

Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind and Cognition

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Lecture No. # 25

The Concept of Intentionality

Today, we are going to discuss the concept of intentionality. As I mentioned in the last class that intentionality is an intrinsic property of consciousness. According to Searle, intentionality and consciousness are identical, they are necessarily related, consciousness been produced by brain processes, shows that intentionality, say is a kind of **a** causal relationship with brain processes. I am trying to site this causal notion of intentionality precisely, because there is already a theory of intentionality advocated by Edmund Husserl.


According to Husserl, intentionality is also the necessary property of consciousness, but Husserl does not hold the causal theory of intentionality as it has been understood by sir. Johnson's biological naturalism remains sympathetic to the naturalistic tradition that is there is a scientific understanding of consciousness possible. Meaning, there by everything is based on the ontological status of the matter, intentionality has a material grounding, whether it is biological or physical intentionality has this material grounding.

Because as you know Sealers biological naturalism is based on two pre suppositions, that is the atomic theory of matter and the evolutionary biology, so intentionality does not disjoin this presuppositions. In other words, Sealers theory of intentionality is a causal theory of intentionality, because which does not have it own causal route. Now, Husserl on the other hand tries to talk about a transcendental theory of consciousness, where Husserl tries to figure out intentionality is a logical feature of consciousness.

Consciousness is intentionally related with the world, so Husserl's theorization of intentionality is, different from the Searle **an** theorization of intentionality. For Husserl's intentionality is a non physical phenomenon, it is a non physical feature of consciousness, whereas for Searle it is a physical feature of consciousness. We would

discuss about Husserl's intentionality a bit when we need a transcendental notion of consciousness, how consciousness is a transcendental phenomenon may be in some other class.

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Today, we would try to analyze what is Searle notion of intentionality. Now, intentionality as you know that it has this feature of directedness, aboutness. So, whenever we talk about a mental state or intentional states, they are necessarily about the world or about the object or a state of affairs. Now, for Searle, desire, belief and intentions are the mental states as you see, believe, desire and intentions are the mental states which are directed about the world. Whenever I say that I have the desire then I try to say that I desire something, now I give an example and try to illustrate this notion of intentionality. Think of a case for intentionality is a part of the very experience of desire belief and intention.

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
Intentionality & Experience

- Rohan **desires** to have a high profile job
- Rohan **believes** that high profile job are available in the market and he **intends** to work hard.
- Rohan's desire will be **fulfilled** iff he works hard and secures good grade in the final exam.



Now, I said this case of Rohan, which could be anybody else, but if Rohan is a person human being, Rohan desires to have a high profile job. Rohan believes that is high profile job are available in the market, **there is** there are jobs available in the world and intends to work hard to get the job. Rohan's desire will be fulfilled if and only if he works hard and secures good grade in the final exam.

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So, think of the case x, x being the person, x has desire, belief and intention. Now, x desire something, so this is very expression of desire, is to talk about how a particular

mental stage like desire is directed to the world, because jobs are available in the world. So, this directedness are what Searle aboutness, is an intentional feature of the mind. Now, Searle makes a distinction between intention and intentionality, intentionality is always a feature whereas intention is a mental stage.

All mental states will have this feature of intentionality, what is important to understand here is this that how these mental states explain our actions, because the mental states are about the mind. As I mentioned in the last class that these are mental states constitutes the network, is mental states constitute the network and the network represents the mind.

So, there is something internal about the mental states. But when Searle talks about the internality of mental states, Searle also tries to show that these mental states are expressed in the form of language **in the form of language**.


So, the expression of mental states in the form of language shows that they are directed about the world. They also show that they represents the world, say for example, how Rohan perceives the notion of a job in the market, speaks about Rohans experience of the social phenomenon. So, if that is the case, how does an individual experiences things and how does he or she represents them. So, that will bring the concept of intentionality in a more explicit manner. And it will also show that this idea of a fulfillment or satisfaction will talk about how things are also associated with mind, it is not intentionality, is not about the external conditions or external relations, but also something internal to the mind. And that is what is now we are trying to explain and Searle very well explains this that there is some kind of a direction of fit between the individual, the subject, which a conscious being and the world. So, that kind of relationship will talk about.

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II Directedness


- Teacher says that
- Rohan is doing well in the class
- Rohan is happy about his performance in the class and exam.
- Rohan gets good grade and the high profiled job.

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Now, what is directedness? Look at let us extend this example little further. If the teacher says that Rohan is doing well in the class and Rohan hears this statement of teachers, Rohan is happy about his performance in the class and in the examinations, then Rohan of course feels happy.

Now, the question is whether this happiness or the feeling of happiness is intentional? Do they represent like the desires, belief and intention. Now, I am intending to do certain action, intending to perform certain action, I am intending to work Rohan, intended to work, Rohan is working for the examination is an intentional action and Searle calls it intention in action.

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When Rohan experiences this fact that he has been working hard, when Rohan experiences this fact that there are good quality job available in the market, now this very experience of certain things, Searle says that look at how intention works that is what is called intention in action. A very fact that Rohan gets good grade and a high profiled job gives them some kind of satisfaction.

So, the experience of satisfaction, the experience of this is something internal to Rohan or any person called Rohan that is something internal to him. We need to understand little further that, **further** what kind of directedness the notion of feeling will have?


The Searle say that feeling is directed about certain things, the Searle point out this fact that **feeling is** feeling represents something and it is also true in the case of desire and intention that they represent things. Whenever I say I desire a glass of water, where I would like to have a glass of water, this desire represents something that I am thirsty or I am experiencing thirst, something like that, now the question is whether feeling also expresses or represents this something.

According to Searle there are mental states which are unintentional, they do not represent things. Say for example, my sudden feeling of happiness elatim and fear, fear and elatim are some kind of mental experiences but they do not really represent things, certain cases of say Rohan did not get a job. Think of a situation where Rohan did not get a job, then

there is a possibility that Rohan may get it depressed, because he was anxious of getting a job.

So, anxiety, depression are non representational mental states, they do not represent anything, meaning thereby they are not directed towards any object. I am anxious of certain things it is difficult to say that what I am anxious of. So, in the depression the person **is** not really know what the cause of depression is, so, therefore, for Searle the feeling of depression and **anxious** anxiety are not directed, they are the evidence of undirected mental states.


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III. unintentional states

- Rohan says that he is **feeling** sad.
- Rohan **does not know why** this sadness.
- Is Rohan **depressed**?
- Is he **anxious** of getting a well-paid job?
- Evidence of **Undirected** mental states

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So, there are mental states which are directed about the world and there are mental states which are not directed about the world. Say for example, I am feeling very nervous, **I am** or I am feeling kind of a fear being in this room, but I do not know what the cause of my fear is.

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Thought and Action

- Intending and intention are just one form of intentionality (1983: 3)
- Intending is an intentional act
- **Doing (drinking/ writing)**
- **Desiring or expecting (mental act)**

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So, in that situation things are non-intentional in character. There are feelings, but feelings are non intentional, they do not represent things, then we need to understand what the nature of representation in Searle's theory of intentionality is. Intending and intention are just one form of intentionality.

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Intentionality and Representation

- Intentional state (directed) object/ SAF
- Speech act (represent) object/ SAF in the world
- Intentional states are representational states
- **Is intentionality necessarily linguistic?**

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Now, we need to look at what is Searle's notion of representation. As I said that mental states are intentional states and all intentional states are presentational, because they represent an object or state of a phase in the world. Intentional states are representational

states; when I say that I must also point out little bit on this that how thoughts or mental states are representational. This network of mental states that Searle is talking about refers to thoughts **thoughts** are mental. Now, if thoughts of mental phenomena, then how thoughts cause action.

According to Searle thought and actions are intentionally related, there is some kind of a causal intentionality operating in this. Searle says that intending to act or the intention is just one form of intentionality. As I mentioned that there is a kind of an intention in action, now this intention in action tries to show that there is some kind of a causal change. Intention which is causing action, now if the intention causes action and this entire experience is linked by intentionality and Searle calls as intention in actions.

Now, they are just one form of intentionality, they are not two different kinds of intentionality. Intentionality of thought and intentionality of action are the performance of my action, are not two kinds of intentionality, they are one kind of intentionality.

Now, therefore, intending is an intentional act, it is an intentional act. So, all voluntary reaction according to Searle is intentional actions. Desiring is a mental act, intending is a mental act, thinking is a mental act, because whenever I think I think of something, that would show what is mental and what is non mental.

So, intentionality is the marker of the mental, there one can see the similarity between Searle and Brentano. Brentano also says that intentionality is the specific feature of the non physical or the mental. So, mental and physical distinction is created by intentionality and Searle also uses this as a marker of the mental phenomena. When I say that an individual performs on a **a** conscious being, performs an action, then this action is an intentional expression of certain things.

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Intentional expression

- Our bay daughter often cries for food
- Ladoo my friend's pet keeps waiting till my friend arrives
- Language/ meaning is derived from intentionality not conversely.

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So, look at this expressions, intentional expressions in the case of a, sorry this is wrongly typed, it should be baby daughter. If I say our baby daughter often cries for food and ladoo, my friends pet keeps waiting till my friend arrives. Now, they are two different conscious beings, one is the human and other is non human, for Searle the non human expressions are also intentional, because the non human is also a living being.

So, being a biological source that they express intentionality, so animals, plants, etcetera as I mentioned in the previous class that they are all have this capacity to express intentional actions. But, when it comes to human beings, when it comes to human life, that human life is expressed in a different way, because human being use language in a typical way, probably it is to human's beings language or a linguistic form of life we are able to understand the other forms of life.

But for Searle, human linguistic activities are found, are structured and can be explained with the help of intentionality. So, meaning according to Searle can be explained through intentionality, so meaning is very much part of the social linguistic activities of human beings.

When I say that meaning can be explained through intentionality, one has to look at this point of Searle that intentionality is a primary condition for language use. Language is secondary, because meaning is derived from intentionality. Meaning is not derived from language use or the form of life in the way ((C)) puts it. So, Searle has a different concern

here, we need **need** to look at this in a more explicit manner, so this idea of meaning derived from intentionality has to be seen explicitly and we will do that in one of the classes when I will be speaking about language worldly relationship. But **but** today let us look at briefly how does Searle explain the intentionality that is involved in language use.

As you all know Searle has this hypothesis in seventies, when he wrote speeches, of course speeches are published in 1969 (()). Now, in speech act Searle comes out which are these hypothesis, that philosophy of action is a branch of philosophic language. When he says this he makes it a point that is whenever I express something I perform a linguistic action. So, expressions, linguistic expressions are nothing but actions, one kind of actions.

But, in later period when he wrote intentionality, in 1983, he comes out with another hypothesis. That is philosophy of language is a part of or a branch of philosophy of mind, so all the linguistic activities that human beings perform flows from human intentionality. So, intentionality is therefore primary and intentionality has the defining power, defining power in the sense that it explains human actions, human linguistic behaviors, particularly meaning. So, in this sense Searle tries to give primacy to the intentional rather than the linguistic, for Searle intentionality is not linguistic, five intentionality is not linguistic, I will come back to these questions. One can critic Searle's position, but what is important here look at how Searle articulates, the notion of intentionality is a part of linguistic expressions.

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The slide is titled "Speech as expression" and is part of a presentation on "Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition". It lists several key concepts:

- Speech act: Illocutionary force
- F(P)
- Representative content → Direction of Fit
- Psychological Mode → Condition of Satisfaction
- Pm(Rc)

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
Now, when Searle says that speech is an expression, Searle says that we talk about P, P is a proposition and P has a kind of a force embedded in it and Searle calls it illocutionary force. In speech act often defines that there are three stages, one is the locutionary state, illocutionary states and the perlocutionary states. So, for the linguistic expressions are concerned, so the locutionary force is involved in the propositions or in the expression of the statement. So, whenever I say something, say P, then P also carries some kind of a force. For example, if I say close the door is an expression of a command close the door.

But, if I say please close the door, may be used in the sense of a request, so command, request are carrying some kind of a force and Austin calls them performative (()), Searle calls them speech acts. There is no difference between Searle and Austin here, because when Austin says by saying that please close the door I am performing an action, I am trying to say this with a particular force and Searle calls it a locutionary force, this illocutionary force will act in such a way that it will force the hearer to act in a particular or way.

Meaning there by the hearer will follow what is said and then he would perform what is desired. So, speech act is like performative act, now all performative acts have a content because when I say please close the door this statement has a content, it expresses the meaning and the hearer understands that meaning and reacts to the statement made by

the speaker. So, there is a representational content involved in the representational state expressed by the speaker.

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Searle says this representational state will have a direction of fit, now what is this direction of fit? As I mentioned to you earlier, that if x expresses P, P is a statement to the hearer, then the hearer listens to that statement and again reacts. If I say please close the door, then the hearer listen to the statement made by me and closes the door. So, when I say please close the door, I have this hope, of that is some kind of an expectation that the hearer will follow.

Now, when hearer does something meaning, thereby when hearer closes the door then this intentionality is from intentionality towards the speaker, so there are two kinds of intentionality operating here. One, the speaker, so when says something intentionality is from mind to the world, when the hearer is saying something then it is coming from world to the mind and that is what is called direction of fit.


So, in the case of speech act when the speaker performs an action and his desire is fulfilled then the direction of speech is achieved. And Searle points out that every statement is expressed with a psychological mode, it is not that just represented the content but there is a psychological mode involved in it. So, P n stands for the psychological mode, R c for representational content, so when the representational

content and psychological mode are involved in expression a speech act what is achieved is some kind of a condition of satisfaction.

Because I am satisfied, in the sense that what I was expecting is also fulfilled, so I say something and I expect certain things, I say that please close the door, but I also desire that the hearer would follow. But I said, but if the hearer does not follow it does not obey then I will express dissatisfactions, because expression of dissatisfaction is something which is essential for understanding meaning.

Because Searle says in the case of speech act the sincerity condition is violent, because whenever I expressed is made, this is made with an authority and the hearer would follow what the speaker says. If the hearer does not listen to what he said and expected whether (()), then there is a (()) of what kind of a linguistic activities. There is no direction of it, what is there is a kind of a dissatisfaction, because it violates the principle of condition of satisfaction according to Searle.

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
Now, as I mentioned earlier that the condition of satisfaction will talk about some kind of an internality that every illocutionary action and the sincerity condition, we will talk about some kind of an internality, that they it is me who is satisfied, it is my mind which is getting satisfied or a particular desire which is getting satisfied. So, desire is not available there, desire is very much part of my mental states, it is associated with other mental states.

It is part of my mind, so in **in** that sense Searle would try to show how mind and meaning are related, they are not to separate things, they are in fact relative to each other and this relationship can be explicated through intentionality. So, intentionality not only explains the meaning embedded in our linguistic activities but also explains our experiences, the structure of experiences, because it tries to explicate the structure of representational states or intentional states.

How intentional states has content and how this content brings satisfaction, so all that. So, whenever Searle will talk about intentionality, Searle talk about experience of the content of mental states and Searle will also suggest that this intentionality, the human intentionality is self referential, is self reflexive and that is what is shown when he talks about direction of fit. When I am seeing a particular object he says in the case of perception this self referentiality is explicit. When I say I am seeing the rose, the very fact that I am seeing the rose, I am experiencing the beauty that the rose has. Now, this experience is not only showing a kind of a intentionality connecting the subject to the object, but also experiencing the object in me, but there by Searle does not say that the content is an object, the content can be symbolized, can have a syntactic representation in my thought.

So, Searle differs very strongly from the other representationalist who argue that, intentionality is causally produced by certain mechanical function of the brain.

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The slide features a dark blue header with the text "Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition" in yellow and white. Below the header, the title "Concept of Representation" is centered in a large, bold, black font. Underneath the title, there are two bullet points: the first is "– Cognitive Science and AI" and the second is a quote: "– 'I am most emphatically not saying that a belief is a kind of picture, not am I endorsing Tractatus account of meaning nor I am saying that belief represents something.'" (1983: 9). In the bottom left corner, there is a circular logo with a red and yellow design and the text "NIPTEL" below it.

Now, according to them particularly the cognitive science and artificial intelligence theory of mind would try to show that there is a syntactic representation, where content can be computed. Now, **look** I would try to look at this quotation and please pay the attention to this, that I am mostly emphatically not saying that believe is a kind of a picture, not I am endorsing tractatus account of meaning, nor I am saying that believe represents something, something very important we look at. The tractatorian account of meaning suggest a representational theory of a meaning, Searle (()) says that language represents the world; propositions are the pictures of the world.

So, propositions have pictorial element in it, thoughts are expressed in propositions, so thoughts would also have the pictoriality in that. So, Searle is not accepting the tractatorian notion of representation, Searle is also not endorsing the notion of representation which is been argued by the coognitive scientist and people who are trying to study human mind **from** through artificial intelligence.

Because look at the notion of representations, belief is a representational state and belief when we syntactically computed will have a symbolic representation, but Searle does not believe that. According to Searle the content that is experienced by the subject is not to be characterize as an object, content is not an object of thought, whether content is just experienced, whenever I am perceiving certain things or seeing certain things or acting on certain things or saying certain things in the case of meaning, action, perception, intentionality is acting in the mode of intention in action. So, therefore, the content is being experienced by the subject, but content is not an object of our observation or experience. So, there is no syntactic representation of content possible according to Searle.

So, therefore, he strongly differs from **there** other representationalist, particularly the coognitive scientist and to some extent it differs from instanian notion of representation.

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Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

Searle on Representations

- Not syntactical
- Syntax will be causally determined
- Syntax in the computational process is observer relative
- For Searle, MR are related to feeling, experience, understanding, etc.

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So, in that sense, so the kind of theory of meaning advocating will be something very unique, we will study them in some other class, but let us look at what is sealer **on** notion of representation. Searle **on** notion of representation is not syntactical; syntax in the computational process is observational. I am sure those **are not** will explain when he would talk about Searles distinction between stronger I and weaker, **I** Searle puts **it** very emphatically that computers cannot think; now this sounds very typical of Searle.

When Searle says the computers cannot think what he means by this that computers do not have first order intentionality. The kind of intentionality which has been produced by the machines or the computers, the kind of intelligence which is shown by cognitive machines, which has this cognitive power or second order intentionality, biological intentionality is the first order intentionality. All biological beings, living beings will have first order intentionality and it was there is intentionality is something intrinsic to their consciousness.

It is something intrinsic to their life, whereas machine intentionality is a derived notion of intentionality, because whatever be is been there, whatever is being programmed are the representational states ascribe to certain machines. So, therefore, they are all desired intentionality, they will have second order intentionality and Searle also points out that an artificial system will not have life, the kind of consciousness, **we have** computer will not have.

So, to understand what consciousness is we need to understand what the concept of consciousness is and what kind of form of life human beings live. The computer does not fall in love, human beings fall in love, so falling in love is a kind of an experience which Searle will associate it strongly with human life, a human form of life. Whereas, in the case of computer that is absent.


So, that could be several other examples, other forms of life which human beings have, computer does not smile like human beings smile. Human beings smile is a meaningful, **one** they represent a meaning and they send a message to us. So, in that sense there are enormous attributes of human consciousness. Now, we will **be too** look at them and try to show how computers cannot have intentionality. Now, Searle's mental representation m r are related to feelings experience and understanding. So, when I say something, I understand this fact that what is being said or in other words, when I say something I mean whatever is said.

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Contemporary Issues in Philosophy of Mind & Cognition

Content

- Content is revealed in different modes of intentionality working together.
- Perception: seeing, experiencing, believing, hoping, ...
- Understanding and imagination are higher order consciousness.

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So, meaning presupposes understanding, in that sense the content is revealed in different modes of intentionality. As I mentioned earlier that the perception: seeing, experiencing, believing, hoping, etcetera are different kinds of experiences for different kind of expression of human intentionality in which the content of representational state is experienced. Understanding imagination are higher order conscious features or feature of human intentionality, because **in** animals do not understand a way human beings

understand, animals lack the power of imagination. As I mentioned that intentionality has self-referentiality, intentionality with the help of its self-referential feature tries to show that it is me who is acting.

The sense of identity is produced by the self-referential feature of intentionality, because the subject understands this fact that he is acting or she is acting, she is doing this, she is experiencing the object. So, the action is associated with the subject, which is very necessary when **you** one talks about the concept like moral responsibility. Animals do not have the sense of moral responsibility and what Searle calls the deontic power of intentionality. So, human intentionality is deontic, has a sense of right or wrong.

Human beings have drastic imaginations, they are engaged with creating new things, art, poetry are the manifestation of human imagination, aesthetic imagination. So, in that sense human intentionality is a very profound notion of intentionality and is different from the machine intentionality. The intentionality of an artificial system which is human intentionality shows how interacting with the world, how we are intentionally involved in the world. So, the performance of action, perception, meaning etcetera will project the significance of human intentionality.

So, with this I would like to conclude the lecture stating that Searle's theory of intentionality, would explain how intentionality is an intrinsic feature of consciousness. Searle's theory of intentionality will also suggest that it is different from Husserl's theory of intentionality, because Searle gives a causal account of intentionality and Husserl's gives a transcendental notion of intentionality, an epistemological account of intentionality. When Searle says intentionality is intrinsic to human mind, it is intrinsic because it is irreducible, it is not causally explained by certain function of the brain processes or it cannot be causally produced by certain mechanical function of a machine.

So, human intentionality is different. When we talk about human intentionality we look at the entire form of human life, the **((C))** of human life, then only we will understand what is consciousness and how consciousness is intensive; thank you.