


Introduction to Cryptology
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Lecture – 20
Problem discussion

Hello. This is the last lecture of our course Introduction to Cryptology. We will be doing some problems on hash functions. I believed that you have enjoyed this course and you have also participated in the discussion forums. This lecture will be on some constructions or basically some toy constructions of hash functions and we will be checking the kind of securities they do not have or sometimes they have. So, this is Example 1.

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Example 1

- Suppose that $f: \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ is a preimage resistant bijection. Define $h: \{0,1\}^{2m} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ as follows. Given $x \in \{0,1\}^{2m}$, write $x = x' || x''$ where $x', x'' \in \{0,1\}^m$. Then define
$$h(x) = f(x' \oplus x'').$$
 Prove that h is not second preimage resistant.

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Example 1 says that suppose we have a bijection from $0, 1$ raise to the power m to $0, 1$ raise to the power m which is preimage resistant. And suppose we are going for some kind of iterative construction with this bijection, the iterative construction goes this way. We are using x as a compression function and h is a function from $0, 1$ to the power twice m to $0, 1$ to the power. So, please read $0, 1$ to the power m . Let me write over here.

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I have a function which I claim to be a bijection and preimage resistant bijection from $0, 1$ to the power m to $0, 1$ to the power m that means, it takes m length string to m strings. And I am considering a function h from $0, 1$ to the power twice m to $0, 1$ to the power m , so there is a print here that will correct later. Now, how are we defining this function? Given an element x in $0, 1$ to the power twice m , we realize then we can split it into left half and right half. So, we will write x as x_1 concat x_2 where x_1 belongs to $0, 1$ or let us write them together x_1 and x_2 belongs to $0, 1$ to the power m . Then h of x is defined as f of x_1 bitwise XOR bit x_2 .

The question is, well I have used in the slide x prime and x double prime here I am using x_1 and x_2 that is understandable. So now, the question is that whether this is second preimage resistant or not. Now let us look at this function. Suppose that we have got a preimage image pair, so suppose x is a particular x this is equal to let us call it x_0 . So, suppose this x_0 splits up into x_0_1 and x_0_2 .

Or let me write like this here, suppose x_0 splits up as x_0 prime and x_0 double prime. I evaluate h on x_0 to obtain $f x_0$ prime XOR $f x_0$ double prime and I claim that I have this value. Now I have to find an x_1 which is not equal to x_0 and whose evaluation is this. This is not difficult because, suppose we take a string let us say 1 and all 0's, all together m bits belonging to $0, 1$ raise to the power m . Let us call this e_1 .

Now let us construct a function like this sorry, let us a construct a point x_1 which is this

$x \oplus 0 \oplus 1$ concat $x \oplus 0$ prime or $e \oplus 1$ and $x \oplus 0$ double prime $\oplus e \oplus 1$. Now one thing is sure that $x \oplus 0$ prime plus $e \oplus 1$ is not equal to $x \oplus 0$ prime, because if it happened then that would have meant $e \oplus 1$ equal to all 0 strings which is not so. It is also clear that $x \oplus 0$ double prime plus $e \oplus 1$ is not equal to $x \oplus 0$ double prime the argument is again same.

Therefore, we can say that $x \oplus 0$ is equal to $x \oplus 1$, but if we evaluate the hash function at $x \oplus 1$ let us see what happens. $h(x \oplus 1)$ equal to $h(x \oplus 0)$. We know that this is the left and this is the right half so we can directly write f of $x \oplus 0$ prime plus $e \oplus 1$ plus $x \oplus 0$ double prime plus $e \oplus 1$, and therefore f of $x \oplus 0$ prime plus $x \oplus 0$ double prime plus that is $\oplus e \oplus 1$ that is $\oplus e \oplus 1$. Now we know that $e \oplus 1 \oplus e \oplus 1$ bitwise is going to be 0 therefore I arrive at f of $x \oplus 0$ prime plus $x \oplus 0$ double prime which is equal to h of $x \oplus 0$. Thus, we see that we have obtained another point $x \oplus 1$ such that h of $x \oplus 1$ is equal to h of $x \oplus 0$, but $x \oplus 1$ is not equal to $x \oplus 0$. Thus, we have obtained a second preimage.

So, this is why this construction leads to hash function which is not second preimage resistant all though the compression function used is preimage resistant.

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
Example 2

- Suppose $h_1: \{0,1\}^{2m} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ is a collision resistant hash function. Define $h_2: \{0,1\}^{4m} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ as follows:
 - Write $x \in \{0,1\}^{4m}$ as $x = x_1 || x_2$, where $x_1, x_2 \in \{0,1\}^{2m}$.
 - Define $h_2(x) = h_1(h_1(x_1) || h_1(x_2))$.

Prove that h_2 is collision resistant.

Here we reclaim that we have a collision resistant hash function h_1 which is a compression function in fact and which is from $0, 1$ raise to the power $2m$ to $0, 1$ m.

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So, let me write it over here h_1 is a function from $0, 1$ raise to the power $2m$ to $0, 1$ raise to the power m is a collision resistant hash function or compression function. And we have a scheme here which says that here defining h_2 from 0 raise to the power $4m$ to $0, 1$ raise to the power m . As follows I take an element of x belonging $0, 1$ raise to the power $4m$ I split up into two parts each part belonging to $0, 1$ to the power $2m$. I am taking x inside $0, 1$, rise to the power $4m$ and split it up.

So I am splitting up x into x_1 plus x_1 concat x_2 , where x_1 and x_2 both are elements of $0, 1$ raise to the power $2m$ and then I use the original concat function, sorry original concat function. So, I get $h_2(x)$ is equal to h_1 of $h_1(x_1)$ concat $h_1(x_2)$ so this is my definition. Of course, h_1 can accept $2m$ bit string and here also h_1 can accept a $2m$ bit strings and h_1 maps any $2m$ bits strings to m bit strings so I get m bit string over here, I get a m bit string over here joining them I have a $2m$ bit string. So, again h_1 can accept this I apply h_1 on it and I get the value of h_2 . So, that is my construction.

Now I have asked to prove that h_2 is collision resistant. The question is how to prove this? What we do is that we in the beginning assumed that it is not collision resistant, suppose if possible h_2 is not collision resistant. That means that I should be able to pair an elements of $0, 1$ to the power m which are the same image.

Now let us denote this pair by symbols. So we have got a point is a x and x splits up as x_1 , suppose this is one number, one point and x' which splits as x'_1 concat x'_2

prime this is another string. And I am claiming that they are not same, x is not equal to x prime that is my claim have assume. Such that I assume that this gives a raise to a collision, so $h_2 x$ is equal to $h_2 x$ prime suppose that it happens.

Now let us try to see, what are the logical consequences of this assumption? If this is true that if I am able to find out collision in h_2 then from this I will have $h_1 h_1 x_1$ concatenation $h_1 x_2$ is equal to $h_1 h_1 x_1$ prime concatenation $h_1 x_2$ prime is my definition. Now one thing is clear to me that by my initial claim h_1 is collision resistant. Therefore, if h_2 is not collision resistant we arrive at an equation like this, and since h_1 is collision resistant then I cannot get a collision but this hash values are equal. That means, hash values are equal means this forces me to say that $h_1 x_1$ concatenation $h_1 x_2$ is equal to $h_1 x_1$ prime concatenation h_1 concatenation x_2 prime. I am forced to say this suppose it is not so that means I have obtained a collision of h_1 which is not possible

And therefore, since these two strings are equal then $h_1 x_1$ is equal to $h_1 x_1$ prime and $h_1 x_2$ is equal to $h_1 x_2$ prime. Well, again we know that h_1 collision resistant. So, when I am got an equation like this it forces me to say that x_1 is equal to x_1 prime and x_2 is equal to x_2 prime. That means, that this assumption contradicts this, but I am forced to say this because my basic claim is that h_1 is collision resistant. And therefore, I cannot assume that h_2 is not collision resistant, h_2 is also collision resistant.

So, what we see in this small problem is essentially what we studied in iterative construction and Merkle Damgard construction. In Merkle Damgard construction is more complicated and it is quite elaborate, but it achieves ultimately the same thing. It says that if you assume that the compression function used in Merkle Damgard construction is collision resistant then whatever you are going after iteration by using that rule is going to be collision resistant. Of course, this is not Merkle Damgard construction but this is another construction, but it shows the same kind of property.

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Example 3

- Let the input data be of the form $X = (X_0, X_1, X_2, \dots, X_{n-1})$ where each X_i is a byte. Consider the following hash function:
$$h(X) = X_0 + X_1 + X_2 + \dots + X_{n-1}$$

Where + stands for bitwise modulo two addition. Is this a secure hashing method in the sense that collisions are hard to find?

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Let us now move to the last problem of this session. This is a very easy problem will do this and close this series of lectures. For the time being it is a very easy problem. It just says that suppose that we have input data in the form capital x is equal to x_0, x_1, x_2 and to x_{n-1} such that x_i are bytes.

These are 8 bit segment. And suppose my hash function is just summing up all these things and let us assume that this sum is bitwise addition modular 2 bitwise XOR. And so the question is this secure, the answer is it is not secure.

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$n = 2$


$h(x_0, x_1) = x_0 + x_1$

$X_0 = 10101010$

$X_1 = 0000$


So, we will do it just by taking n equal to 2. If we have n equal to 2 and then the hash function is like let us say x_0 comma x_1 is sum $x_0 x_1$. So let us look at this as a closing remark, so we have got 2 bytes; one byte is 1 0 1 0 1 0.

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So, suppose I take x_0 equal to 1 0 1 0 1 0 and x_1 0 0 0 0 another 1 0 and x_1 is 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 add up 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1.

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So, my hash value is this. Now suppose I inverted the order. Suppose, I evaluated this over $x_1 x_0$ and of course this sequence $x_0 x_1$ is not equal to $x_1 x_0$ and then I also get

the same result, because this addition is commutative 00001111 and $x0$ is 10101010 so if I add up I will get 10100101 , the same. And therefore we have obtained a collision, and therefore this is not a secure hash function.

By this I end today's lecture and this is the last lecture of our course. I hope that you have enjoyed the course and I wish you all the best for the final examination.

Thank you very much.