

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind and Cognition

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Module No. # 01

Lecture No. # 35

Emergentism and Supervenience

Today lectures, I am going to explain about supervenience and emergentism or emergentism and supervenience. How the emergentism and supervenience goes together at the same times, there are some differences. And how the emergentism theory of mind, explaining the concept of mind at the same time? How the supervenience thesis explaining the concept of mind. As we know that emergentism has a theory of mind which is part of non-computational view of mind, non-mechanistic view of mind, that is the main aim in this lecture too, to show.

Now, the question is what is emergentism? According to emergentism, the higher level of quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its root therein, but it emerges there from and it does not belong to that level, but it gives rise to a new order of existence with special laws.


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Emergentism & Supervenience

What is Emergentism?


According to emergentism, the higher-level quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its roots therein, but it emerges there from, and it does not belong to that level, but gives rise to a new order of existence with special laws.



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Samuel Alexander says, “the higher-level of quality emerges from the lower level of existence and have its roots therein, but it emerges there from, and it does not belong to that lower level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existence with its special laws of behaviour. The existence of emergent qualities thus described is something to be noted as some would say, under the compulsion of brute empirical fact, or, as I should prefer to say in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the natural piety’ of the investigator. It admits no explanation.”




Alexander, S., "Space, Time, and Deity, Vol.II," Macmillan, London, 1920

But whereas, Samuel Alexander who is the founder of this emergentism thesis and he says, that the higher-level of quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its root therein, but it emerges there from, but it does not belongs to lower level, but constitutes its possess a new order of existence with its special laws of behavior. The existence of emergent qualities thus described is something to be noted as some would say, under the compulsion of brute empirical facts, or, as we should prefer to say in less harsh term, to be accepted with the natural piety of the investigators. It admits no explanations.

Here, eminence refers to the fact that, in the course of a evolution, new things and events occur, with unexpected and unpredicate properties. Things and events are new, in the sense, in which a great work of art may be described as a new thing. A brief genuine emergence introduces novelty in the world.


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To say that an emergent characteristic is a novel means:


- Firstly, it is not simply a rearrangement of pre-existing elements, although such rearrangement may be one of its determining conditions.
- Secondly, the characteristic is qualitatively, not just quantitatively, unlike anything that existed before in history.
- Thirdly, it is unpredictable not only on the basis of knowledge available prior to its emergence but even on the basis of ideally complete knowledge of the state prior to its emergence.

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To say that an emergent characteristic is a novel means: Firstly, it is not simply a rearrangement of pre-existing elements, although such rearrangements may be one of its determining conditions. Secondly, the characteristic is qualitatively, not just quantitatively, unlike the anything that existed before in history. Thirdly, it is unpredictable not only on the basis of knowledge available prior to its emergence but even on the basis of ideally complete knowledge of the state prior to its emergence.


These points permits a distinction to be made between, what is new in the sense of being a phrase combination of old factors and a what is novel, in the sense of being qualitatively unique and unpredictable. In this a lectures, we will find out how consciousness emerges from mental properties and how the emergent properties of consciousness cannot be explained in a functional or computational way.

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- Some philosophers argue that consciousness might be an emergent property, in a sense that it is still compatible with materialism. It is also often held that emergent properties are unpredictable from low-level properties.
- However, it can be argued that these properties are new in an ontological sense. What is interesting about these properties is that they are not obvious consequences of the low-level properties. But they are still causally supervenient on low-level facts.

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Some philosophers argue that consciousness might be an emergent property, in the sense that it is still compatible with materialism. It is also often held that emergent properties are unpredictable from lower-level properties. However, it can be argued that these properties are new in an ontological sense. What is interesting about these properties is that they are not obvious consequence of the low-level properties. But they are still casually supervenient on the low-level of facts.

Following the above arguments, we can put that the phenomena of a consciousness could rise only in the presence of some non-computational physical processes taking place in the brain. As we know, living human brains are ultimately composed of those same material, satisfying the same physical laws, as are the inanimate objects of the universe. There is the Cartesian view that consciousness arises only in humans and that animals are inanimate automata. A view which is clearly pre-evolution and we have reason to accept the view that there are lower and higher states of consciousness. Moreover, the most reasonable view seems to be that consciousness is an emergent property of animals arising under the pressure of natural selections.

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- The problem of emergence in this context starts with 'life' and it should be remembered that 'brain' is not just a piece of inanimate matter, but a part of the 'living' body.
- Daya Krishna remarks, "it is not even clear whether those who want to deny the 'reality' of consciousness want to deny the reality of 'life' also. The 'body' they talk about is a 'living body', the 'brain' they are fond of is the brain that is 'alive'. Take 'life' away and everything 'dies', 'ceases', at least as we 'live' and 'feel' and 'know' it."

NIPTE

Daya Krishna, Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective, Delhi, 2006.

If this is so, then the questions are like this. That, how does consciousness arises from (()) constituents, in the physical universe. This question is still unanswered. Even, if the observation of the behavior of the (()) created the strong impression that it is conscious. And we can find its symptoms of activity and initiative, in its behavior. That activity and behavior is something different from what happens in the neurons. The human brain is estimated to have ten thousand millions of neurons. There are also thousands of inactive relations among the neurons. But the qualities which exist in the consciousness are not found in the neural relations.


There is a new emergent entity in consciousness which did not exist in the neurons, because the emergent properties of consciousness are ontologically new. The problem of emerges in this context, starts with life and it should be remembered that brain is just a piece of inanimate matter but a part of the living body.

As Daya Krishna remarks, it is not even clear whether those who want to deny the reality of consciousness, want to deny the reality of life also. The body they talk about is a living body. The brain, they are fond of the brain that is alive. Take life away and everything dies, ceases. At least live it and feel it and know it.

Here, Daya Krishna is trying to identify life with consciousness. Here, like consciousness, life also emerges from human body. And identify the consciousness. In fact, the problem of emergence of life is a far wider one but here, we are concerned with

human life only, because the question is that why is it that the phenomena consciousness appears to occur as, whereas we know only in a living beings, although we should not rule out the possibility that consciousness might be present also in other appropriate physical systems.


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
Now, the question are;

- Why is it that the phenomenon of consciousness appears to occur, as far as we know, only in 'living' beings, although we should not rule out the possibility that consciousness might be present also in other appropriate physical systems?
- How could it be that such a seemingly ingredient as non-computational behavior presumed to be inherent in the actions of all material things, so far has entirely escaped the notice of physicists?

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The second question is how could it be that, such a seemingly ingredient as non-computational behavior, presumed to be inherent in the actions of all material things. So, far as entirely escaped the notice of physicists. The first question is that, the question is related with the subtle and complex as a organization of the brain but that alone could not provide a sufficient explanation. Penrose clearly maintains that i quote

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- The first question is that the question is related with the subtle and complex organization of the brain, but that alone could not provide a sufficient explanation.
- Penrose clearly writes, "I am contending that the faculty of human understanding lies beyond any computational scheme whatever. If it is microtubules that control the activity of the brain, then there must be something within the action of microtubules that is different from mere computation."


 Penrose, Roger, *Shadows of the Mind*, 1995.

I am contending that the faculty of human understanding lies beyond any computational schemes whatever. If it is microtubules that control the activity of the brain and then there must be something within the action of microtubules that is different from mere computations, on quote. Here, he says that this inanimate matter is microtubules. That control the activity of the brain because there is life in it. That is in the brain. The actions of microtubules is different from mere computations because he points out that such actions are non computational actions, in which life is related to consciousness. The above statement leads to the question easy. Is there any evidence that the phenomena of consciousness is related to the action of microtubules, in particular, it must also be the case that, the detailed neural organization of the brain is fundamentally involved in growing what from that consciousness must take.

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
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- Firstly, there is some kind of useful non-computable action involved, which Penrose takes to be an essential part of consciousness.
- Secondly, we must expect that vestiges of such non-computability should also be present, at some indiscernible level, in inanimate matter.




For Penrose, if that organization we are not important then our lives would invoke as much consciousness as do our brains. Here, he put it like this. What the preceding arguments strongly suggest is that it is not just the neural organization our brain, that is important. The cytoskeletal underpaining of those very neural seems to be essential for consciousness to be present, on quote. But, it is not the cytoskeletal as of that is relevant. But, some essential physical actions that biology has so, cleverly contributes to incorporate into the activity of its microtubules. Moreover, it may be pointed out that in our brain, there is an anonymous organizations and since consciousness appear to be a very global feature of our thinking, it is seems that we must look to some kind of over ends on a much larger than that level of single microtubules or even single cytoskeletons. And there is some kind of useful non computational actions involved which Penrose takes to be an essential part of consciousness.

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
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- Firstly, there is some kind of useful non-computable action involved, which Penrose takes to be an essential part of consciousness.
- Secondly, we must expect that vestiges of such non-computability should also be present, at some indiscernible level, in inanimate matter.


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Secondly, we must expect that by vestiges of such non-computational should also be present, at some indiscernible levels, in inanimate matter. But, here the physics of ordinary matter seems to allow no room for such non-computational behavior. Jaegwon Kim is one of the famous founder of supervenience thesis, in his book on supervenience and his article on supervenience, he argued that there is a strikingly similarity between emergence and supervenience.

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Jaegwon Kim, in his article on '*Supervenience*' argued that there is a striking similarity between emergence and supervenience.



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According to Kim, “higher-level properties notably consciousness and other mental properties, emerge when, and only when, an appropriate set of lower-level (basal conditions) are present, and this means that the occurrence of the higher properties is determined by, and dependent on, the instantiation of appropriate lower-level properties and relations. In spite of this, emergent properties were held to be ‘genuinely novel’ characteristically irreducible to the lower level processes from which they emerge.”

Kim, Jaegwon, "Supervenience" in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*, 2000.




According to Kim, the higher-level properties notably consciousness and other mental properties, emerges emerge when, and only when, an appropriate set of lower level or basal conditions are present and this means that the occurrence of the higher level properties is determined by, and dependent on the instantiation of appropriate lower level properties and relations. In spite of this, emergent properties where held to be genuinely novel, characteristically irreducible to the lower level processes from which they emerge, on quote.

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
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- Then, the concept of emergence combines the three components of supervenience delineated above, namely, property covariance, dependence, and non-reducibility.
- The emergentism can be regarded as the first systematic formulation of non-reductive physicalism.
- According to this thesis, the mental states are not reducible to but are supervenient on the physical states in such a way that whatever changes take place in the physical states must make a difference to the mental states well.




Then, the concept of emergence combines the three components of supervenience delineated above, namely, property covariance, dependence and non-reducibility. Thus emergentism can be regarded as the first systematic formulation of non-reductive physicalism. This thesis makes the mental life supervenient on its physical background, that is to say, according to this thesis the mental states are not reducible to, but are supervenient on the physical state in such a way, that whatever changes take place in physical states must make a difference to the mental states as well. No two things could differ in a mental respect, unless they differ in some physical aspect. That is, imperceptibility with respect to physical properties entails indiscernibility with respect to mental properties. That is the core idea of mind-body supervenience.

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
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- No two things could differ in a mental respect unless they differed in some physical respect, that is, imperceptibility with respect to physical properties entails indiscernibility with respect to mental properties. That is the core idea of mind-body supervenience.
- Kim points out that one must notice that the mental is dependent on the physical but not vice versa, because the mental states are directly a consequence of the physical states.

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Thus, supervenience thesis understood in the strong sense, that it makes room for a numerical difference of the mental, on the physical, such that the physical states are necessarily responsible for the mental states. As Kim points out that the mental is dependent on the physical but not vice versa, because the mental states are directly a consequence of the physical states. The mental states themselves do not determine the physical states. In that sense, the mental states remain numerologically dependent on the physical universe. In his article on the Non-reductionist's Troubles with Mental Causations and he mentions that the non-reductive physicalism consists of following theses.

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


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Kim, in his article on *'The Non-Reductionist's Troubles with Mental Causation'* mentions that the non-reductive physicalism consists of following theses.




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
- (a) All concrete particulars are physical.
- (b) Mental properties are not reducible to physical properties.
- (c) All mental properties are physically realized; that is, whenever an organism, or system, instances a mental property M, there is a physical property P such that P realizes M in organisms of its kind.
- (d) Mental properties are real properties of objects and events; they are not merely useful aids in making predications or fictitious manners of speech.



Firstly, all concrete particulars are physical. Secondly, mental properties are not reducible to physical properties. Thirdly, all mental properties are physically realized; that is, whenever an organism or system instances a mental phenomena M, there is a physical property P such that P realizes in M, in organisms of its kind. Fourthly, mental properties are real properties of the objects and events; they are not merely useful aids in making predications or fictitious manners of speech. Therefore, we find that these four basic theses bring non-reductive physicalism very close to emergentism. In fact, the non-reductive physicalism of this variety is best viewed as a form of emergentism.

Emergentist, in general, accepted purely mechanistic ontology of concrete physical objects and events. For example, Samuel and Alexander is one of the principal theoreticians of emergent schools argues that, there are mental events over and above neural processes. Alexander says, we thus becomes aware, partly by experience, partly by reflections, that processes with the distinct quality of mind or consciousness is in the same place and time with a neural processes; that is with a highly differentiated and complex processes of our living body.

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- Emergentists in general accepted purely materialist ontology of concrete physical objects and events.
- Samuel Alexander, one of the principal theoreticians of emergence school, argues that there are mental events over and above neural processes.
- The emergentist doctrine that emergent properties are irreducible to the physical conditions out of which they emerge is familiar; this irreducibility claim is constitutive of the emergentist metaphysical world-view.


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We are forced therefore, to go beyond the mere correlation of the mental with these neural processes and to identify them, there is but one processes which being of a specific complexity as the quality of consciousness. It has then to be accepted as an empirical fact that, neural processes of a certain level of development process, the quality of consciousness and is there by mental processes and alternatively, a mental processes is also a vital one of the certain order. However, emergent properties are irreducible to the physical conditions out of which, they emerge is familiar. This irreducibility claim is constructive of the emergentist's Meta physical value, although the emergentist's idea of reductions or reductive explanation diverges from the model of reduction, implicitly in current anti-reductionist argument. The philosophical significance of the denial of reducibility between two property levels is the same. The higher level properties being irreducible are genuinely new addition to ontology of this world.

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- Although the emergentists' idea of reduction or reductive explanation diverges from the model of reduction implicit in current anti-reductionists argument, the philosophical significance of the denial of reducibility between two property levels is the same.
- The higher-level properties, being irreducible are genuinely new addition to ontology of the world.




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Samuel Alexander says,

“Out of certain physiological conditions nature has framed a new quality mind, which is therefore not itself physiological though it lives and moves and his its being in physiological conditions. Hence it is that there can be and is an independent science of psychology... No physiological constellation explains for us why it should be mind.”




Alexander, S., "Space, Time and Deity Vol. II," Macmillan, London, 1927.

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For example, Samuel Alexander says that out of a certain physiological conditions nature has framed a new quality mind, which is therefore, not its physiological, though it lives and moves and his its being in physiological conditions. Hence, it is that there can be and is an independent science of psychology and no physiological constellation explains for us, why it should be mind? The strong supervenience thesis does not bridge the gap between mental and physical because, it pairs to account for how the mental state with their qualitative content arrives at all in a material environment. The gap between the


physical and a mental remains wide because, it is not known how the mental world can be explained.

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- The strong supervenience thesis does not bridge the gap between mental and physical because it fails to account for how the mental states with their qualitative content arise at all in a material environment.
- Now the question is: Is it not possible that the mental life not be there even if the physical universe exists perfectly?

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Now, the question is, is it not possible that the mental life not be there, even if the physical universe exists perfectly? That is to say that, there are possible worlds in which all the physical states of the present universe are there. But, there is no conscious state at all. For example, robots behave like human beings but lack consciousness. The behavior itself is not consciousness and if consciousness is the same in all organisms like a material things, then there will be no qualitative difference between the human and non-human. Therefore, we cannot prove that consciousness is supervenient on the physical world.

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- John R. Searle has given an example, which will make the above thesis more legitimate.
- Suppose, we have a system S, and the elements of system are A, B, C.... S might be a stone and the elements might be molecules.

H₂O = Water



John R. Searle has given an example, which will make this thesis more legitimate. Let us see thesis, suppose that, we have a system S, and the elements of systems are A B C, S might be a stone and the elements might be molecules. There will be a features of that are not or not necessary feature of A B C, but there are some features which have causally emergent system features, like solidity, liquidity, and transparency are example of causally emerging system features. In these connections, will remind us that life is an emergent property and if there were no life, there would be no consciousness. Either, here in the case of two hydrogen and one oxygen, we are getting water. the quality which are existing in two hydrogen and one oxygen, the same qualities are not in the water. for example, liquidity and solidity.

What John Searle is making here? Although John Searle is giving one kind of naturalistic theory of mind or consciousness, but in this naturalistic theory of consciousness if you see that, there is a differences and in the case of emergency, there is some kind of qualitatively, may not be any kind of a quantitative difference. But, there is a qualitative difference. And this qualitative difference is sufficient in explaining that mind is different from the body and a mind is different from the machines. As we know that, water is the combination of two hydrogen and one oxygen but there are qualitative difference between water, on the one hand and the hydrogen and the oxygen, on the other hand. The qualities which we find in the water, we will not find in the oxygen and hydrogen. In the same way there is differences between consciousness and a matter


because, there is a qualitative dependence between the two. The qualities which emerges from consciousness will not possible to explain in the mechanical or functional way but it needs separate explanation and it is explanation is non reductive explanation; that is self-explanations

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The existence of consciousness can be explained by the causal interactions between elements of the brain at the micro level, but consciousness cannot itself be deduced or calculated from the sheer physical structure of the neurons without some additional account of the causal relations between them.

Now the question is:
Why is consciousness an irreducible feature of physical reality?




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The above definitions shows that consciousness is a causally emergent properties of systems. It is an emergent feature of creation system of neurons, in the same way that solidity and liquidity are an emergent features of the system of molecules. Thus, the existence of consciousness can be explained by the causal interactions between elements of the brain at the micro level but consciousness cannot itself be deduced or calculated from the sheer physical structure of the neurons without some additional account of the causal relations between them.

And the question is, why is consciousness an irreducible feature of physical reality? There is a standard argument to show that consciousness is not reducible in the way that material properties are reducible. For example, that I am now in pain, I am now in a certain consciousness state, such as pain. Now, the question is: what fact in the world corresponds to my statement, I am now in pain?

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


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- There is a standard argument to show that consciousness is not reducible in the way that material qualities are.
- For example, I am now in a certain conscious state such as pain. Now the question is: what fact in the world corresponds to my statement. 'I am now in pain'?
- No description of the third-person type would convey the first-person character of pain because the first-person features are different from the third-person features.


Here is the fact that, I have no certain un present conscious sensation and I am experiencing these sensation from my experiences. It is these sensations that are constitutably of my present **present** pain but the pain is also caused by certain underlying neuro-physiological processes consisting in large part of patterns of reasons, firing in my brain. It is like that, I have a pain because there is (()) or pairing is happening in my physical systems. And therefore, there is an identity between the (()) pairing and my pain experiences. But, if you reduce the first person sensation of pain, though the thought per pattern of neurons, pairings then we try to say that the pain is really nothing but the patterns of neurons pairings. If this is so, then we are living the essential feature of pain. No description of the third person type would convey the first person characters of pain because, the first person features are different from the third person features.

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


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- There is a standard argument to show that consciousness is not reducible in the way that material qualities are.
- For example, I am now in a certain conscious state such as pain. Now the question is: what fact in the world corresponds to my statement. 'I am now in pain'?
- No description of the third-person type would convey the first-person character of pain because the first-person features are different from the third-person features.

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Nagel says,

“Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it... no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience *at all* means, basically, that there is something it is like to *be* that organism...But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to *be* that organism—something it is like *for* the organism.”

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
Nagel, Thomas, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat", 1998

Thomas Nagel states that by contrasting the objectivity of the third person features with the, what it is like to be features of the subjective experience, subjective state of consciousness. As Nagel says I quote, conscious experience is a wide spread phenomena. It occurs at many levels of animals life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simple organisms. And it is very difficult to say in general, what provides evidence of it. And no matter, how the form may vary, the fact that an organizing has conscious experience at all means, basically, that is something it is like to be that organism. But,

fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something, it is like to be that organism, something it is like to, it is like further (()).


Thus, I know that I am in pain is a different sort of knowledge, that my knowledge that you are in pain. The feeling of pain indicates that there is close relation between consciousness and self-consciousness. This is due to the emergence of self-consciousness out of consciousness and thus making it a radical different from what is, if it is at all human levels.

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- This is due to the emergence of self-consciousness out of consciousness and thus making it radical different from what is it, if it is at all human levels.
- The development of robotics denies the reality of consciousness because of this 'self-consciousness' knowledge have 'self-determination' and deny the existence of mind or consciousness.


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But, Daya Krishna remarks that the development of robotics denies the reality of consciousness because of this self-consciousness. Knowledge have self determinations and it deny the existence of mind or consciousness. This self-consciousness has forgotten it is dimension of knowing, feeling and willing. The last result in the transformations through technology, that has obsessed the modern mind to such an extent that it has gone to the extent of denying its own reality and a considering the matter alone as real. But, yet matter though resistant is flexible, agreeable to change, which consciousness does not seem to be in the same sense.

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
Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

- This 'self-consciousness' has forgotten its dimension of 'knowing', 'feeling', and 'willing', the last resulting in the transformations through technology that has obsessed the modern mind to such an extent that it has gone to the extent of denying its own reality and considering the 'matter' alone as 'real'.
- The denial of 'I-consciousness' which is an inevitable accompaniment of self-consciousness.




The denial of I-consciousness which is an inevitable accompaniment of self-consciousness. the real causal role of consciousness have, becomes clear when self consciousness comes into its own and discover that it can be directly affect consciousness and indirectly everything else through imagining, intending, thinking attending, concentrating, reasoning and the other narrates activities which man has encountered in himself and developed, to be a long process. Therefore, from the above explanation, it follows that once consciousness emerges from physical properties. It will never be reduce to it. This shows that emergentism cannot support functionalism or computationalism, because a functionalist explains consciousness or mind in the reductive way.

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- Therefore, from the above exploration, it follows that once consciousness emerges from physical properties, it will never be reduced to it.
- No explanatory gap between mind and body.
- The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience, especially to first-person character which cannot be explained within a scientific framework.

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
Whereas an emergentists explained consciousness in a non-reductive way. Consciousness makes the mind body problems really interact able. The reductionist shows that, the mind body problems is not a real problem, for him or her. There is no explanatory gap between the mind and body. We have to find out, why these arguments means do not help us to understand the relations between mind and body.

Without consciousness the mind and body problems would be less interesting, but with consciousness, it seems hopeless. The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience, especial to first person character which cannot be explained within a scientific framework. Cognitive science can explains a system function, in terms of its internal mechanism. But, it is not possible to explain, what it is to have subjective experience. But, it is not a problem about the performance of functions. Thomas Nagel says that conscious experience is a wide spread phenomena.

Fundamentally, an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that, it is like to that be that ((C)). Something it is like to be further rising. In recent times all sorts of mental phenomena have helded his, to scientific explanation, but consciousness has stubbornly resistant this explanation. Many philosophers and scientists have tried to explain it or the explanations, but explanation always seem to fall short of the target. Now, the question is, why is it so difficult to explain? Now, according to David Chalmers cognitive science has not explained, why there is conscious experience

at all, **why there consciousness experience at all**. When we think and perceive there is various of information processing but there are also subjective individual aspect of consciousness which goes beyond the information processing.

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


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- The easy problems are easy because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need a mechanism that can perform the function. The cognitive sciences offer this type of explanation and so are well suited to the easy problem of consciousness.
- On the other hand, the 'hard' problem is 'hard', because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. The problem persists even when the performance of all the relevant functions are explained.

He says that, when it comes to consciousness experience this sort of explanation fails. What makes the hard problem? Hard and the almost unique is that, it goes beyond problems about the performance of the functions. To see this, not that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions, in the vicinity of experience, perceptual descriptions, categorizations, internal access, barbell reports, there may still remain further questions, why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience. According to David Chalmers, even if all the functions of a system are well articulated, there is further questions as to why there is an experience at all. Accompanying their functions, cognitive science fails to explain, why there is any experience at all, even though it explains all the brain functions. The hard problem of consciousness consist in the why questions regarding consciousness. Now, the question is why is the hard problem is so hard and why are the easy problem is so easy.

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- The easy problems are easy because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need a mechanism that can perform the function. The cognitive sciences offer this type of explanation and so are well suited to the easy problem of consciousness.
- On the other hand, the 'hard' problem is 'hard', because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. The problem persists even when the performance of all the relevant functions are explained.

The easy problems are easy because they are the concerned explanations of the cognitive abilities and functions to explain a cognitive function; we need a mechanism that can perform the functions. The cognitive sciences offer this type of explanations and so are well suited to the easy problem of consciousness. On the other hand, the hard problem is hard because, it is not a problem about a performance of the functions. The problem persists, even when the performance of all the relevant functions are explained. And he says that I quote, I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental. We know that a theory of consciousness requires the addition of something fundamental to our ontology.

As everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness, we might add some entirely new non physical features, from which experience can be derived. But, it is hard to see what such a feature would we like, more like, we will take experience itself has a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge and space, time. If we take experience as fundamental, then we can go about the business of constructing a theory of experiences on quote.


The reductionist have not solved the hard problem of the consciousness because as we have seen, it has explained consciousness only in terms of the easy problem of consciousness. Easy problems are all concerned with how a cognitive or behavioral function is performed. There are questions about how the brain carried out the cognitive

task; that is, how it is discriminate stimulates, integrate information and so on. Whereas, the hard problem consciousness goes beyond the problems about how functions are performed. If scientific view of mind tries to give a definite definition of consciousness then, it leaves out the explanation explanatory gap. That is, there is no explanatory gap between mind and the body, because there is no distinction between mind and body. Mind can be explained in terms of body and there is nothing called the mind. Since the mind itself is a part of the body, which we have already seen in the functionality model of mind and in the artificial intelligence model of mind. And if this is a so, then it leaves out subjective experience and adopts for the third person perspective of consciousness.

Consciousness makes the mind body problems really intractable, the reductionist deny that there is a mind body problem at all. Further, there is no explanatory gap between the mind and body because there is no distinction between the mind and body. Mind can be explained in terms body and there is a nothing called the mind, since the mind itself is a part of the body. Therefore, for them, that the mind is a reductively explainable in terms of body. On the other hand, many philosophers told that mind cannot be explainable in terms of body. But, **we** as we have seen, that is subjective quality which makes the distinction between mind and the body. And this subjective includes emergent biological properties such as life. The essence of body is special extensions. The essence of mind is thought, as we have seen in the Cartesian concept of mind. Thought is taken to be defining attributes of mind which is an in corporal substance, a substance that is non-special in the nature. The term thought, we can understand everything which we argue as for the happening within us. Hence, so for as we have awareness of it.

What follows from Descartes view is that, consciousness is essential a first person subjective phenomena. And a consciousness, conscious states cannot be reduced or eliminated into the third persons. Therefore, it is consciousness which makes the explanatory gap between the first person and third person perspective. According to the Cartesian concept of mind, we have access to the contents of our own minds, in a way deny to us in respect to matter. There is something special about our own knowledge of our own mind; that naturally goes with the Cartesian view. But, if you see, especially some other arguments or the mental life which is qualia cannot be numerologically determined by the physical conditions of the universe.

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- The easy problems are easy because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need a mechanism that can perform the function. The cognitive sciences offer this type of explanation and so are well suited to the easy problem of consciousness.
- On the other hand, the 'hard' problem is 'hard', because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. The problem persists even when the performance of all the relevant functions are explained.

The followings are the reason of the thesis that the mental life is independent of the physical body although they coexist. Firstly, the qualia of the mental state cannot be reproduced in an artificial machines like a robot or a machines table, their unique, the unique to the person concerned. The qualia are the essence of consciousness and some must be intrigue to the consciousness subject. Thus, there is one kind of intelligibility gap between the qualia and the physical world remains as the qualia as the understood why it has belong to the conscious subject? Consciousness makes the gap between mind and body and the subjectivity. And it is most troublesome features, self which is a subject which is the encompasses our feeling, thinking, and perception.

The qualitative character of consciousness is what it is like to be subjected to have the experiences. But, consciousness experience is a, as we have seen, is one kind of wide spread phenomena. And this consciousness experience is very difficult to explain in a mechanistic way. It is because of the emergence of consciousness, make one kind of strong distinction between a mind and body, and mind and machines. Therefore, this subjectivity cannot be explained reductively. It is not analyzed in terms of any explanatory system of functional states or intentional states. Since, they could not be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experience nothing.

There is (()) attached to our conscious experience because (()) at the outcome of consciousness experience. That is consciousness itself cannot be established simply on

the basis of what we observe about the brain and its physical effects. We cannot explain which property of the brain accounts consciousness and distinct cognitive properties, namely, perceptions and innervations, necessarily mediate our relationship with the brain and with consciousness.

We cannot understand how the subjective aspect of experience depends upon the brain; that, it is a really the problem. Therefore consciousness is the essential subjectivity and that is not the mechanical, as manipulation believes, that it is high or subject, who is experiencing and it is high, is the subject which is emerges from the biological systems are concerned and consciousness is essential. Therefore, it is an essential subjectivity. The term pain is subjective as it is not accessible to any observer because it is the first person, first priority. For example, I have a pain in my leg. In this case, the statement is completely subjective. The pain is itself, has the subjective model of essence. As Searle says that, a consciousness state exists only when they are experienced by some human or animal subject. In that sense they are essentially subjective. I used to create subjectivity and qualitiveness as distinct feature but it is now, seems to be that properly understood qualitiveness and subjective is because, there is this qualitative and subjectiveness making a one kind of difference. If there is no subjectivity, no experiences. And this qualitative experiences can exist only in experienced biased of subjects. Because, it is consistent of subjective, in the sense, it is legitimate to hold that, there is a first person ontology as oppose to third person ontology. And this factor of person ontology is emerges from the, one kind of emergent properties and that makes the differences in between, in the mind and body.

And that establish the distinction between the emergent thesis and supervenience thesis. Although, but this is a one kind of naturalistic emergentists thesis, but still it makes a sufficient distinction between and the emergentism and supervenience thesis because supervenience thesis, as we have seen is that, they have been arguing that there is close or there is a kind of close interaction with mind and body. And mind can be explained in terms of body and body can be explained in terms of mind. But, in the case of emergentism, there is a mind is emergences, but of course the core subject to qualities and consciousness expansion emerges from the physical object, but it has its own identity. And these are the main thesis of emergentism and supervenience thesis. Thank you very much.