

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind and Cognition

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
Lecture No. # 40

Personal Identity-II

In the last class, as you have seen that, I have explained about the problem of personal identity and how there are many scientists as well as philosophers have explained the problem of personal identity. In the problem of personal identity is one of the important problems in the philosophy of mind. And without proper understanding of personal understanding, it is very difficult to know what exactly the main problem of mind. And today, I am going to explain about the concept of persons, especially a non-materialistic view of person, a special relation to Strawson's concept of persons.

How Strawson's explains the concept of person is different from Williams Locke and many other materialistic philosophers. The concept of person is one of the most important concept in the philosophy of mind. The present thesis aim is to outline and explain the non-materialistic theory of the mind and persons.


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Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

A NON-MATERIALISTIC VIEW OF PERSON


- What is a person?
- What is its nature?
- It was Descartes who has proposed a theory of mind and person according to which a person is not just a material body, but also a thinking self. For him, a person is a self, a self-conscious mind which thinks, feels, desires and so on.

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And here the fundamental question is, what is a person and what is its nature? It was Descartes who has proposed a theory of mind and for him, that a person is not just a material body, but also a thinking self. Therefore, according to Descartes, a person is a self, a self-conscious mind which thinks, feels, desires and so on. The materialists have, however, rejected the Cartesian theory of persons and have argued that persons are just material bodies, though they are complex material systems with some sort of mental properties. It is wrong to say that, mind is the brain or mind has only physical properties.

Our brain has a particular size, shape and special locations. In virtue of these qualities, our brain has a particular look. We can say that our brain can be variously experienced. The qualities of shock experience are related in somewhere to the material object. But, if this is so, where do we situate the qualitative of experience? There are many scientists; they may say that, all these are neural activities. Now, the question is where are they? The answer is that, they are located in your mind. This implies that the mind is distinct from the body, the problem of this essay is to question, are persons material bodies? The materialists have argued that persons are material bodies, although very complex material bodies. The main aim of this section is to show that persons are not merely a material entity and we have to show that person is non-material entities.

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The slide features a dark blue header with the text "Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition" in white. Below the header, the title "What is a Person?" is centered in a large, bold, black font. The main content consists of two bullet points, each preceded by a right-pointing arrowhead. The first bullet point states: "The English word 'person' is alleged to have been derived from the Latin 'persona', which was the mask worn by actors in dramatic performances." The second bullet point states: "In common usage 'person' refers to any human being." At the bottom left of the slide, there is a circular logo with a red and white starburst pattern, and the word "NPTEL" is written in red below it.

Firstly, we have to see now what is person? In these sections, that is to say that, we have to examine the nature of person from non-materialistic point of view. Before, analyzing

this concept of persons, we have to raise a few questions like, what is persons, what is the nature of persons, and so on. These questions are fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind. In fact, **the** what a person is referred to English word person is analyzed to have derived from the Latin persona, which was the mask worn by actors in dramatic performance. Neither in common sense usage nor in philosophy has there have been a univocal concept of persons. In the common sense usage, persons refer to a any human being in a general way.

The person is distinct from a thing or a material object, it is general and stands for a living conscious human beings but Strawson's definitions of person is different from William's, because as you know Strawson's says that mind is something, it has some kind of personal properties, to who which both the predicate? p predicate and n predicate is applicable. That I will be explaining in these lectures. But, according to William, William's bodily criteria, is the primary criteria to explain the persons.


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Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

Strawson defines 'person' as

"a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, etc., are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type."


Strawson, P. F. *Individuals*, 1963

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Strawson defines that a person type of entity such that both predicate ascribing state of consciousness and predicate ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situations, etcetera., are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type. Thus, for Strawson persons are unique individual who have both mental and physical act. Thus, persons are neither purely physical body nor are they purely physical substance.

However, from Strawson's view of person is purely non-material whereas, Williams view of persons is purely material, which opposes Strawsons **Strawsons** view.

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


This is because William claim is that bodily continuity is a necessary condition for personal identity, because according to Williams, it is body which identify the persons but not the mind and there is no mind at all. Therefore, bodily criteria identify the persons. Thus, it is clear that Strawson would certainly rejected, the contention that mental attributes are reducible to physical attributes, because Strawson admit that the concept of persons is non-material. But here the question arises, does Strawsons wish to say that, persons are bodies of a certain sort, namely, bodies which have mental attributes, as only Strawsons holds that persons have bodily attributes too. But, unlike ordinary bodies, persons are things which have mental attributes as well. According to Strawson, it is essential to persons, that they are entities which necessarily have mental and bodily attribute. In addition, those mental things are essential different from physical things.

There are different types of substance, persons are radical different material bodies. Strawsons theory looks like dualistic in holding that there are two different types of substance the physical bodies and the persons. Again, these physical bodies necessarily have only one dimensions, that is a physical dimensions. Persons necessarily have two dimensions; a physical and a mental dimensions. Persons thus have a dual nature. Now,


we may have to look at the relationship between the knowledge a person has of himself and the knowledge of that of others of him.

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


Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

- Persons necessarily have two dimensions, a physical and a mental dimension.
- Persons thus have a dual nature.
- Now, we have to look at the relation between the knowledge a person has of himself and the knowledge that others have of him.




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Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

- Firstly, if the unity of a person is necessarily connected with the continuance of his body through time, then it is impossible for a person to survive the death of his body.
- Secondly, if bodily identity is a necessary criterion of personal identity, then it could not be shown that some non-physical characteristics of a person continues after his bodily death.
- Finally, if the fundamental criterion of identity were memory, it would follow that a person might be known to have survived death because he continued to have memories in his disembodied state.




There are general three views on the personal identity. Firstly, if the unity of a person is necessarily connected with the continuance of his body through time, then it is impossible for a person to survive the death of his body. Secondly, if bodily identity is

necessarily criteria of personal identity, then it could be shown that some non-physical characteristics of a person continues after his bodily death.

On the other hand, if bodily identities not a necessarily criteria of the personal identity, persons bodily death is nearly one major event in a person's history and not the end of his life. Finally, if the fundamental criteria of identity were memory, it would follow that a person might be known to have survived death because he continued to have memories in his disembodied state.

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The most important fact about the person is the self. The self is sometimes used to mean the whole series of a person's inner mental state and sometimes the spiritual substance to which they belong. The self does not refer to the body but the mental history of the persons. This made the unity problem seems intractable because, when the mental images like feelings and the like are contrasted with the temporal persistence. In Strawson's sense a person is a thing, which necessarily has both mental and physical aspects. The person is primarily the subject of mental experience.

In the person theory, we cannot say that a person is a body, but we can say that a person is in fact a body. A person is a body, then it cannot be conscious mind. One of the important question is, can we even say that a person has a body? Strawson would say that, but what would it mean about the theory of persons? It means that persons have

bodily attributes and the question is, does it say anything about the relationship between a person and a body. The body necessarily has a bodily attribute and has nothing to do with a person's attribute.


But Strawson's view is that persons have both bodily and mental attributes. We recognize all human beings as persons. This is because, we generally do not make a distinction between person and human beings, but we can hardly contemplate the coincidence of biologically very different persons inhabiting other planets who are not human beings like us. The concept of person is in some way, an inalienable part of our conceptual scheme.

In our conceptual scheme, persons and human beings coincide like Joseph Margolis in his book on persons and minds, mentioned that persons are the particulars that have minds and nervous systems, sensations and brain processes. But, this will not quite do in order to explain the personal identity. A nervous system is not a person's nor is a fixed cycle persons. It is at once the subject of both neurological and psychological predicates. In other words, it is both nervous systems and a psyche entity. Persons are not **meriological** complex entities nor kind. Each of which contains parts, a non-physical basic subject and a purely corporeal object to which, this subject is in some way attached.

For such a claim, would not allow us to ascribe psychological attributes or corporeal attributes to the persons as a whole. It is because persons are more than their bodies and that they are not reducible to any kind of body gross of sub tool. The person substance as described above is not taken to exclude the material properties as such. They only exclude the fact that persons are material bodies and nothing else. Persons are autonomous, so for us the description in terms of bodies and mind is concerned.

But, it is not that. No referents to body and minds is to be retained and are, thus, persons describes have the attributes reference to the body and mind. From the above discussion, we can recreate the Cartesian distinction between the mind and the body. There of course, to the each other because the essence of mind is thinking and the essence of body is extensions, which I have already explained in the some of the lectures. That is to say that the body is something special which is perishable.

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Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

- The mind or person is something non-spatial. After death, the body only remains. This concept of the body becomes gruesomely explicit when we refer to it as 'the remains'.
- It is this conception of the body, which comes closest to that found in the person theory. In this theory we find that the body is not a person, nor is it a part of a person. It is the person, insofar as he is thought of as the subject of bodily attributes. But it becomes a reality at death. We call it a corpse.

The mind of a person is something non-spatial. After death, the body only remains. This concept of the body becomes gruesomely explicit when we refer to it as the remains. However, it is this conception of the body which comes closest to the found in the persons theory. In this theory, we find that the body is not a person nor is a part of the person. It is the person, insofar as he is thought of as the subject of bodily attributes. But it becomes a reality at death. We call it a corpse.

Therefore, one of the paradoxical implication of the person theory is that the body which a person has cannot be considered as a physical subject to the laws of physical world. As we know, from this theory that persons are conscious. Finally, from the above examinations, we came to know that a person's body is not a physical thing. Therefore, it is very difficult to identify persons with physical body. Now, you have to see how the persons mind and consciousness goes together? And what is the relationship between person, mind and consciousness?

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The slide is titled "Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition" and "Person, Mind and Consciousness". It contains two bullet points: one asking what consciousness is, and another quoting G.E. Moore's observation that consciousness vanishes when we try to fix our attention on it. A small logo is in the bottom left and a citation is in the bottom right.

Contemporary Issues in **Philosophy of Mind & Cognition**

Person, Mind and Consciousness

- what is this consciousness which a person certainly has, but rocks and other animate beings do not have?
- G.E. Moore writes, "The moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what distinctly it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us as mere emptiness when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue; the other element is as if it were diaphanous."

Moore, G. E., *Philosophical Studies*, 1965.


As we have argued so far, as person is an entity which has both mental and physical attributes, we could say of a person that he is 5 feet tall and weight 100 kilogram and many other things. But, more importantly, we could say that he is thinking about his friends, feels a tang of happiness or is sad or so on. We may therefore, say that person has a mind which different from his body because the subject of consciousness does not mean a body of a certain sort but it still might turn out that, whatever is a subject of consciousness is identical with a body of certain sort. Strawson says that the view that the subject of **of** a state of consciousness is only immaterial, non-physical, a thing to which nothing but a state of consciousness can be ascribed. According to him, consciousness is not applicable to physical things, not to purely immaterial substance is applicable to persons but fundamental questions is what is consciousness?

Generally, consciousness is described as something which distinguishes man from a good deal of the world around. Only a person possesses this consciousness, which is not by other material objects. Again, the question arises that what is this consciousness which a person certainly has but rocks and other animates, beings do not have? G.E. Moore writes, the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what distinctly it is, it seems to vanish; it seems as if we had before us as mere emptiness when we tried to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue; the other elements is as if it were diaphanous. We know perfectly while that we are conscious of

things around us including other people but we do not grasp conscious in itself; however, it is this common feature consciousness which may be said to be the central element in the concept of mind.


If we are asked to give a genetic characterization of the branch of philosophy, called philosophy of mind, we might say that it is that branch particularly concerned with the nature of consciousness. We will call them mental phenomena to which only genes capable of consciousness, are subject mental phenomena are such as ways of genes conscious; that is hearing, imagining and many other mental capacities.

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- Pradhan says that Person is being minded have the capacity of doing the mental activities. Such activities include thinking, willing, feeling, understanding, speaking, communicating, and above all, remembering the past. Mental activities are such that they presupposes that there is a thinker who is capable of these activities.
- The thinker is here a subject or 'I' who is or has the capacity of consciousness. Wherever we will find the concept of 'I', we will find the existence of consciousness because it is person who stands for the concept of 'I', have consciousness.

 Pradhan, R. C., *Persons as Minded Beings: Towards a Metaphysics of Persons*, (JCPRI), 1998.


Person is a minded being and have the capacity of doing the mental activities. Such activities include thinking, willing, feeling, understanding, speaking, communicating and above all, remembering the past. Mental activities are such that they presupposes that there is a thinking who is capable of these activities. The thinking is here a subject or a I who is or has the capacity of consciousness. Wherever, we will find the concept of I, we will find the existence of consciousness because, it is person who stand for the concept of I and have consciousness.

One of the most general view is that, the philosophy of mind is concerned with all mental phenomena which they themselves are concerned with consciousness. Philosophy from Descartes formers have accepted consciousness as a fundamental metaphysical reality. I

remain the same person, if I am consciousness of being so, even though my body should change drastically and be diminished through amputations. Logically, it is possible that I should remain the same persons, although I am altogether disembodied persons. Therefore, persons are individual non-corporeal simple entities.

It is because it becomes, it is difficult here to distinguishes persons. So, constitute from metaphysical self; that is transcendently go, spirit, mental substance, soul and other similar immaterial substances; however, the concept of persons does not fit into these entities because persons are, if anything concrete beings in the world. One can ascribe consciousness others, only if one can identify other subject of experience.

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
In addition, one cannot identify other subject, if one can identify them only as subject of experience. Position of state of a consciousness, the latter must have concrete existence in the world. If we are too obsessed with the inner criteria, we shall be tempted to create persons as essentially as minds. However, admitting outer criteria does not mean that, there are no state of consciousness. We should claim that some pre-predicate safer to the occurrence of state of consciousness.

The persons are uncertainly identical beings having the life of their own. They are not definitely cartesian egos rather they possesses mixed bag of M-predicates and P-predicates. Persons are in any case conscious individual who can be ascribed a larger

number of predicates such as thinking, feeling, willing, deciding, etcetera., These conscious states according to Searle are intentional, that is are of something and it turn for something, and though the intentionality which we have explained already.

That is, they are directed to something outside them. Those persons have these conscious states are intentional and mental beings. Again, only a being that could have conscious intentional states, could have intentionality at all. And so every unconscious intentional state is at least potentially consciousness, potentially conscious. This thesis has enormous consequence for the study of the mind. But there is a conceptual connection between consciousness and intentionality. That I have the consequences that a complete theory of intentionality requires an account of consciousness. And our consciousness is of consciousness of something, thus persons have the essential features of consciousness.

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
Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

- There is an interconnection between person, mind, and consciousness.
- Empirically, there is distinction among them.
- But transcendently, they point in the same direction.
- It is right to say that a person is a mental being, and the essence of mind is consciousness.
- Therefore, the concept of the mind, the person, and the consciousness go together.

Thus consciousness is related to mind, which also belongs to a person.

There is an interconnection between persons, mind and consciousness. Empirically, there is a distinction among them. But transcendently, they point in the same directions. It is right to say that a person is a mental being and the essence of mind is consciousness. Therefore, the concept of mind and the persons and the consciousness go together. Thus, consciousness is related to mind which also belongs to a person's. Therefore, in this way consciousness mind and person goes together.


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Now, we have to see that the dual nature of persons. Why there is a dual nature, because as you have seen from the view and then, in the Strawson view also, there is also dualism also is there. The problem of person has traditionally been based in a dualistic context. It has many greatly influenced those who have discussed by the picture of a person as compose of two entities; body and mind, which are continently related to each other. The person substance are not merely a set of properties, physical or mental because, they are not fully existed in their existence. The description of the persons as heading such and such properties are complete still pre-supposes that there are persons as a being, those properties.


According to Strawsons, the properties like being at **such and such time** and place heading, such and such weight, color and so on are M-predicate. The other properties are psychological properties, like being in the state of happiness, being in the state of pain and so on are the state of P-predicates. In this way, Strawsons has rightly said the concept of persons is to be understood as the conceptual type of entities so that both predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation and consciousness are equally applicable to an individual entities of that type.

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- Strawson has pointed out that their co-applicability to the same person substance. The M-predicates cannot be ascribable independently because of that prohibits them from being ascribable to the conscious beings, like M-predicates, the P-predicates cannot be ascribed to the material bodies.
- The above argument shows that Strawson accepting person as non-material and non-dual without rejecting Cartesian dualism.



Strawson has pointed out that the co-applicability to the same person substance. The M-predicates cannot be ascribable independently because of that prohibits them from being ascribable to the conscious beings, like M-predicates, the P-predicates cannot be ascribed to the material bodies. This is because combination of distinct kind of substance that has both physical and mental properties without being reducible to each other.

The above argument shows that Strawsons consider persons as non-material and non-dual without rejecting Cartesian dualism. This is because Descartes held that, when we are on the concept of persons, we are really referring to one or both of two distinct substances of different types, each of which has its own appropriate types of states and properties, and none of the states belongs to both; that is, to say that state of consciousness belong to one of the substance and to the other.

Descartes has given a sharp focus on this dualistic concept of persons. It is not easy to get away from dualism because persons have both sort of attributes, such as mental and physical. According to dualistic conceptions, a person is something altogether distinct from body. And that is a person is not identical with his body. Some dualists, however, believes that person is a composite entity, one part of which is its body and another part of which is something immaterial spirit or soul.

The dualism essentially adieus to the mind body distinctions and persons as mental beings as distinct from material bodies. According to Descartes the self of a person is something altogether distinct from its body. So, the self is altogether non-physical, lacking in all physical characteristics, whatever. On these interpretations, we can say that person is an immaterial substance a spirit or a soul which stands in spatial relation to certain physical body which is its body.


Descartes think that a person is some sort of combination of one immaterial soul and one a physical body, which stand to one another in a, rather mysterious relation of substantial. There is a one kind of substantial union in both body and a mind. But, Cartesian dualism does not maintain that a person is immaterial stuff. On the contrary, it maintains that a person is a combination of body and mind. In fact, our bodies and we are what are we unlike one another, in respect to the sort of properties that we possess or bodies have special extensions and location in physical space. Whereas, we have no such qualities.

On the other hand, we have thought and feelings, state of consciousness; whereas, our bodies are known to have qualities other than these. But the question arises, should a person not simply be identified with a certain physical body as Williams has argued? Strawsons gives an answer to the above questions. He says that mental states such as thoughts, feelings, seems not to be properly attribute to something like a body. But only to a person's one is in claim to or that it is I, who thinks and feels not my body. Even, if I need to have a body to be able to think and feel; however, if a person is composed of body, but not identical with it, then, it seems that every part of the body must be a part of the persons but not every part of the person can be the part of the body. So, one of the possible assumption is that a person has a parts which are not part of the body and so it is not identical with the body.

By saying this, we are denying that a person is composed of body. All that is meant is that persons have both bodily and mental existence. Persons are nor purely disembodied spirit. But, if you see one of the most important thinkers in the philosophy of mind is A.J. Iyer and he says that the relationship between consciousness and the subject to which is attribute to this is a contingent relations. According to him a person is not a purely immaterial stuff or immaterial subject. It is a rather unembedded person to which mental attributes are a causal ascribable. He accept a causal relation between the person and his


body. Therefore, according to him, there is no contradiction in holding that a person's body would have been inhabited by another person. Strawson says that, he rejects the idea of causal relation together.

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
According to him, persons are more primitive than their mind and body; That is, persons are primary than whereas, mind and body are secondary. Because for him the concept of a person is a primitive concept and this primitiveness of the person gives one kind of distinctness in Strawsonian concept of mind or persons. In the case of persons both mind and body is ascribable but not in the case of mind and body.

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Now, we have to see persons as individual. John Locke says that, the concept of person is something like forensic concept but the Strawson says that, the concept of person is something primitive concept. Locke wishes of the persons while it rises philosophical problems of its one perhaps, it is less risk, it is because of that there is a one kind of dispute in both the explanations. Especially, in the Locke explanations says that that concept of person is forensic concept but Strawsons concept of person is metaphysical concepts like the concept of the self. And therefore, it is not merely social or forensic concept. But then, points out that it is a metaphysical concept of persons because it shows that the how it can be used to describe the minded being as a unique substance which is not identical with the body, though it is necessary linked with the body; that is, to say that persons have material bodies and yet are not on same level as the physical bodies or organism.


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➤ For Strawson, a person's body occupies an important position in the person's experience so that he could answer to the following questions satisfactorily:

- (a) Why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?
- (b) Why are they ascribed to the same thing as certain corporeal characteristics?



Persons therefore, are not physical things at all; that is, because persons have transcendental, their physical existence. Therefore, persons have transcendental being. The transcendental qualities however, shows that persons are explainable from the first person perspective. The first person perspective and unique individual that is an I, we experience as Wittgenstein point out that, even it is the name which can substitute I, therefore the first person is not the discussion of any human beings, because it refers to the third person perspective, but it refers to the person himself or herself. This does not mean that persons is distinct from this world but person is a part of this world. As Strawson and persons to begin with is to be understood as distinct from a near material body which returns the contrast customarily observed between person and things. According to Strawsons each of us distinguishes between himself and the state of himself on the other hand. And what is not himself or a state of a himself on the other hand. Then, the question is what are the conditions of are making these distinction? Why do we make it in the way we do? Strawson argues that, in our conceptual scheme, material bodies are basic properties; this means, that material bodies could be identified without referring to another individual in particular.

Whereas, the identification and re-identification of particulars of other categorize the rest ultimately on the identification of material bodies. Then, Strawson enquiries whether we could make intelligible, took our self a conceptual scheme in which material bodies are not basic. This leads him into the construction of the model, no space world in which all

the sensory items are auditory but in which, it did seem possible to find a place for idea of re-identifying particulars by exploiting certain auditory analogues of the idea of a spatial substance.

The requirements was, for a scheme in which a distinction was made between oneself and not on self, oneself. Let us now think of some ways, in which we ordinary talk of our self, certain things which we do and which are ordinary ascribed to our self. We ascribe our self as intentions, sensations and feeling, perceptions and memories also. We ascribed ourselves, locations and attitudes. Of course, not only we ascribe our self temporarily conditions like state situations. But also including characteristic, including physical characteristics like height, shape, weight; that is to say that those among the thing, that we ascribe to our self are those that we ascribe to material bodies, but there are things and attributes that we ascribe to our self, but cannot dream of ascribing to material body.


Let us take a visual experience first, there is a group of empirical facts of which the most familiar of the either eyes of that body are closed. The person sees nothing. These group belong to all the facts known to the athletic surgeons. Secondly, there is the fact that falls within the field of region at any moment of difference in part of the orientation of these eyes; that is, the direction his heads is turned in and the orientation of his eye ball in the sockets. Thirdly, there is the fact that where he sees from, what is possible field of region at any moment depends on the body.

But Strawson divides these facts into the group to emphasize in the following. The fact that visual experience in all this. These three ways depends on the fact about the body or bodies. It is a continuant fact that it is same body. Each person's body occupies a spatial position in relation to that persons perceptual experience. For each person, there is one body occupy certain causal position in relation to the, that persons perceptual experiences.

For Strawson, a person's body occupies an important position in a person's experience. So, that he could answer to the following questions satisfactory. Firstly, why are one's state of consciousness ascribe to anything at all? And why are they are ascribed to the same thing at certain corporeal characteristics? For the Cartesian, this question does not arise. It is only a linguistic illusion, that both kind of predicates are properly ascribed to


one and the same thing, that there are is a common owner or subject. (()) say that when we speak of a person, we refer to two distinguished substances; the state of consciousness belong to one, those of (()) and not to other. Strawson says that, he escapes one of our questions but he does not escape the other. Why is that because state of consciousness ascribe to anything at all. In order to overcome above problems Strawson use the concept of persons as a primitive concept.

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Then he said, what I mean by the concept of person is the concept of type of entity such that both predicates ascribing state of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, physical situation and c and are equally applicable to a single type. Why he is saying that, it is because the concept of person is a one kind of primitive conceptualism. And now, we can get answer to the above questions, which Descartes arised but Strawson says that the answer to these two questions are connected in this manner.

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


That is a necessary condition of state of consciousness are ascribed at all is that they should be ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation and c. That is to say, states of a consciousness could not be ascribed at all, whereas they were ascribed to persons, in that sense I have claimed for this world. Above Strawson's view say that a necessary condition of a state of consciousness being ascribed at all is that they should be ascribed to persons. The concept of person is prior to that of an individual consciousness. A person is not an embedded ego but an ego might be a disembodied persons. Again, Strawson points out that one can ascribe a state of consciousness to others only, if one can identify other subject of experience. In addition, one cannot identify others, if one can identify them only as subject of experience of state of a consciousness. He says that this way, will lead to cartesianism, we cannot but refer to the bodies of other, so state of consciousness could not be ascribed at all.

Unless, they are ascribed to an individual persons who has a body. So, the pure individual persons are consciousness, in the sense of theory, that is a concept that cannot exist. Strawson says that, it can exist only as a secondary, non-primitive concept but can be analyzed in terms of concept of persons. The pure individual consciousness cannot exist as a primary concept to be used in the explanation of the concept of person. What it might have logically secondary existence? From within our conceptual scheme, each of us consists of his or her individual survival of bodily death. One has to think of oneself

as, having thought, memories in a disembodied state but this disembodied state is only a secondary concept because cannot, but thinks a person as embodied beings.


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According to Strawsons, a person is not an embodied ego but an ego might be a disembodied person, retaining the logical benefits of individual from having been a person. As we have seen, there are two kinds of predicates properly applied to individuals of this type.


The first kind of predicate consists of those that are also properly applied to material bodies to which we do not ascribe state of consciousness, which he calls M-predicate. The second type consists of those predicates such as thinking hard, believing in god, which he calls P-predicates. Therefore, Strawson say that the concept of person is to be understood and the concept of type of entities such that both predicate ascribing state of consciousness and those ascribing state of corporeal characteristics. That is, M-predicates are equally applicable to an individual entities.

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


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- The first kind of predicates consist of those that are also properly applied to material bodies to which we do not ascribe states of consciousness, which Strawson calls M-predicates.
- The second type consists of those predicates such as 'thinking hard', 'belief in God', etc., which Strawson calls P-predicates.



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Strawson says,


“... the concept of a person is to be understood as the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation and c. are equally applicable to an individual entity of that type.”

Strawson, P. F. *Individuals*, 1963.



Then, he said that the concept of persons is to be understood as the concept of type of entities such that both predicate ascribing state of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation and c, are equally applicable to an individual of that entities of that type. Strawson is not taking the concept of person as a secondary concept in the relation to two primary kinds. That, all particular consciousness and a human body.

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


Strawson says that though not all P-predicates are what we should call predicates ascribing state of consciousness, that is going for a walk and many other things, they may be said to have, this in common, that they imply the position of consciousness and the part of that to which they are ascribed from the ever stand point. What Strawson want to say is that one ascribe P-predicates to others on the strength of observation of their behavior. And that their behavior criteria one goes on a, on are not just science of the presence of what is meant by the P-predicates.

But are criteria on both and they are not just sign of presence of that; that is meant by the P-predicate, but our criteria of a logical adequate that kind of ascriptions of the P-predicate. This claim shows that persons is immaterial because of state of consciousness is applicable to persons. This is because, there are predicates which could not be self-ascribable and other ascribable to the same individual, but there are remains many cases in which one has an entire adequate basis for ascribing P-predicates to oneself and yet, this basis is distinction from those one which one ascribe the predicates to another.


In other words these predicates have the same meaning and both ways of ascription is in perfect individual; that is why P-predicates have certain characteristics such as I am in pain, I am depressed and etcetera. And one should not ascribe to somebody from these observations because this is rare to third person perspective of the concept of persons. Moreover, the above explanation makes an important questions that is

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
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- How can one ascribe to oneself, not on the basis of observation, the very same thing that others may have, on the basis of observation, reason of a logically adequate kind for ascribing one, which might be phrased?
- How are P-predicates possible?
- How is the concept of a person possible?




How can one ascribe to oneself not on the basis of observations, they vary same thing that others may have, on the basis of observations, reasons of a logically adequate kind of ascribing one, which might be phrased. Strawson says that as the above questions may be observed in a wider one, which might be phrased the questions, how are P-predicates possible and how is the concept of persons is possible?

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- Strawson says that these two questions are replacing those two earlier questions, that are, why are one's states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? And why are they ascribed to the same thing as certain corporeal characteristics?
- The answer to these two questions are inherited in the primitiveness of the concept of person, this is because the uniqueness character of P-predicates.



Strawson says that these two questions are replacing those two earlier questions that are, why one state of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? And why are they ascribed to the same thing as certain corporeal characteristics? The answer to these two questions are in inherited in the primitiveness of the concept of person. This is because the uniqueness characters of P-predicates, because he or she who is an individual have the P-predicates. The attributes of P-predicates that make a person is an individual. The persons are meta physical beings, claims an ontological liberty, in the sense, they could not be, what they are without meta physical essence. Therefore, this is the essence about the concept of persons according to Strawsons. And Strawson has been explaining the metaphysical point of view on persons. Thank you.