


Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition
Prof. Ranjan K. Panda & Prof. Rajakishore Nath
Department of Humanities & Social Science
Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay

Lecture No. # 33
Language and the World – I

Today's discussion would be on language and the world. Since we were discussing about mind the concept of mind, we need to see how mind is related with the world and this relation is possible through language. Human beings are not only conscious beings, but they are linguistic beings. We need to analyze and understand how this linguistic beings relate themselves to the world. This is one of the important questions regarding the mind language world relationship. I would explore this referring to the notion of meaning particularly meaning guided by human intension, meaning guided by human intentionality.

So, let us try to explain how the psychological is connected with language and how the psychological vis-a-vis the language or the linguistic is related to the world.

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


So, therefore, **the my subtitle** is Intention Based Semantics Relating Mind, Language and the World. Now we understand following the discussion on language and thought, we

have discussed earlier Searle's concept of language, Fedoras concept of language particularly with reference to conversion of representation.

Today, I will also focus a bit on the representational features of language. It is that representational feature of language connects the linguistic beings with the world and what kind of grammatical connection. We are the philosophers of mind try to conceptualize here is the matter of discussion.

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Following **wittgenstein** people have been talking about language and forms of life. Meaning can be analyzed with reference to not only the language used, but also the forms of life. So, the huge theory of meaning tries to distance it itself particularly the very activities of language from the mental. This is the impression that later **wittgenstein** try to create, but some of those philosophers have tried to show us that this shift those sounds very significant. But linguistic representations are connected with human experiences they are connected with the notion of mind in general. Hence, we cannot comprehensively discuss the notion of meaning without taking into account the notion of experience and the other psychological features. So, therefore the huge theory of meaning must relate to the representational theory of meaning which was advocated earlier.

Now, if somebody emphasizes that it is only through linguistic representation, that meaning can be analyzed then the question would be is there a kind of a symmetry

between the linguistic representation on the one hand and the mental representation on the other hand. Searle has clearly shown us that so far the content is concerned, so far the structure of representations are concerned, the content is a static meaning thereby the content of thought and the content of an expression of that particular thought are identical .

So, in that sense, Searle is trying to draw our attention to this fact that mental representation are connected with linguistic representations and whenever we try to understand meaning with reference to mind, we cannot rule out this fact that how the meaning is constitute from the prospective of language as well as experience. So, the experiential component that is embedded in our linguistic activities is very much part of the whole analysis of meaning and the mind world relationship or mind language world relationship. So, that is **that is** the background of this particular talk, I would like to emphasize here with reference to this linguistic representation of the world.

Wherever we talk about the language and world relationship, we it also brings in how language represents the world and in other words how the world is articulated by language that is very important. So, within the semantic structure of all the sentences the language world relationship is not fully settled. If you only emphasize on language or language use, there is a possibility that we would commit to some form of reductionism or we will commit to some kind of a **eleminitivism**. As if mind is not a necessary or as if certain mental features are not essential for the analysis of meaning, our focus would be how certain mental states are involved in forming the linguistic expressions and there by elucidating the content.

So, we would like to discuss that now so far the meaning is concerned.

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Meaning

- Meaning as common element between language and the world.
- to bridge the gap *language and the world*

How the meaning of the sentence is fixed?


“meaning is the semantic clothing of the world and, for that reason, it is not the contingent product of our sense experience.”

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Meaning is a common element between language and the world.

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There is essentially a kind of a gap **a gap** which is seen with reference to language on one hand and the world on the other. The representational theory of meaning advocates that linguistic representation is intentionally connected to the world in other words expressions are directed towards the world. If there is an expression then expression is directed towards the world. So, this directedness shows a kind of a intentional connection between the world in one hand and the language on the other hand.

Now the language user or what I called the linguistic the linguistic beings are connected to the world, they are very much part of the world and their connection is established through intentionality and as Searle points out intentionality is a pre-linguistic phenomenon. Intentionality is been defined as a pre-linguistic phenomenon precisely keeping this in the background that language has evolved as an institutional fact whereas intentionality is an intrinsic feature of human beings. In other words, intentionality is an intrinsic feature of all biological beings. There are many biological beings who do not probably use language as we use, who probably do not create any kind of a sound.

So, thereby the mode of communication for them is not through language, but may be through something else. But suppose the human beings are concerned, since they live a linguistic form of life. It is very important for us to show how language helps us explaining this intentional relationship, without language the intentional link with the world is possible, but with language how this intentionality gets a surplus feature to talk about the world to theorize about the very existence of the reality is something very significant to the whole **apitrronic** discourses that human beings are involved with. So, therefore how meaning of a sentence is fixed? It is fixed because of intentionality, because of this conciseness or the concise attitudes intentional attitude of conciseness or it is fixed through certain other linguistic categories which are non-intentional in nature.

We would like to see this that the meaning is something clothing the world as **(())** advocates it. Meaning is the semantic clothing of the world and for that reason it is not a contingent product of our sense experiences. So, here is an impression given to us that there is no naturalistic theorization of meaning possible in order to dissolve all kinds of problems that is there within the framework of semantics in general. The naturalistic account does not resolve the problem of truth which is very much part of the discourse of meaning.

Hence the non naturalist account of meaning emphasizes that the world language relationship is not a contingent phenomenon rather it is necessarily rather the relationship is intrinsic and we would like to see how this relationship is conceptualized as an intrinsic relationship. It is intrinsic precisely because the non naturalists have tried to show us that is there is a kind of fitting relationship. What Searle calls the direction of fit **the direction of fit**? Suggests that there is a language to world relationship say for example, when the linguistic beings express something then this expression represents

something about the world. This directedness is not only one directional rather, but also self referential in nature. Searle while explaining the nature of meaning tries to show us this double level of intentionality that is working between the language and the world.

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The notion of *fitness*

- Representations as basic ingredients of language
- Searle refers to indicative/ request/ command
- *Language-to-the-world*
- *the-world-to-language* Direction of Fit
- Thought content and its directedness towards the world / the intentionality of language

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
So, therefore, we need to talk about this notion of direction of fit as if there is a kind of a fitness fitting relationship. I should not call it fitness rather it is a fitting relationship between language and the world, and this is constitute looking at the notion of representation in a particular. How human beings represent the world? Because whether it is thought or an expression both are directed, both exhibit this intentionality, one can understand it with reference to any kind of language use particularly when we talk about the **performative** utterances whether it is indicative request or command they also this directedness. A kind of a intentional link between the language user on the one hand and the world or the other audiences on another side.

So, that is **that is** how we need to see how the speaker is connected to the world or how the speaker is connected to the audience and how the audience is connected to the speaker ,and this connection the exchange this linguistic exchange between the speaker and the audience is a kind of a intentional connection. It is intentional precisely because the intentionality is grounded in language. So, the later **wittgenstein** will emphasize on this fact that intentionality is grounded in the language.

Whenever question the anthology of language, where Searle is questioning the anthology of language. Hence he considers that intentionality is a pre-linguistic activity, but for me intentionality though is pre-linguistic. So, for the human, linguistic creatures has concerned, it is through language we explicate the nature of intentionality. So, both conciseness and the language get together, to theorize the notion of meaning.

So, in that sense, we need to further proceed to these questions is meaning a mental entity because meaning is not only discussed with reference to what we say, rather we also give importance to this fact that what we mean, saying and meaning are necessarily connected in the sense that if I request you to bring a glass of water, I must have at least this assumption that you would go and bring a glass of water. Now if I do not mean that then my request is nothing but a misfire, my request will not bring the kind of satisfaction which I would derive seeing that you are going to fetch a glass of water for me. In that sense, linguistic actions are actions which carries the content in the actions which communicate things to the audience or to the world. So, language use is basically about communication, basically about the exchange of ideas and thoughts to generate understanding. Now understanding is again a kind of a mental activity.

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Now let us not go into that part try to see how the mental is reconnected with the linguistic. The association of meaning along with the psychological property of language needs to be discussed when we talk about meaning is a mental entity. But some of the philosophers particularly those who argue for the representational semantics, they try to


distance themselves from psychologism as if to say the meaning is related to mind, they would commit to some sort of psychologism, which is dangerous trained in philosophy of mind, which is a dangerous trend in philosophy of language particularly when we try to theorize the concept of meaning.

So, without committing to the problem of psychologism, how can we constitute this fact that meaning is associated with mind. By saying that meaning is associated with mind, I do not commit that meaning exist in the mind. So, rather I would accept this position that meaning or the content is very much a part of this notion of experience, the kind of intentional field it creates. It is neither fully there in our mind nor it is there in the world which probably the externalist would try to suggest. I would suggest that it is a very part of experience, it is part of that intentional linguistic field that is been created by human beings created by this human linguistic beings. So, from that point of view, we need to comprehend this notion of meaning. The need for a comprehensible theory of meaning includes the need of taking into account the mental attitudes, beliefs and the intentions of the speaker who matters to language so much.

So, when we talk about language use, the intentional based semantics has emphasized basically on this mental attitudes of the speaker. What the speaker intends to speak, what he intends to communicate to the hearer is more important. What does he believe? When I say, I need a glass of water. So, this request of mind assumes the fact that I believe water can quench my thirst or I believe this fact that passing this request to you. You would go and fetch a glass of water for me. So, the expression the intentional expression is connected with belief, it is connected with so many other desires that I have.


So, intention is one of the mental states, one of the varieties of mental states and when we talk about linguistic communication or communication intention, we do not say it in isolation. From the other mental states, rather they are all connected, they are all intentionally connected, they are connected through intentionality. Hence we need to understand this intentional link between the language and the world, between the human beings and the world, because human beings are not only **conscious** beings they are also linguistic beings.

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So, therefore, it is essential for us to talk about the speaker's intention as a basic feature of meaning because the psychological states are linguistic states.

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So, when we talk about say for example, P as a psychological state, P has some kind of content because it is just about something. So, being a psychological state it has some content which when it is expressed in the form of expression. It refers to a particular fact or an object in the world. So, that is **that is** very much there, but when it is expressed **it is expressed** through a kind of a psychological mode. The mode in which the particular

expression is being articulated is also important and we all know about it when we talked about the performative utterances with reference to the speech act theory.

It is only when we talk about the intentional expressions, only when we talk about expression of this utterances or it is very idea of talking about statement making then we have that we make the intention explicit. I am very clear when I making you a suggestion, please read this material on speech act. So, this is where I am making my intention explicit in my suggestion. So, the intentional explicit, when I say get me a glass of water please. Here my intention is explicit. You feel the urgency of getting a glass of water for me. Hence we need to show that is a how these expressions are being articulated.


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Making an Intentional Expression

– “The expression of psychological life, which is the exclusive and primary aim of intentional speech. What is rather intended is to influence or to control the unknown inner life of the hearer. Intentional speech is a kind of action, which is essentially aimed at evoking certain psychological phenomena in the person.”

– (“On Meaning and Expression: Marty and Grice on Intentional Semantics,” 1990)

 RIPTL

Prof. Ranjan K Panda, Department of Humanities & Social Science, IIT Bombay

Antony Marty writes and I am quoting Marty here that the expression of psychological life, which is the exclusive and primary aim of intentional speech. What is rather intended is to influence or to control the unknown inner life. So, we need to talk about the inner life of the speakers as well as the hearers; the unknown inner life of the hearer because when I make this statement or a request, I must also making this attempt to know what is going on in your mind, whether you would listen to my request.

So, in that sense, the intentional speech is a kind of action, which is essentially aimed at evoking certain psychological phenomena in the person. So, the speech is intentionally directed towards the hearer and it evokes some kind of expected thoughts in the mind of

the hearer and the speaker must put it in that form. So, that he succeeds in evoking that mental fact in the mind of the hearer. So, there is an attempt on the part of the speaker to articulate the expression, in fact, must articulate intentionally and now to cause certain action. Hence speech is equivalent of any kind of action, as Searle says it is a special kind of action. Now as I said, there are naturalist understanding of intention based semantics or the meaning in general, there are non-naturalist theorization of meaning. The naturalists have tried to explain the notion of meaning and the language world relationship with reference to **causality**.


According to them briefly, this relationship that we talk about between the language and the world are casually bound. It is a natural in that sense, it can be causally explainable. The non-naturalists try to go beyond this causal dependency argument, they try to show what are the non causal phenomena had a responsible for constraint meaning.

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IBS: non-naturalistic account

- x utters p knowing well that y would mean K
- P is intentionally produced so that y listening to p means K
- Meaning of is informative or descriptive
- The speaker x **induces** the meaning
 - Grice's non-naturalistic account of ibs

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So, therefore, when we talk about intention based semantics in particular, we have a speakers x , let us say utters statement proposition say p knowing well that the hearer y would mean K . P is intentionally produced so that y listens to p and means K . Now this intentional relationship that I was talking about referring to this idea of evoking some kind of mental state in the mind of the hearer is something very significant. The non-naturalistic account emphasizes that meaning is an informative act. They are also descriptive rather than being explanatory about the notion of meaning. They also argue that speaker intention or speakers' intentional expressions of certain things tries to

induce meaning in the hearer's mind. So, this idea of an inducing the content is something very special to Paul Grice who talk about intention based semantics in the beginning.

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
Now Grice theory also adheres to the notion of representation in this sense that the speaker not simply utters to induce, rather makes a deliberate attempt could not quote. It is a deliberate attempt in the sense that on his thinking rationally about in telling and making the hearer to think over it in order to fulfill his intention.

So, when we talk about speech act, we try to conceptualize or in fact, there is a need to conceptualize the course of action. What I am saying, what do I mean, when I say this and what the hearer would mean if I say this. All these is to design a kind of or preconceptualize a kind of course of action before saying something. Because we are not just expressing whatever comes to your mind, rather you are deliberately or rationally trying to suggest the hearer that this is what is being expected from you when you hear this statement of mind.

So, in that sense, there is a necessity to talk about the reason, there is a necessity to talk about how a particular course is rationally being formed. So, in that sense there is you know fixity of reason in the domain of communication, the reason can change you can make sit. So, the course that you formed, the field that you are creating through intentionality through rationality, I mean for Searle intentionality and rationality are

necessarily connected. To be intentional is to be you know rational. It is that kind of thing is arguing for intentional actions are not just merely desired actions. There could be desired independent action as I mentioned in one of my lectures earlier. Now, we need to see how the speaker deliberately putting an expression and also wants this ability to manipulate in a sense, the very course of action. Hence there is no fixity of reason.

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


So, there is **there is** a possibility to talk about how the fixity of reason in the domain of communication and what is Grice says. Grice says, this points to the fact for x to have meaning, the intended effect must be something which in some sense of reason the recognition of intention behind x is for the audience a reason not merely a cause (reason for believing and reason for doing). So, that is very fact that Grice is talking about a non-naturalist theory of meaning shows that when I am saying x then saying this not a cause, rather it is a reason that emphasis on the audience to act as I am expected to act. Searle will call it a kind of a mental causation.

So, Searle has a different vocabulary all together when he talks about how mental states are expressed and this ability to express or the ability to cause intentional action. Searle says this is all mental causation. Let us not go into that here. Let us try to understand that Grice tries to make this distinction very clear to us. The reason for believing and the reason for doing are different from the kind of causal explanation is expected in the case of a naturalist theory of a meaning.

Stephan Schiffer also criticizes Grice intention based semantics. Schiffer has two things to suggest. One that this linguistic course of action that we are talking about in the case of Grice following later **wittgenstein** is constituted within a kind of a conventional framework of language use, where the convention is important to explain meaning. See for in the beginning of a discussion of intention based semantics, thus emphasize that the conventional model is important, but in the course, he also talks about the psychological model. Now what is the significance of accepting a psychological model? These are the conventional model which intention based semantics holds on to. We need to see that we need to see what Schiffer advocates in details. Schiffer talks about intention of the speaker speech is produced by the intention of the speaker. He also emphasizes that this speech is being recognized by the hearer or the audience.

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So, this saying so, when we talk about speech, intention of the speaker and the recognition of the speech. We also need to bring in the mutual knowledge that both speaker and the hearer possess. The speaker and the hearer must possess mutual knowledge within a kind of a conventional framework. So, if they do not share that mutuality then the hearer may not recognize, may not be able to recognize what is being said to him. So, therefore, it is important for Schiffer to talk about the concept of mutual knowledge, the common knowledge within a kind of a framework of convention in which both speaker and the hearer participate while exchanging ideas, thoughts or having a conversation a meaningful conversation.

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Functional analysis

- *x intends to produce a reason R in the audience A. it means x knows about the responses in A.*
- Communication intention activates the process of knowing and recognizing each other's intention.
- **Truth supporting reasons.**

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Schiffer gives a functional analysis to this fact. He says x intends to produce a reason R in the audience A . It means x knows about the responses in A . And that is what the common knowledge he talks about, that is what the sharing he talks about. Sharing of the mutual knowledge, x knows about the responses. What kind of response a speech would generate is being conceptualized or being conceived minimally by the speaker. So, in that sense, there is a need to talk about the mutual knowledge.

Communication intention activates the process of knowing and recognizing each other's intention. So, both hearer and the speaker must know each other's intention. So, the convention therefore, is bound by some kind of a norms. In other words both the speaker and the hearer, when they participate in the framework of convention, we must also see that how conventions are guided by certain norms or conventions are regulated by certain norms.


In a class room atmosphere, both student and the teacher are governed by certain norms. In other words, the activities of the teacher and the activities of student are regulated by certain normative principles of institution. Hence these norms in a sense of facilitate the hearer or the student to recognize what kind of things or actions are possible, what kind of actions are expected from a teacher or what kind of actions are expected from a student. So, therefore the reason of this expectations are truth supporting reasons. Schiffer says, the reason of this expectations are very much truth supporting in this sense.

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Schiffer

- “Let’s call reason which are held in this way “truth supporting” reasons. One’s reason for believing p need not be truth supporting; one might have moral or prudential grounds for thinking that p.” (*Meaning*: 1974)
- Morality and prudentiality is considered as the rational precondition for the intentional action.

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I will conclude reading out these sentences from Schiffer, Let us call reason which are held in this way truth supporting reasons. One’s reason for believing p need not be truth supporting; one might have moral or prudential grounds of thinking that p. Look it Schiffer. Now Schiffer is bringing the notion of morality and prudentiality in order to talk about an authentic intentional action that is been produced by the speaker or produced by any agent who is participating in this framework of linguistic field. I would talk about this and elaborate how linguistic communications takes place or must takes place within a normative framework. It is through norms, we need to have access to truth or truth supporting reasons. Hence value is important. Thank you.