creates the social and cultural individual out of an amorphous biological mass. If you if you look at this I mean in the case of both Marx and Weber. Relationships are forged on the basis of individuals, collectives, groups, communities and so on.

On the contrary in structuralism relationship takes off and becomes fully independent, it is no longer human beings, it is no longer individual, it is no longer community, it is no longer group, it is no longer collective, who relate with each other, but the fact of

relationship which first creates the social and cultural individual out of an amorphous biological mass. What does it refer to, what does it imply ok. I mean this is sometimes turned into a statement that that we can only know the social in other words, the relational and that the individual or human nature are therefore, metaphysical concepts in the strict sense of the term that we cannot know them.

Let me if I say that we can only know thus the social not the individual, not the self or human nature. We can only know the social or the relational how am I how I am related to you how you are related to me, how I am related to others how others are related to me?

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- For example, we cannot know X in her unique, individual internal experience (even if we believe it exists) – why? Because all we have available to us is our social interaction with her – what she says and what she does – this ultra-relationalism, in other words, leads to what is known by the slogan of “the death of the subject”
- Meaning, either the individual literally does not exist because they are only created by social interaction, and form simply an intersection between different social relations; or the individual is methodologically unknowable because we can only know the social.

Only what we can only know the social in other words the relational I mean that the individual or human nature are therefore, metaphysical concepts in the strict sense that we cannot know note it. For example, we cannot know x in her or his unique individual internal experience even if we believe it exists why? Because all we have available to us is our social interaction with her or him what she says and what she does this ultra relationalism in other words leads to what is known by the slogan of the depth of the subject ok.

I mean let me give you an example everybody knows Sachin Tendulkar, everybody knows Saurav Ganguly, everybody knows Virat Kohli, Mahindra Singh Dhoni,

everybody knows Pele Diego Maradona Messi, Lata Mangeshkar, Sharukh Khan, Aamir Khan.

As if I have to reflect on structuralist interpretation that actually I do not know Sharukh Khan or Aamir Khan or Pele Maradona Messi, Sachin, Saurav, Virat Kohli I do not. I just know or Lata Mangeshkar, I just know the way Sachin bats, Sachin plays or Pele is to play or Maradona is to play or Messi plays, Lata Mangeshkar the way Lata Mangeshkar sings what they say. And what they do are real, but I do not know actually I do not know them.

I know them through their performance, I know them through their action, I know them through what they do and what they say? Otherwise I do not know that person as such I do not know that individual as such ok. I mean for structuralists the individual the individual ceases to exist the individual no longer exists.

What exists that what that particular individual tells us and what that particular individual does. This is a structuralist control of critical modernist paradigm in sociology, this is very important. Why I am why is it. So, precisely because the way we can precisely because of the ways in which structurelists argue that, we can only know the social in other words their relational, the other than relational the other than social cannot be known to us.

Because I have never interacted with Lata Mangeshkar, I have never interacted with Sachin Ramesh Thendulkar, I have never interacted with Pele or Diego Maradona, I have never interacted with Kapil Dev Nikunj or Sunil Minaj Gavaskar ok. I mean this is very important to know that or I have never interacted with the prime minister of India for example.

What I know what I know of the prime minister of India or the president of India is through what they say and what they do? Ok. That is why in the structuralist case, we can know we can only know the social in other words the relational and that the individual or human nature are therefore, metaphysical concepts in the strict sense that that we cannot know them that is why I said for example, we cannot know Lata Mangeshkar in her unique individual, internal experience, even if we believe it exists because we all we have available to us all in all we have available to us is our social interaction with her, what she says? What she does? How she sings? and so on. I mean

this ultra relationalism in other words leads to what is known by the slogan of the depth of the subject or the depth of the author ok.


What does it imply? It implies that either the individual literally does not exist, because they are only created by social interaction and form simply an intersection between different social relations or the individual is methodologically unknowable because we can only know the social this is this is interesting.

I mean if I say this ultra relationalism leads to what is known by I mean leads to the depth of the subject or depth of the author. It implies that either the individual literally does not exist the individual ceases to exist, because the individuals are only created by social interaction. The individuals form simply an intersection between different social relations, it is the function, which play which assume greater significance than the individual it is the action, which plays a more dominant role than the individual herself or himself ok. I mean it the this ultra relationalism, which leads to the depth of the subject or depth of the author ok.

Leads us into two directions one may be, the individual literally does not exist, because the individual is only created by social interaction and the individual simply forms an interaction between different social relations or second option is that or the individual is methodologically unknowable, because we can what we can know we can know only the social in other words the relational.

I mean methodologically also it is not possible to know the individual, what at most what to the greatest extent possible? We can know we can just know what the individual says and or what the individual does?

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Then the argument that the individual literally does not exist and that they are only; the intersection of social relations or the bearers of social structure is argued very strongly by Louis Althusser who sees our belief that we are individual to be a psychological illusion instead Althusser argues. I mean let me quote Althusser that the way he said the category of the subject is the constitutive category of all ideology. That is why our illusory subjectivity generates ideology and ideology reproduces our illusions of subjectivity it is very important, that is why if we have to go by what Althusser said if we have to decode what Althusser is trying to say?


He that a structuralism argues that the individual does not exist that, the individuals are only the intersection of social relations of production or the or the bearers of social structure ok. I mean in through the lens of Althusser who sees our belief that we are individuals to be a only psychological illusion mental illusion the way he argues that the category of the subject is the constitutive category of all ideology.

Whether it is individual or the social relations or relational human nature, whatever you say the category of the subject is the constitutive category of all ideology, that is why this is our subjective position ok. What Althusser suggests that that it is our subjective position, which has created such psychological illusion, that is why our illusory subjectivity, that is why our illusory subjectivity produces ideology produces I mean

our illusionary subjectivity generates ideology and ideology reproduces our illusions of subjectivity ok.

Now, let us come to the second important element within holism or totality that is difference.

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Difference

- All that we can know, or all that exists, is the relational.
- If all that we can know about is relations, then we can think about the way in which those relations interact with one another in a very detached, and often very formalistic approach.
- We can also try and categorise the different types of relation which are possible; Weber's four types of social action are a move in this direction.
- Further, we have seen that despite his methodological individualism the concept of instrumental rationality in particular has a tendency to become dominant in his thinking.

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Now, then we have discussed within holism or totality we have discussed relationalism and the depth the subject, I mean we can only know the social in other words the relational and that the individual or human nature are therefore, metaphysical concepts in the strict sense that we cannot know them, I mean such ultra relationalism leads to the depth of the subject I mean either the individual literally does not exist, because they are only created by social interaction and form simply an intersection between different social relations or the individual is methodologically unknowable because you can only know the social.

The argument that the individual literally does not exist that they are only the intersection of social relations or the debates of social structure or or the bearers of social structure is argued very strongly by Althusser, who sees our belief that we are individuals to be a psychological illusion instead he argues the category of the subject is the constitutive category of all our ideology, our illusionary, subjectivity, generates ideology and ideology reproduces our illusions of subjectivity.

Now, in now in while examining difference all that we can know then or all that exists is the relational. If all that we can know about is relations then we can think about the way in which those relations interact with one another in a very detached and even very formalistic approach. We can only try and categorize the different types of relation, which are possible which may be possible. And Weber's 4 types of social action are a move in this direction, what are those what were those 4 types of social action that we have already discussed; traditional social action, effective or emotive social action, value rational social action and goal rational social action goal rational social action is also known as instrumental rationality ok.

Then, these different types of relation which are possible ok? Further we have also seen that despite Weber's methodological individualism, I mean I mean we have seen that a despite a Weber's methodological individualism the concept of instrumental rationality or goal oriented social action in particular has a tendency to become dominant in his thinking ok. That is why if you slightly recall we have discussed that how he thought of, how he thought that no this I mean traditional social action and effective or emotive social action and are unreflective in nature. And hence they are meaningless and they do not contribute to meaningful social action.

Rather value rational social action and goal rational social action the contribute to the domains of or spheres of meaningful social action ok, that is why instrumental rationality is very important instrumental rationality in particular has a tendency to become dominant in Weber's thinking.

What relationally what relationalism is likely to lead us to.

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
- What relationalism is likely to lead us to, in other words, is a categorisation of different **types** of relation and different **levels** of relation, and an account of society in terms of the **interrelation** of these different relations.
- So, relational approaches tend towards this kind of categorisation, but they also tend to privilege intellectual **consistency** over empirical usefulness.

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In other words is a categorization of different types of relation on the one hand and different levels of relation. There are two things, different types of relation different forms of relations and at the same time different levels of relation within a particular relation you will find different levels of relation and an account of society in terms of the interrelation of these different relations.

So, I mean I mean this can this can clearly become very abstracted very rapidly and see right mills the way we have we have adopted this method of the sociological imagination, I mean I mean his mill see right mills discussing on the problems of grand theory is very relevant here I mean. So, relational approaches tend towards this kind of categorization, but they also tend to privilege intellectual consistency over empirical usefulness.

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- As we generate more of these concepts describing **types** and **levels** of relations, we are going to want to make them as **consistent** as possible with each other, for very valid intellectual reasons.
- For equally valid reasons, we are likely to want to be able to generate all of them from as restricted a number of basic concepts as possible; in other words, to generate **typologies of possible variations and interrelations of particular types of relations**.
- The net effect of all of this is that relational approaches have a tendency towards what we can properly describe as **structuralist accounts**, that is, **accounts which derive all of social reality from the operation and permutation of a limited number of basic concepts**.

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
In other words in other words because our description of different types of social relation is likely to be quite an abstracted 1, if it is to be much of much use in in in telling us things that we do not already know it will be a highly intellectual account.

As we generate more of these concepts describing types and levels of relations we are going to wish to make them as consistent as possible with each other for very valid intellectual reasons. For equally valid reasons we are likely to wish to be able to generate all of them from as restricted a number of basic concepts as possible.

In other words to generate typologies of possible variations and interrelations of particular types of relations; I mean these types and levels of relations, I mean types of relations as well as levels of realism ok. There must be consistency and we must we must attempt to generate typologies of possible variations and interrelations of particular types of relations ok.

The net effect of all this is that relational approaches have a tendency towards what we can properly describe as structuralist accounts, that is in other words accounts which derive all of social reality from the operation and permutation of a limited number of basic concepts. Ideally this number can be reduced to only 1, I mean that is relationalism ok.

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- Because this core concept, from which our description of society is generated, is a highly intellectual one, this is very likely to produce **a form of philosophical idealism: a theory which treats the (social) world as generated from ideas, and in this case from a single idea.**
- While there are dramatic differences in the content, the **structure** of our account of society is likely to be very similar whatever idea we start from; in some ways **Althusser's** account, not of actual modes of production but of the **idea** of modes of production, and **Levi-Strauss'** account of culture oriented around **difference**, produce quite similar ways of thinking.

Because this core concept from which our description of society is generated is a highly intellectual one, this is very likely to produce a form of philosophical ideology, what is that philosophical ideology? That is it that is a theory it is a method, which treats the social world as generated from ideas and in this case from a singularity, because it can be reduced to ideally this can this number can be reduced to 1.

In this sense this core concept ok, which is very likely to produce a form of philosophical idealism I mean it is a theory or method, which treats the social world has generated from ideas and in this case from singularity. Why there are dramatic differences in the content the structure of our account of societies likely very similar whatever idea, we start from in some ways Althusser account not of actual modes of production, but of the idea of modes of production and Levi Strausses account of culture oriented around difference produce quite similar ways of thinking ok.


I mean why what Althusser tried to look at that it is not the actual mode of production that we talk about in the context of modernity, in the context of capitalism ok, but actually we are talking about the idea of mode of production.

We are not talking about modernity as such, but actual modernity, but we are talking about the idea of modernity what we can envision modern? How we can envision modernity? How we can how we have tried to encapsulate capitalism? We do not know actually what actually capitalism is all about get idea ok.

I mean that is why I mean I mean the structure of our account of society is likely to be very similar whatever idea we start from in some ways Althussers account not of actual modes of production, but of the idea of modes of production and Levis-Strausses account of culture oriented culture oriented toward difference produce quite similar image of thinking.

I mean to finish with this general account.


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To finish with this general account it has to be said that Levis-Strausses account privileges, this approach rather more visibly and it is worth saying worth mentioning something briefly about what it is? Essentially Levis Strauss performs two operations in his account of human culture. On the one hand Levis Strauss employs a linguistic analogy to treat culture not a just not just as a system of relations, but as a system of symbolic relations such as myths.

And on the other hand using the same linguistic analogy Levis Strauss aims at a purely formal description of the various elements involved in particular myths. I mean particular system of symbolic relations such as myths in other words Levis Strauss sets out to describe structure but not the content.

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- What this leads to is an argument that there is an **objective meaning** in human culture (revealed by **structure**) which is other than the **subjective meaning** (revealed by **content**).
- Since, however, this objective meaning cannot be straightforwardly shown to be present in a particular myth once we bracket any question of the way people say they understand it or the contexts they tell it in, it has to be located within the unconscious. In other words, **from a description of social relations we move to a description of the nature of the human psyche**.
- To complete this account, what Levi-Strauss claims to be the central feature of the human unconscious – a claim which he believes to be backed up by linguistics – is naturally enough identical with the concept he uses to analyse the objective meaning of the form of myths; this concept is that of **difference** or **distinction**. For Levi-Strauss, then, the end of the intellectual journey is a description of the social and in particular cultural world as a reflection of the supposed tendency of the human brain to divide things up.

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What this what this leads to an argument that there is an objective meaning in human culture, which is other than the subjective meaning I mean what this leads to is an argument that is an objective meaning in human culture. Which is revealed by structure and which is other than the subjective meaning, which is revealed by content? Ok. Objective meaning in human culture is revealed by structure whereas, subjective meaning in human culture is revealed by content.

And what Levis Strauss was more interested in Levis Strauss was interested in the objective meaning of human culture as revealed by structure that is why, what we just now discussed that using the same linguistic analogy Levis Strauss aims at a purely formal description of the various elements involved, in these systems of symbolic relations namely myths in other words Levis Strauss sets out to describe structure, but not the content ok.

Since; however, this objective meaning cannot be straight forwardly shown to be present in a particular myth. Once we bracket any question of the way people say they understand it or the context that they tell it in it has to be located situated within the unconscious. In other words from a description of from a description of social relations we move to a description of the nature of the human psyche.

To complete this account what Levis Strauss claims to be the central feature of the human one consists a claim which he believes to be backed up by linguistics is naturally

enough identical with the concept that Levis Strauss uses to analyze the objective meaning of the form of myths this distinction is that of difference or distinction.


For Levis Strauss then the end of the intellectual journey is a description of the social and in particular cultural world as a reflection of the supposed tendency of the human brain to divide things up.

Now what we have discussed in this lecture today very quickly we will see we started with the structuralist interpretation of modernity through the and how the works of Levis Strauss and Loui Althusser have contributed immensely to the debates on modernity.

And these four parameters these four central philosophical and political foundations of modernity, we try to examine through their works through the works of Levis Strauss and Althusser, we will we gave up a (Refer Time: 55:34) remark about the structuralist interpretation, how structuralism.

I mean there is an intersection between structuralism on the one hand and positive[sm]- and functionalism on the other, which has led the works of which is highlighted in the works of and Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim and which leads on to the works of Parsonian structural functionalism. And in holism or totality we have discussed relationalism and the depth of the subject and we have discussed difference ok.

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Functionalism

- If we assume that the social world can be derived from an idea – the idea of the capitalist mode of production, the idea of difference – then in principle there is no possible explanation of how social change arises.
- The world is divided up like this because it is identical with the way the idea is organised; there is no reason why it should change.
- Another possibility is to develop a typology of different possible types of society, so that change is simply change from one way of expressing the idea to another one. A more interesting and widely-used approach, however, is what is known as functional explanations.

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In the in the next lecture we are going to complete two more very important aspects. So, within holism or totality I mean namely functionalism and modernity.

Thank you.